Spencer v. Nev. Direct Insurance Co. ( 2015 )


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  •                 default judgment against Lopez and issued the declaratory relief that
    Nevada Direct sought, declaring, among other things, that Nevada Direct
    had no duty to defend or indemnify Lopez in the action brought by
    Spencer.
    Subsequently, Spencer and his insurance each filed motions
    for reconsideration raising, for the first time, that Nevada's financial
    responsibility laws applied, in particular NRS 485.3091(5)(a), and that
    even the failure of a supposed condition precedent to coverage—i.e. Lopez's
    alleged non-cooperation with Nevada Direct's investigation and defense—
    could not negate those protections. The district court denied these
    motions. After the timeline for appealing the existing judgment had
    passed, assuming that judgment was final, Spencer filed a motion for
    summary judgment on declaratory relief in the same action, arguing, once
    again, that Nevada's financial responsibility laws applied. The district
    court denied this motion, "in concurrence with its prior rulings in this
    matter." Spencer then appealed this denial.
    DISCUSSION
    We are inclined to agree with Spencer that the supposed
    failure of a condition precedent to coverage cannot defeat the protections
    of Nevada's financial responsibility laws given NRS 485.3091(5)(a). The
    section's text supports this outcome inasmuch as it provides that "[t]he
    liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance required by
    this chapter becomes absolute whenever injury or damage covered by the
    policy occurs," NRS 485.3091(5)(a) (emphasis added), and "the word
    'absolute,' as used in a motor vehicle financial responsibility act . . . means
    that there will be no defenses to liability of the insurer based . . . upon
    exclusions, conditions, terms, or language contained in the policy."
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    7A Steven Plitt et al.,      Couch on Insurance § 104:45 (3d ed. 2013)
    (emphasis added). The policy underlying our financial responsibility laws
    counsels likewise. See Hartz v. Mitchell, 
    107 Nev. 893
    , 896, 
    822 P.2d 667
    ,
    669 (1991) ("Nevada has a strong public policy interest in assuring that
    individuals who are injured in motor vehicle accidents have a source of
    indemnification. Our financial responsibility law reflects Nevada's interest
    in providing at least minimum levels of financial protection to accident
    victims."). And the precedent of foreign courts interpreting nearly
    identical statutes is in accord.   See Harris v. Prudential Prop. & Gas. Ins.
    Co., 
    632 A.2d 1380
    , 1382 (Del. 1993) (non-cooperation of insured cannot
    defeat application of absolute liability statute where innocent third party
    is injured); Dave Ostrem Imps., Inc. v. Globe Am. Cas./ GRE Ins. Grp., 
    586 N.W.2d 366
    , 368 (Iowa 1998) (condition precedent to coverage cannot
    defeat application of absolute liability statute); Teeter v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
    
    192 N.Y.S.2d 610
    , 615 (App. Div. 1959) ("It is impossible to reconcile the
    existence of a right to rescind ab initio with the general scheme of the
    compulsory insurance law."), aff'd, 
    173 N.E.2d 47
    (N.Y. 1961); cf. Kambeitz
    v. Acuity Ins. Co., 
    772 N.W.2d 632
    , 638 (N.D. 2009) (stating that foreign
    courts have "universally held or recognized" that an insurer cannot
    "retrospectively avoid coverage . . . so as to escape liability to a third
    party" on fraud and misrepresentation, grounds relating to the inception
    of the policy (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted)).
    However, we cannot, on this record, reverse the district court's
    declaratory judgment. Spencer brought no counterclaims in the original
    declaratory relief action, nor did he expand on the affirmative defenses
    incorporate[d]" by his insurance provider's answer, or even raise the
    existence of NRS 485.3091(5)(a) until after the declaratory relief issued.
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    And, that judgment disposed of all the issues presented by Nevada Direct's
    complaint in that it issued the very declaratory relief that Nevada Direct
    sought. Thus, the original declaratory judgment left nothing for the future
    consideration of the court in the matter and was final.   See Lee v. GNLV
    Corp., 
    116 Nev. 424
    , 426, 
    996 P.2d 416
    , 417 (2000). The district court
    therefore lacked jurisdiction to render a decision on Spencer's subsequent
    motion for summary judgment as there are a limited number of motions
    that may be filed once an un-appealed final judgment issues, of which a
    motion for summary judgment is not one.          See SFPP, L.P. v. Second
    Judicial Dist, Court, 
    123 Nev. 608
    , 612, 
    173 P.3d 715
    , 717-18 (2007). It
    follows that this court could not acquire jurisdiction over Spencer's appeal
    thereof. See Quintero v. United States, 
    281 F.3d 1279
    (5th Cir. 2001).
    Accordingly, Spencer's appeal must be DISMISSED.
    Parraguirre
    as
    J.
    Cherry
    cc:   Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge
    Salvatore C. Gugino, Settlement Judge
    Mueller Hinds & Associates
    Murchison & Cumming, LLC/Las Vegas
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    Nevada Division of Insurance
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    4
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Document Info

Docket Number: 64151

Filed Date: 5/1/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021