Finias (James) v. State ( 2015 )

 exchange for her testimony because he did not have a good faith basis to
make such an inquiry in the circumstances presented. See Daniel v. State,
119 Nev. 498, 513, 78 P.3d 890, 900 (2003) (requiring party to have good-
faith basis for inquiry about specific acts of misconduct).
Second, Finias argues that the district court erred in refusing
to give an instruction that Robinson was an accomplice and that her
testimony should be corroborated. We disagree. The record does not
indicate that Robinson was ever charged with or was liable for any offense
arising out of the shooting. See NRS 175.291(2) (defining an accomplice as
"one who is liable to prosecution, for the identical offense charged against
the defendant on trial"). Moreover, Robinson's testimony was
corroborated. Phone records placed Finias in the area of the shooting and
demonstrated that Finias was planning to meet the victim, Finias' DNA
was recovered from a cigarette at the scene, a weapon that was in Finias'
possession matched the shell casings left at the scene, and the condition of
the weapon confirmed that Finias damaged it after the shooting to thwart
forensic testing. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing the
proposed instruction. Rose v. State, 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 43, 255 P.3d 291,
295 (2011).
Third, Finias contends that the district court erred in
instructing the jury that direct evidence of a defendant's state of mind
may not exist and the jury may infer state of mind from the circumstances
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proved at trial.' We discern no abuse of discretion. Id. The given
instruction correctly states Nevada law. See Miranda v. State, 101 Nev.
562, 568, 707 P.2d 1121, 1125 (1985) ("The prosecution is not required to
present direct evidence of a defendant's state of mind as it existed during
the commission of a crime, and the jury may infer the existence of a
particular state of mind from the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence."), overruled on other grounds by Bejarano v. State, 122 Nev.
1066, 146 P.3d 265 (2006).
Fourth, Finias argues that the given instruction on the
presumption of innocence improperly reduced the State's burden of proof
because it did not define what elements were "material." 2 We disagree
because other instructions defined the elements of each charged offense
and the State's burden to prove those elements. Burnside v. State, 131
Nev., Adv. Op. 40, P.3d (2015); see also Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev.,
Adv. Op. 69, 263 P.3d 235, 259-60 (2011); Morales v. State, 122 Nev. 966,
971, 143 P.3d 463, 466 (2006); Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 751, 121
P.3d 582, 586-87 (2005); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209, 969 P.2d
'The challenged instruction reads: "A defendant's state of mind does
not require the presentation of direct evidence as it existed during the
commission of a crime. The jury may infer the existence of a particular
state of mind of a party from the circumstances disclosed by the evidence."
2 Thechallenged instruction reads: "The Defendant is presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the
State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material
element of the crime charged and that the Defendant is the person who
committed the offense."
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288, 296 (1998). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in giving the challenged instruction. Rose, 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 43, 255 P.3d
at 295.
Lastly, Finias argues that the cumulative effect of the errors
committed during his trial warrant reversal of his conviction. As Finias
has demonstrated no error, there is nothing to cumulate.
Having considered Finias' contentions and concluded that they
lack merit, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
\nusi /AIR , J.
Douglas Cherry
cc: Hon. David B. Barker, District Judge
Special Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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