Jones (Darryl) v. State ( 2013 )

 The district court denied this claim because this court rejected Jones'
contention that the search was illegal on direct appeal, see Jones v. State,
Docket No. 55508 (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and
Remanding, November 5, 2010), and therefore any argument would have
been futile. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103
(2006). We conclude that the district court did not err by denying this
claim.
Second, Jones argues that the district court erred by denying
his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to propose an instruction
defining "personal identification information." Jones asserts that, without
such a definition, the jury had no guidance in applying the law to the facts
and he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to seek such a definition
because the issue was not preserved for appeal.' The district court denied
this claim because Jones failed to demonstrate that the instructions given
were objectionable and did not establish legal cause for different
instructions. We note that Jones failed to suggest an appropriate
definition of "personal identification information," and the words are
"sufficiently definite that ordinary people using common sense could grasp
the nature of the prohibited conduct," Ford v. State, 127 Nev.
262 P.3d 1123, 1132 (2011) (quoting U.S. v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 147
(2d Cir. 2007)). We conclude that the district court did not err by denying
this claim.
'Jones also appears to claim that counsel was ineffective for failing
to challenge a statute as unconstitutionally vague. We decline to address
this claim because it is not supported by any authority or cogent
argument. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987).
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Third, Jones argues that the district court erred by denying
his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview James P.
Carney to determine whether he gave Jones permission to use his identity.
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and determined that
the claim was belied by the record because James P. Carney, the victim,
testified that he never gave Jones permission to use his identity.
However, Jones' argument indicated that counsel was ineffective for
failing to interview a different James P. Carney who Jones claimed lived
in California. Because Jones failed to establish that James P. Carney of
California's testimony would have been favorable, or that he even existed,
we conclude that the district court did not err by denying this claim. See
Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (noting that we
will affirm a decision of the district court if it reaches the right result,
even if for the wrong reason).
Fourth, Jones argues that the district court erred by denying
his claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview other
witnesses, subpoena bank policies and procedures, and subpoena bank
surveillance videos. The district court denied these claims because Jones
failed to identify what such investigations would have revealed and how
they would have changed the result at trial. See Browning v. State, 120
Nev. 347, 357, 91 P.3d 39, 47 (2004) ("[S]peculation does not demonstrate
prejudice."). We conclude that the district court did not err by denying
these claims.
Fifth, Jones argues that the district court erred by denying his
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to in-court
identification tainted by a photographic line-up. The district court denied
this claim because there was no indication that the photographic line-up
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was suggestive and thus any objection would have been futile. See Ennis,
122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103; see also Gehrke v. State, 96 Nev. 581,
583-84, 613 P.2d 1028, 1030 ("The test is whether, considering all the
circumstances, 'the confrontation conducted in this case was so
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification that (appellant) was denied due process of law." (quoting
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-302 (1967), disapproved on other
grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 326-27 (1987))). We
conclude that the district court did not err by denying this claim.
Sixth, Jones argues that the district court erred by denying his
claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating
evidence at sentencing and failing to argue for concurrent sentences. The
district court denied these claims because counsel adamantly argued on
Jones' behalf at sentencing. We conclude that the district court did not err
by denying these claims.
Seventh, Jones argues that the district court erred by denying
his claim that counsel's ineffectiveness, considered cumulatively, warrants
relief. The district court denied this claim because it found that counsel
was not ineffective. We conclude that the district court did not err by
denying this claim.
Having considered Jones' contentions and concluded that no
relief is warranted, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Gibbons
___, J. J.
Douglas Saitta
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cc: Hon. Doug Smith, District Judge
Matthew D. Carling
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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