Levine v. Hoag (Child Custody) ( 2015 )

 P.3d 1044, 1048-49 (2015). Here, the district court found that appellant's
motion failed to support his claim that he had custody more than 40-
percent of the time. Indeed, the record indicates that appellant did not
state the dates he claimed he had custody, and attached calendars with
illegible handwritten notations. Accordingly, we conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's request for a
modification of custody and we affirm this portion of the order.' NRCP
7(b)(1) (providing that written motions for court orders must "state with
particularity" the grounds for the requested order); see Wallace v. Wallace,
112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996) (providing that this court
reviews a district court custody order for an abuse of discretion); see
generally Rooney v. Rooney, 109 Nev. 540, 542, 853 P.2d 123, 124 (1993)
(holding that "a district court has the discretion to deny a motion to modify
custody without holding a hearing unless the moving party demonstrates
'adequate cause' for holding a hearing").
Appellant next challenges the district court's restriction on
filing future motions without first seeking permission from the district
court. 2 A court may on its own initiative impose sanctions on parties and
'Because appellant's failure to properly support his motion is
determinative as to appellant's request to modify custody, we need not
address the district court's additional reasons for denying appellant's
request and appellant's corresponding arguments on appeal regarding
custody modification.
2 The district court described the restriction as a "GOAD Order,"
presumably alluding to Goad v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1073, 1081-82
(S.D. Tex. 1987) aff'd in part and vacated in part, 837 F.2d 1096 (Fed. Cir.
1987). See Goad v. Rollins, 921 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1991). We note, however
that court-imposed restrictions on filing, like the one at issue here, are
governed by NRCP 11 and Nevada's vexatious litigant case law. See
continued on next page...
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA 2
(0) 1947A e
must tailor those sanctions to address filings that are brought for an
improper purpose. NRCP 11(b)(1), (c)(1)(B), and (c)(2); Jordan, 121 Nev.
at 56, 110 P.3d at 40. Such sanctions, however, may not be imposed
without first providing the offending party notice and opportunity to
respond. NRCP 11(c) and (c)(1)(B); see Jordan, 121 Nev. at 63, 110 P.3d at
44 (holding that a district court's sue sponte vexatious litigant order
entered without notice or opportunity to respond violated the litigant's due
process rights). Here, the district court provided no notice to the parties
prior to imposing its limitation on filing new motions. We therefore
conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the
restrictive order without first providing notice and an opportunity to
respond. NRCP 11(c)(1)(B); see NRS 125.090 (providing that family law
proceedings should conform to the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure as
nearly as conveniently possible); see also Office of the Washoe Cnty. Dist.
Attorney v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 629, 636, 5 P.3d 562, 566
(2000) (stating that orders imposing NRCP 11 sanctions are reviewed for
abuse of discretion on direct appeal). Thus, we reverse the district court
order as to its restriction on filing future motions with the court and
remand for further proceedings.
Finally, appellant asserts that the district court violated his
due process rights by not being sufficiently prepared for certain
proceedings in the case and truncating cross-examination during an
evidentiary hearing. Appellant, however, provides no transcript of any
...continued
generally Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121
Nev. 44, 56, 110 P.3d 30, 40 (2005), disavowed on other grounds by Buzz
Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 181 P.3d 670 (2008).
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A (740D
proceedings during which the alleged violations occurred, and thus he fails
to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion in this regard.
Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131,
135 (2007) (explaining that this court "generally cannot consider matters
not contained in the record on appeal" and "[w]hen an appellant fails to
include necessary documentation in the record, we necessarily presume
that the missing portion supports the district court's decision"); see NRAP
30(b)(1).
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN
PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the
district court for proceedings consistent with this order.
109,cc7c-
- J.
Parraguirte)
a.2
cc: Hon. Jennifer Elliott, District Judge, Family Court Division
Barnet LeVine
Mindy Hoag
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
4
(0) 1947A e