Gillespie (Levon) v. State ( 2014 )


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  •                 later, after the State sought permission to admit unfavorable evidence,
    Gillespie informed the court that he wanted to plead guilty pursuant to
    the negotiated agreement and had intended to do so all along. The State
    responded that the offer had lapsed, but noted that Gillespie was free to
    plead guilty to the charged crime without the negotiated benefits.
    Gillespie declined to do so, and the district court denied his request to
    plead guilty pursuant to the defunct agreement.
    First, Gillespie contends that his right to due process was
    violated because the district court rejected his plea to the reduced charge.
    Gillespie contends that the district court was required to accept his plea
    because the agreement never specified a time in which he had to enter the
    plea and he believed he could plead guilty at any time.      See Sullivan v.
    State, 
    115 Nev. 383
    , 387, 
    990 P.2d 1258
    , 1260 (1999) ("A plea agreement is
    construed according to what the defendant reasonably understood when
    he or she entered the plea."). Gillespie also contends that he detrimentally
    relied on the agreement by pleading guilty in his other case. See State v.
    Crockett, 
    110 Nev. 838
    , 844-44, 
    877 P.2d 1077
    , 1080 (1994). We reject
    each assertion and conclude that Gillespie's right to due process was not
    violated. It was Gillespie's actions, not the State's, which precluded him
    from entering a plea pursuant to the terms of the negotiated agreement.
    His assertion that he never requested a trial and always intended to plead
    guilty is belied by the record. We conclude that no relief is warranted.
    Second, Gillespie contends that the district court erred by
    admitting testimony that he was on parole during the incident as res
    gestae. Evidence of an uncharged bad act is admissible as res gestae if "it
    is so closely related to the act in controversy that the witness cannot
    describe the act without referring to the other uncharged act or crime."
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    Belton v. State, 
    121 Nev. 436
    , 444, 
    117 P.3d 176
    , 181 (2005). The evidence
    underlying the charge in this case was discovered by Gillespie's parole
    officer while conducting a random search of his reported residence.
    During the search, Gillespie reached for a large envelope. The officer
    briefly looked through the envelope and saw that it contained letters to
    inmates, with whom contact was prohibited by the conditions of Gillespie's
    parole. Suspicions aroused, the officer took the envelope and searched it
    on a later date, wherein she discovered credit card information of another
    person that had been reported as compromised. Because the officer could
    not reasonably explain how she discovered the evidence without
    explaining that Gillespie was on parole, we conclude that the district court
    did not abuse its discretion.'
    Third, Gillespie contends that the district court violated his
    right to due process and effective assistance of counsel by denying his
    requests for a continuance. "This court reviews the district court's
    decision regarding a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion."
    Rose v. State, 
    123 Nev. 194
    , 206, 163 13 .3d 408, 416 (2007). Gillespie
    asserted that a continuance was necessary because the decision to admit
    his parolee status required him to "reposition" his defense. The district
    court rejected Gillespie's assertion because he was aware that his parole
    status was an issue in the case. The district court also found that
    Gillespie's purportedly new defenses were essentially the same as those
    that existed before the evidence was admitted. We agree. Moreover,
    Gillespie fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the failure to
    "We also agree that this evidence was admissible pursuant to NRS
    48.045(2), as the State argued in the alternative below.
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    grant a continuance. See Higgs v. State, 126 Nev.       „ 
    222 P.3d 648
    ,
    653 (2010). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
    by denying his motion for a continuance.
    Accordingly, we
    ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
    Pickering
    cc:   Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge
    Clark County Public Defender
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney
    Eighth District Court Clerk
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Document Info

Docket Number: 64957

Filed Date: 12/11/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021