Lewis v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
AUSTIN LEWIS, AN INDIVIDUAL, No. 83079
Appellant,
vs.
MID-CENTURY INSURANCE FIL D
COMPANY,
Res i ondent. SEP 2 s 2012
A BROWN
E COURT
D PUP.' CLERZ
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This appeal challenges a summary judgment in a breach of
contract action. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Kathleen
M. Drakulich, Judge." While appellant Austin Lewis was driving his off-
road motorcycle on an off-road track, an underinsured driver caused an
accident, injuring Lewis. Lewis filed a claim with his insurance provider,
respondent Mid-Century Insurance Company (Mid-Century), seeking the
underinsured motorist policy limits of $250,000; however, Mid-Century
offered only the statutory minimum coverage of $25,000, asserting that an
exclusion provision applied. Lewis filed a breach of contract action, after
which the district court granted Mid-Century's motion for summary
judgment and denied Lewis' cross motion for partial summary judgment.
Lewis now appeals.
'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
(0) I997A
Lewis argues that the district court erred in determining that
the exclusion applied because, at the very least, the provision was
ambiguous as to whether it applied to his off-road motorcycle. Reviewing
de novo, see Wood v. Safeway, In,c., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029
(2005) (holding that a summary judgment is reviewed de novo); see also
Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161, 252 P.3d 668, 672
(2011) (reviewing the interpretation of an insurance policy, which presents
a legal question, de novo), we disagree.2
The insurance policy at issue provides that uninsured motorist
(UIM) coverage for damages beyond the minimum UIM liability limits
required by Nevada law "does not apply while occupying any vehicle owned
by you or a family member for which insurance is not afforded under this
policy or through being struck by that vehicle."3 In arguing that this
exclusion provision does not apply, Lewis focuses on the definition of "motor
vehicle" in the UIM definition section and argues that it excludes his off-
road motorcycle from the UIM exclusion provision:
2. Motor vehicle means a land motor vehicle or a
trailer but does not mean a vehicle:
2The parties do not address whether the UIM exclusion provision is
unenforceable on public policy grounds. See, e.g., Clark v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 1227, 1228 (Utah 1987) (noting public policy issues
related to restricting UIM coverage). We therefore express no opinion on
that matter.
3 The parties do not dispute that Lewis' off-road motorcycle was
"owned by [Lewis] or a family member," that insurance is not afforded for
the off-road motorcycle under the policy, or that the off-road motorcycle is
not listed on the policy's declaration page.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
11.)) 1947A
b. Designed principally for use off public roads,
including, but not limited to, dune buggies, go-
carts, all terrain vehicles of two or more wheels,
mini-bikes, farm tractors and other farm
equipment, stock cars and all other racing cars, and
all other vehicles of similar characteristics.
The exclusion provision, however, does not use the term "motor vehicle."
Instead, the exclusion provision references "any vehicle." The word "any"
ordinarily means "one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind" or "used
to indicate one selected without restriction." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 56 (11th ed. 2003) (emphases added); see also Siggelkow v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., 109 Nev. 42, 44, 846 P.2d 303, 304 (1993) (holding that we
interpret an insurance policy "with the terms of the contract viewed in their
plain, ordinary and popular sense"). Thus, the only reasonable
interpretation of the exclusion provision is that it applies to a broader group
of vehicles than "motor vehicles," including Lewis' off-road motorcycle. See
Century Sur. Co. v. Casino W., Inc., 130 Nev. 395, 398-99, 329 P.3d 614, 616
(2014) (holding that, to preclude coverage under an insurance policy's
exclusion provision, the insurer must, in relevant part, "demonstrate that
the interpretation excluding coverage is the only reasonable interpretation
of the exclusionary provision"). For these reasons, we conclude that the
policy did not create a reasonable expectation of coverage in the
circumstances presented. United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 120 Nev.
678, 684, 99 P.3d 1153, 1157 (2004) ("The question of whether an insurance
policy is ambiguous turns on whether it creates reasonable expectations of
coverage as drafted."). And thus, the district court did not err by finding
that the policy's UIM exclusion provision unambiguously applied to Lewis,
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NEVADA
3
(01 1947A 4S30.
such that he is barred frorn recovering under the policy in amounts
exceeding the statutory minimum.4 We therefore
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
, J.
Silver
Cii
Cadish
, J.
'
Picilem cur , J.
Pickering
cc: Hon. Kathleen M. Drakulich, District Judge
Jill I. Greiner, Settlement Judge
Galloway & Jensen
Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg
Washoe District Court Clerk
4 We decline to address Lewis' arguments regarding the parol evidence
rule, given that the district court did not rely on the rule in its decision. See
9352 Cranesbill Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 136 Nev. 76, 82, 459 P.3d 227, 232
(2020) (providing that "this court will not address issues that the district
court did not directly resolve"); Yellow Cab of Reno, Inc. v. Second Judicial
Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 583, 592 n.6, 262 P.3d 699, 704 n.6 (2011) (declining
to address a legal issue that the district court did not reach).
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OF
NEVADA
4
(0) I947A