Bellagio, LLC v. Dist. Ct. (Rhone) ( 2015 )

 burden of demonstrating that the extraordinary remedy of writ relief is
warranted. Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130
Nev., Adv. Op. 61, 331 P.3d 876, 878 (2014).
"[We] will only consider writ petitions challenging a district
court denial of a motion for summary judgment when no factual dispute
exists and summary judgment is clearly required by a statute or rule, or
an important issue of law requires clarification." Walters v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 66, 263 P.3d 231, 234 (2011).
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "no genuine issue of
material fact exists" and the party obtaining the judgment "is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 731,
121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005) (setting forth the standard for summary
judgment under NRCP 56).
In the present case, real party in interest Joyce Rhone was
working for her employer, petitioner Bellagio, LLC, when an off-duty
coworker attacked her. Rhone sued Bellagio and the coworker, alleging,
among other things, that Bellagio negligently hired, supervised, and
retained the coworker. Bellagio filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing in relevant part that (1) the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act
(NITA) provides Rhone's exclusive remedy and, thus, precludes her tort
claims and (2) Rhone's punitive damages claim was improper Rhone did
not file a motion for summary judgment to preclude Bellagio's use of the
NIIA exclusive remedy provision as an affirmative defense.
The district court denied Bellagio's motion with regard to the
application of the NIIA's exclusive remedy provision because it found,
based on the facts of the case, that Rhone's injuries were not causally
connected to her job. Thus, despite the fact that Rhone did not file a
motion for summary judgment, the district court summarily resolved the
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1.947A
issue of the application of the NIIA's exclusive remedy provision in her
favor. The district court denied Bellagio's motion for summary judgment
with regard to Rhone's punitive damages claim because it found that there
were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether punitive damages
could be supported. Bellagio then filed the present petition for a writ of
mandamus seeking intervention from this court to compel the district
court to grant its motion for summary judgment on these issues.
The district court erred by finding that the NIIA's exclusive remedy
provision could not apply in this case
When an employee is injured in the course of employment and
the injury arises out of the employment, the NIIA provides the employee's
exclusive legal remedy. NRS 616A.020(1); Fanders v. Riverside Resort &
Casino, Inc., 126 Nev. 543, 549, 245 P.3d 1159, 1163 (2010). "An injury is
said to arise out of one's employment when there is a causal connection
between the employee's injury and the nature of the work or workplace."
Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032. If an employee is attacked while
at work, the resulting injury can arise from the employment and be
subject to the NIIA if the employment created or increased the employee's
risk of being attacked. See Cummings v. United Resort Hotels, Inc., 85
Nev. 23, 27, 449 P.2d 245, 248 (1969). "However, workers' compensation
statutes do not apply when the animosity or dispute which culminates in
the assault is imported into the place of employment from the injured
employee's private or domestic life, . . . at least where the animosity is not
exacerbated by the employment." Wood, 121 Nev. at 734, 121 P.3d at 1033(internal quotations omitted); see also McColl v. Scherer, 73 Nev. 226, 230,
315 P.2d 807, 809 (1957) (stating the same).
In the present case, the district court found that the NIIA's
exclusive remedy provision did not apply to Rhone's claims because
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A
Rhone's resulting injuries were not related to risks associated with her
employment. This factual finding and the resulting legal conclusion were
made in error because the record reveals a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Rhone's employment caused or exacerbated her risk of
attack. See Wood, 121 Nev. at 731, 733-34, 121 P.3d at 1031-33. Because
the district court made factual determinations about material facts that
were in dispute and resolved an issue that was not presented to it in a
motion for summary judgment, extraordinary intervention is warranted to
correct the district court's determination that the NIIA's exclusive remedy
provision does not apply to Rhone's claims. Instead, that is a question to
be resolved by the jury. Therefore, we grant the petition in part and direct
the district court to vacate the portion of its order that found that the
NIIA's exclusive remedy provision does not preclude Rhone's tort claims.
Despite its factual findings that were made in error, however,
the district court's denial of Bellagio's motion was proper because the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment.
See Holcomb v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 56, 289 P.3d 188, 200
(2012) (affirming a district court order that reached the correct result
albeit for the wrong reasons). Thus, extraordinary intervention is not
warranted to reverse the portion of the district court's order denying
Bellagio's motion for summary judgment on this issue.
On the issue of punitive damages, Bellagio has an adequate remedy in the
form of an appeal and, thus, extraordinary relief is not warranted
The district court did not resolve the issue of whether Rhone is
entitled to recover punitive damages from Bellagio. Whether punitive
damages are recoverable is an issue that is readily reviewable on appeal.
See Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 474-75, 244 P.3d 765, 784-85 (2010).
Thus, Bellagio has an adequate and speedy remedy to address this issue
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
4
(0) 1947A e
should the district court permit Rhone to present this issue to the jury.
See D.R. Horton, 123 Nev. at 474, 168 P.3d at 736. Therefore, Bellagio has
not demonstrated that extraordinary intervention is warranted with
regard to this issue.
Conclusion
The district court erred by finding that the facts of the case
preclude the application of the NIIA's exclusive remedy provision because
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rhone's injuries
arose from a risk associated with her employment. However, because of
this genuine issue of material fact, the district court did not err by denying
Bellagio's motion for summary judgment on this issue. Furthermore,
Bellagio has not demonstrated that extraordinary relief is warranted with
regard to the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment on
the issue of punitive damages. Therefore, we
ORDER the petition GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED in
PART AND DIRECT THE CLERK OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT
OF MANDAMUS instructing the district court to vacate the portion of its
order that improperly found that the NIIA's exclusive remedy provision
does not preclude Rhone's tort claims.
C.J.
Hardesty
J.
Saitta
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
(0) 1947A cler.
cc: Hon. Rob Bare, District Judge
Kravitz, Schnitzer & Johnson, Chtd.
Harold P. Gewerter, Esq., Ltd.
Pitaro & Fumo, Chtd.
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
6
(0) 1947A catto