Wenker (Ronald) v. State ( 2013 )


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  •                 wide discretion in its sentencing decision, see, e.g., Houk v. State, 
    103 Nev. 659
    , 664, 
    747 P.2d 1376
    , 1379 (1987), and will refrain from interfering
    with the sentence imposed by the district court "[s]o long as the record
    does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of
    information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable
    or highly suspect evidence," Silks v. State, 
    92 Nev. 91
    , 94, 
    545 P.2d 1159
    ,
    1161 (1976).
    Wenker does not allege that this statement or any other
    evidence was founded on impalpable or highly suspect evidence but
    nonetheless contends that the district court abused its discretion by
    admitting the statement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Wenker
    has failed to demonstrate that the statement violated his rights under the
    Eighth Amendment. See McNelton v. State, 
    111 Nev. 900
    , 906, 
    900 P.2d 934
    , 938 (1995) (victim impact evidence is "not categorically barred by the
    Eighth Amendment") (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 
    510 U.S. 808
    , 825 (1991));
    see also State v. Martinez, 
    304 P.3d 54
    , 59 (Utah 2013) ("[T]he Eighth
    Amendment doctrine of Payne, which establishes an absolute bar on
    certain types of victim impact testimony, does not apply to sentencing
    proceedings where death is not an option."). NRS 176.145(1)(c) requires
    that presentence investigation reports contain, "[i]nformation concerning
    the effect that the offense committed by the defendant has had upon the
    victim. . . to the extent that such information is available from the victim
    ...continued
    issues for the first time in a reply brief. NRAP 28(c). Therefore, we
    decline to address these issues on appeal.
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    or other sources." "[T]he extent of the information to be included in the
    report is solely at the discretion of the Division." NRS 176.145(1)(c).
    Given that this court has held that it was not error for the district court to
    hear an oral victim-impact statement requesting that the defendants
    "spend the rest of their lives in jail," Randell v. State, 
    109 Nev. 5
    , 6-7, 
    846 P.2d 278
    , 279-80 (1993), we conclude that the district court did not abuse
    its discretion at sentencing by considering a similar statement in the
    Division of Parole and Probation's written report.
    Second, Wenker contends that the district court imposed a
    disproportionate sentence constituting cruel and unusual punishment in
    violation of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
    Wenker argues that because he is 65 years old and not likely to live to the
    age of 95, his sentence of three consecutive life terms, each carrying a
    minimum parole eligibility after 10 years, is unconstitutionally
    disproportionate to the gravity of his offenses because it amounts to a
    sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In other words, Wenker
    argues that his punishment is cruel and unusual because the last third of
    his life will likely be spent in prison. Wenker pleaded guilty to sexually
    assaulting and committing lewd acts with the child victim on multiple
    occasions over a period of five years, more than a third of the child's entire
    life. Wenker's sentence falls within the parameters provided by the
    relevant statutes, see NRS 201.230(2); NRS 200.366(2)(b), and we conclude
    that his sentence is not so unreasonably disproportionate to the gravity of
    the offenses as to shock the conscience, see Culverson v. State, 
    95 Nev. 433
    ,
    435, 
    596 P.2d 220
    , 221-22 (1979); Harmelin v. Michigan, 
    501 U.S. 957
    ,
    1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion); see also People v. Cisneros, 855 P.2d
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    822, 826 (Colo. 1993) (en bane) ("[M]itigating factors, such as the
    defendant's [old] age, are irrelevant in determining whether a punishment
    is proportionate to the crime under the Eighth Amendment"); United
    States v. Murphy, 
    899 F.2d 714
    , 719 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[Old] age is
    irrelevant to the validity of. . . sentences under the Eighth Amendment.").
    Therefore, Wenker's sentence did not amount to cruel and unusual
    punishment, and we
    ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
    /
    Hardesty
    J.
    cc:   Hon. Lidia Stiglich, District Judge
    Richard F. Cornell
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Washoe County District Attorney
    Washoe District Court Clerk
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 63416

Filed Date: 10/16/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014