Smith v. Dist. Ct. (Morgan) ( 2014 )

 Petitioner contends that he cannot be liable for the tortious
conduct of a tenant's minor child that allegedly occurred at a location
unrelated to the leased premises. Before the district court, real party in
interest alleged that a special relationship existed between petitioner and
his tenants, that petitioner knew of the minor child's dangerous
propensities, and that petitioner accordingly had a duty to protect third
parties from the minor child. The district court found that Nevada's
substantive law regarding the scope of a landlord's duty of care toward
third parties was unclear and that certain factual circumstances may have
existed such that petitioner had a special relationship with the tenants,
thereby giving rise to a duty to protect third parties.
Generally, a party owes no duty to a third person to control
actions of another, unless the party owes an affirmative duty of care to
that third person. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm § 37 (2012). A landlord owes a duty of reasonable care to
its tenants within the confines of the landlord-tenant relationship, but
does not have a broader duty extending beyond the leased premises and
the scope of that relationship. Id. § 40 & cmt. f & m.
After petitioner moved for summary judgment, asserting that
the injurious conduct bore no connection to his relationship with his
tenants and that he had no special relationship with his tenants
establishing an affirmative duty to real party in interest, real party in
interest, in opposing the motion, did not set forth specific facts
demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Wood
ix Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 732, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005). Further,
in the context of this writ proceeding, although this court entered an order
on April 17, 2014, directing real party in interest to file an answer against
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issuance of the requested writ by May 19, 2014, she has failed to file an
answer disputing petitioner's contentions that he cannot be liable to real
party in interest as a matter of law. Thus, we conclude that petitioner has
met his burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted,
that summary judgment is clearly required, and that the district court is
compelled to grant his motion for summary judgment. ANSE, Inc., 124
Nev. at 867, 192 P.3d at 742; Int? Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197, 179 P.3d
at 558; Pan, 120 Nev. at 228, 88 P.3d at 844; see NRS 34.160. Accordingly,
we
ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF MANDAMUS instructing the
district court to vacate its order denying petitioner's motion for summary
judgment and to grant summary judgment in favor of petitioner.
J.
J.
Parraguirre
Saitta
cc: Hon. Jerome T. Tao, District Judge
Upson Smith/Las Vegas
Homeowner Relief Lawyers LLC
Eighth District Court Clerk
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