Austerman (John) v. State ( 2014 )


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  •                 Both components of the inquiry must be shown, Strickland, 466 U.S. at
    697, and the petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts by a
    preponderance of the evidence, Means v. State, 
    120 Nev. 1001
    , 1012, 
    103 P.3d 25
    , 33 (2004). We give deference to the district court's factual
    findings if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but
    review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo.    Lader v.
    Warden, 
    121 Nev. 682
    , 686, 
    120 P.3d 1164
    , 1166 (2005).
    First, appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
    for arguing for life sentences in this case and for not presenting mitigating
    evidence. Appellant asserts that counsel's decision to argue for life
    sentences imposed to run concurrently with a life sentence imposed in
    another case was flawed because that case was not final (on appeal) when
    counsel made the argument and counsel failed to investigate this fact.
    Appellant fails to demonstrate that his counsel's performance
    was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant's counsel testified at
    the evidentiary hearing that he made a tactical decision to argue for
    concurrent life sentences based upon the resolution of the prior case (as
    resolved at the time of sentencing) and based upon the State's arguments
    at sentencing. Appellant's trial counsel further testified that he discussed
    with appellant various arguments that could be made at sentencing and
    that appellant agreed to the argument made by counsel. The fact that the
    other case was on appeal at the time of sentencing in this case and later
    reversed after sentencing in this case does not render trial counsel's
    decision and argument at the time of sentencing unreasonable as
    ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are viewed without the distorting
    effect of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Tactical decisions of
    counsel are virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances,
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    and appellant demonstrated no such extraordinary circumstances here.
    Howard v. State, 
    106 Nev. 713
    , 722, 
    800 P.2d 175
    , 180 (1990). Regarding
    the issue of mitigation evidence, counsel testified that he did discuss this
    with appellant. Appellant fails to demonstrate that there was a
    reasonable probability of a different outcome at sentencing had trial
    counsel not made the argument for concurrent sentences or presented
    mitigating evidence. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not
    err in denying this claim.'
    Second, appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective for
    coercing or misleading him into entering a guilty plea and not
    investigating his mental health issues. Appellant asserts that he was
    under the influence of psychotropic medications at the time of his plea and
    was confused.
    Appellant fails to demonstrate that his counsel's performance
    was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant failed to present any
    evidence of coercion at the evidentiary hearing. Appellant's counsel
    testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not tell appellant that he
    would not be adjudicated a habitual criminal and that he would receive
    three consecutive 4 to 10 year sentences. The district court determined
    that appellant's testimony to the contrary was incredible, and substantial
    evidence supports this determination. Appellant was personally
    canvassed about whether he had read the plea agreement, whether he had
    enough time to review the plea agreement with counsel, the elements of
    'To the extent that appellant argues the district court erred in
    refusing to consider letters submitted at the evidentiary hearing, we
    conclude that the district court did not err as those letters were not
    authenticated.
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    the offenses, the terms of the negotiations and the potential consequences,
    and appellant acknowledged that his plea was not the result of threats or
    promises not contained in the guilty plea agreement. Appellant further
    provided a factual basis for the counts in his own words, and appellant
    answered affirmatively that he was not under the influence of anything,
    was "clearheaded," and understood the proceedings. Appellant's trial
    counsel testified that he had no reason to believe appellant was
    incompetent to enter a guilty plea. Although appellant provided mental
    health records showing that he was medicated at the time of his plea, he
    fails to demonstrate that he was incompetent at the time of his plea—that
    he did not understand the proceedings or was unable to assist his counsel.
    See NRS 178.400(2); Melchor-Gloria v. State, 
    99 Nev. 174
    , 180, 
    660 P.2d 109
    , 113 (1983); see also Dusky v. United States, 
    362 U.S. 402
     (1960).
    Appellant fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different
    outcome had trial counsel further investigated his mental health issues.
    Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying this
    claim.
    Third, appellant argues that at sentencing the district court
    provided an incorrect statement of law regarding possible sentences under
    NRS 207.016(1), and thus, he should be resentenced. This claim is outside
    the scope of claims permissible in a post-conviction petition for a writ of
    habeas corpus challenging a judgment of conviction arising from a guilty
    plea. See NRS 34.810(1)(a). To the extent that appellant argues that the
    district court repeated this error at the evidentiary hearing, the district
    court did not rely on this alleged error in rejecting the claims of ineffective
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    assistance of counsel raised in the petition. 2 Finally, to the extent that
    appellant argues that the district court repeated its error in denying his
    motion for reconsideration, the denial of a motion to reconsider is not an
    appealable decision and any error in that proceeding cannot provide a
    basis for relief in this appeal. See Phelps v. State, 
    111 Nev. 1021
    , 1022-23,
    
    900 P.2d 344
    , 344-45 (1995); Castillo v. State, 
    106 Nev. 349
    , 352, 
    792 P.2d 1133
    , 1135 (1990). Accordingly, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
    J.
    Pickering
    -Ir2  Itatt-prr"
    Parrazuirre
    'I
    J.
    J.
    Saitta
    cc: Hon. Jerome Polaha, District Judge
    Edward T. Reed
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Washoe County District Attorney
    Washoe District Court Clerk
    The district court made only a brief reference to its understanding
    2
    of how NRS 207.016 operated. The written findings of fact and
    conclusions of law contain no reference to the court's interpretation of NRS
    207.016.
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