Lyons (Phillip) v. State ( 2014 )

 constituted an abuse of the writ to the extent he raised claims new and
different from those raised in his previous petitions. See NRS 34.810(2).
Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of
good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).
Moreover, because the State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was
required to overcome the rebuttable presumption of prejudice. MRS
34.800(2).
Appellant claimed that the procedural bars did not apply to
him because the filing of an amended judgment of conviction on May 17,
2013, restarted the one-year period for filing a post-conviction petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant's assertion was incorrect. The one-year
time period to challenge a conviction does not automatically restart simply
because the district court entered an amended judgment of conviction. See
Sullivan v. State, 120 Nev. 537, 541, 96 P.3d 761, 764 (2004). Rather,
entry of an amended judgment of conviction may explain a delay in filing
the petition if the petition raises claims challenging the amended
judgment of conviction or the proceedings leading up to the amended
judgment of conviction. Id. Here, the amended judgment of conviction
merely clarified when appellant would be eligible for parole on his life
sentence. The only claim in the petition that challenged the amended
judgment of conviction was appellant's claim that he was not represented
by counsel when the district court entered the amended judgment.
. . continued
post-conviction petition on February 3, 1992, but did not appeal the denial
of that petition.
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However, this claim lacked merit as appellant had no right to counsel in
the post-conviction proceeding that resulted in the amended judgment of
conviction. See NRS 34.750(1). His other claims did not challenge the
amended judgment of conviction and, thus, the amended judgment of
conviction did not provide good cause to excuse his procedural defects. See
Sullivan, 120 Nev. at 541-42, 96 P.3d at 764-65. Appellant also failed to
overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in
denying the petition as procedurally barred, and we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
J.
Pickering
J.
Parraguirre,
J.
Saitta
cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge
Phillip Jackson Lyons
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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