Oliphant v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. ( 2013 )

 condition does not automatically relieve a landowner from the general
duty of reasonable care. The fact that a dangerous condition may be open
and obvious bears on the assessment of whether reasonable care was
exercised by the landowner." Foster, 128 Nev. at , 291 P.3d at 152.
"[U]nder the Restatement (Third), landowners bear a general duty of
reasonable care to all entrants, regardless of the open and obvious nature
of dangerous conditions." Id. at , 291 P.3d at 156. The district court in
this case therefore erred in finding that any duty on the part of respondent
was negated by the open and obvious nature of the stopped escalator
based on this court's holding in Foster.
The district court also found that a stopped escalator is not a
"dangerous condition" on the basis that appellant did not provide evidence
of any rules, regulations, or codes that require the use of barricades or
signs for an escalator that is temporarily stopped. Appellant, however,
provided testimony from an experienced employee of the company that
serviced respondent's escalator, who testified that stopped escalators
should be barricaded because of the risk that a customer may not realize
that step heights on escalators are different than a regular stairwell. The
district court therefore erred in finding that appellant had failed to show
that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the
stopped escalator in this case was a dangerous condition and whether
respondent was negligent in failing to barricade the escalator or provide a
warning sign. Harrington v. Syufy Enters., 113 Nev. 246, 248, 931 P.2d
1378, 1380 (1997) (discussing that courts are reluctant to grant summary
judgment in negligence actions because whether a defendant was
negligent is generally a question of fact for the jury to resolve); Oehler v.
Humana, Inc., 105 Nev. 348, 350, 775 P.2d 1271, 1272 (1989) (holding that
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A
c;70T17:11: WAN BEREMERE
a district court may not grant summary judgment if a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party). Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
this order.
J.
Hardesty
&But
Parraguirre
cc: Eighth Judicial District Court Dept. 4
William F. Buchanan, Settlement Judge
Matthew S. Dunkley
Hansen Rasmussen, LLC
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A
KIZESEEIMERI z KIESIMESS111111