Sharpe (Raymond) v. State ( 2014 )

 officers that he had gone to get a bottle of water and did not know what
had happened to Grundy. At the house, police found multiple weapons
and discovered multiple vehicles, including some that were stripped.
Sharpe was arrested and ultimately charged with thirteen
separate counts, including nine counts resulting from the altercation with
Grundy and four counts resulting from the stripped vehicles found at the
house.' A jury convicted Sharpe on all counts, and he now appeals his
conviction on the following grounds: (1) there was insufficient evidence to
support his convictions on counts one to nine; (2) the prosecution engaged
in misconduct warranting reversal of his convictions; (3) the district court
erred in allowing an amended superseding indictment, adding four
charges, only a few days before trial; (4) the district court erred in failing
to sua sponte sever the fraudulent activity charges; (5) the district court
improperly precluded a defense witness from testifying; (6) the district
court erred in denying his motions for new trial; and (7) cumulative error
warrants a new trial. Because we conclude that Sharpe's claims of error
are meritless, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
'Sharpe was charged with the following counts: (1) coercion; (2) first
degree kidnapping with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial
bodily harm; (3) battery constituting domestic violence resulting in
substantial bodily harm; (4) battery constituting domestic violence with
use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm; (5) burglary;
(6) living with a prostitute; (7) living from the earnings of a prostitute; (8)
pandering with force; (9) assault with a deadly weapon; (10) operate
premise to alter, destroy or disassemble motor vehicles; (11) possession of
stolen vehicle; (12) possession of stolen property; and (13) deface, destroy
or alter identification number or mark. Four additional firearms charges
were originally included in the indictment, but those charges were severed
prior to trial.
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Sufficiency of the evidence
Sharpe argues that his convictions on counts one to nine
should be set aside because the State failed to present sufficient evidence
to sustain each of the crimes charged. We disagree. To assess the
sufficiency of the evidence, we ask "whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 202, 163 P.3d 408, 414 (2007)
(internal quotations omitted). In rendering its decision, the jury is tasked
with "assess[ing] the weight of the evidence and determin[ing] the
credibility of witnesses." Id. at 202-03, 163 P.3d at 414 (internal
quotations omitted). A jury is permitted to rely on both direct and
circumstantial evidence in returning its verdict. Wilkins v. State, 96 Nev.
367, 374, 609 P.2d 309, 313 (1980). This court has consistently held that
"circumstantial evidence may constitute the sole basis for a conviction."
Canape v. State, 109 Nev. 864, 869, 859 P.2d 1023, 1026 (1993); see also
Deveroux v. State, 96 Nev. 388, 391, 610 P.2d 722, 724 (1980).
Sufficient evidence supports count one - coercion
Sharpe challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the
coercion charge, arguing that Grundy's inconsistent testimony failed to
establish the necessary elements of the crime. NRS 207.190(1)(a)
provides, in pertinent part, that it is unlawful to "[u]se violence or inflict
injury" in order to "compel another to do or abstain from doing an act
which the other person has a right to do or abstain from doing." The State
presented testimony from two of Sharpe's neighbors who testified that
they saw Sharpe come out of his house, grab Grundy by her hair, and drag
her into his house. Multiple Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD) officers and a private investigator also testified that Grundy told
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them that Sharpe dragged her back into the house against her will.
Although Grundy testified at trial that it was Sharpe's cousin, not Sharpe,
who came out and escorted her back into the house, the jury was free to
weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses,
including Grundy. See Rose, 123 Nev. at 202-03, 163 P.3d at 414. We
conclude that the testimony, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Sharpe
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of count one.
Sufficient evidence supports count two — first-degree kidnapping with
the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm
Sharpe argues that the State failed to show that he "moved"
Grundy, a required element of the crime charged. NRS 200.310(1)
provides that "[a] person who willfully seizes, confines, . . kidnaps or
carries away a person by any means whatsoever with the intent to hold or
detain" is guilty of first-degree kidnapping. In addition to the testimony
recounted above, the record also demonstrates that once Sharpe dragged
Grundy back into his house, he immediately began loading a gun and
threatening to kill Grundy if the police showed up. Viewing the evidence
presented in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that
any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Sharpe was guilty of count two.
Sufficient evidence supports counts three and four — battery
constituting domestic violence resulting in substantial bodily harm;
battery constituting domestic violence with use of a deadly weapon
resulting in substantial bodily harm
Sharpe was convicted of battery constituting domestic violence
resulting in substantial bodily harm, and battery constituting domestic
violence with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily
harm. Sharpe argues that there was no evidence a battery took place.
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"Battery' means any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the
person of another." NRS 200.481(1)(a). Grundy testified that Sharpe
kicked her during their altercation. The State also presented testimony
from four different law enforcement officers who all stated that on the day
of the incident Grundy told them that Sharpe had pistol-whipped her,
despite Grundy's trial testimony to the contrary. Additionally, the medical
evidence adduced at trial showed that on the day of the incident Grundy
was treated at the hospital for a contusion and laceration near her right
eye. We conclude that the testimony, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to
find Sharpe guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of counts three and four.
Sufficient evidence supports count five - burglary
Sharpe argues that he was wrongly convicted of burglary. "[A]
person who, by day or night, enters any house . . . with the intent to
commit grand or petit larceny, assault or battery on any person or any
felony, or to obtain money or property by false pretenses, is guilty of
burglary." 2 NRS 205.060(1). This court has further clarified that "forcible
entry is not an element of burglary," and a person commits burglary when
entering the premises "with a felonious intent." Hernandez v. State, 118
Nev. 513, 531, 50 P.3d 1100, 1113 (2002). Testimony adduced at trial
demonstrated that subsequent to Grundy fleeing to the neighbors' house
after the initial altercation, Sharpe dragged her back into the house where
he immediately began loading a gun and threatening to kill her if the
2 Sharpe did not raise, and we do not consider, the effect, if any, his
ownership of the house would have on the elements of burglary. We note,
however, that Sharpe maintains he did not occupy the residence at the
time of the incidents that led to his convictions.
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police showed up. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Sharpe formulated the intent to assault 3
Grundy before he re-entered the house with her.
Sufficient evidence supports count six – living with a prostitute
Sharpe was convicted of living with a prostitute. NRS
201.360(1)(e) makes it a felony to "Mive[ ] with. . . a common prostitute."
Sharpe argues the State did not prove that he resided at the residence
during the relevant time frame alleged in the indictment—between March
1, 2011 and July 2, 2011. However, the statute of limitation on a crime of
this nature is three years, see NRS 171.085(2), and, timing is not an
essential element of a crime charged pursuant to NRS 201.360(1)(e).
Because timing is not an essential element of the crime
charged, the State only needed to prove that Sharpe resided with Grundy
at the residence sometime in the three years prior to the filing of the
indictment. See Arnold v. United States, 336 F.2d 347, 353 (9th Cir. 1964)
(stating that "the date of an alleged offense as stated in the indictment is
not binding so as to limit the proof to that specific date; . . . the proof may
fix the offense on any date within the bar of the [s]tatute of [1]imitations")
(quoting Winslett v. United States, 124 F.2d 302, 303 (5th Cir. 1941))); see
also Wilson v. State, 121 Nev. 345, 368-69, 114 P.3d. 285, 301 (2005)
(noting that "there is no requirement that the State allege exact dates
unless the situation is one in which time is an element of the crime
3 "Assaule means: (1) Unlawfully attempting to use physical force
against another person; or (2) Intentionally placing another person in
reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm." NRS
200.471(1)(a)(1)-(2).
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charged[,] . . . provided that the dates listed are sufficient to place the
defendant on notice of the charges").
An LVMPD officer testified at trial that on July 2, 2011,
Grundy told him that the home she resided in was owned by Sharpe and
that Sharpe had last stayed at the house about four months prior to the
altercation. The State also introduced photographic evidence depicting
letters and packages, addressed to Sharpe and to his alias Rashad
Shelton, that were found in the house with dates ranging from 2000 to
2009. Other evidence introduced at trial included the discovery of two
men's size bullet proof vests in the master bedroom and multiple weapons
found throughout the residence, including rifles and hand guns, all of
which according to Grundy belonged to Sharpe. Finally, Sharpe's two next
door neighbors who testified stated that Sharpe was their neighbor,
although they acknowledged that they were uncertain whether he was
actually living at the house in July 2011. Given the evidence adduced at
trial, we conclude that there was substantial evidence presented for the
jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Sharpe was guilty of
count six.
Sufficient evidence supports court seven — living from the earnings of
a prostitute
Sharpe was also convicted of living from the earnings of a
prostitute. "A person who knowingly accepts, receives, levies or
appropriates any money or other valuable thing, without consideration,
from the proceeds of any prostitute" is guilty of living from the earnings of
a prostitute. NRS 201.320(1). At trial, an officer testified that Grundy
told him that she was a prostitute and Sharpe was her pimp. Grundy also
told the officer that she had recently tried to give Sharpe $40,000 to "get[ ]
out of the game." According to Grundy, Sharpe took the money but then
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told her on the day of the incident that she was not done. Further, an
LVMPD detective testified that Grundy indicated she worked as a
prostitute for Sharpe and that she gave Sharpe between $30,000 and
$40,000 of her prostitution earnings at a time. Viewing this testimony in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that any rational
trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Sharpe was
guilty of count seven.
Sufficient evidence supports count eight — pandering with force
Sharpe contends that there was insufficient evidence as to
count eight because there was no evidence that Grundy was ever "caught
in a single act of prostitution with [him]." However, the statutes under
which Sharpe was charged contain no such requirement. NRS 201.300(1)
(2011) provides that any person who "[i]nduces, persuades, encourages,
inveigles, entices or compels a person to become a prostitute or to continue
to engage in prostitution. . . is guilty of pandering." Additionally, the
penalty is enhanced "[i]f physical force or the immediate threat of physical
force is used." NRS 201.300(2)(a)(1) (2011).
Several witnesses testified that Grundy told them that she
was a prostitute, that Sharpe was her pimp, and that she had attempted
to quit prostitution by paying him $40,000, but that he would not let her
go and had become physically violent with her. Furthermore, a detective
testified that Grundy told him that Sharpe became physically violent
towards her because Sharpe believed Grundy was giving another man her
prostitution earnings. The detective additionally testified that Grundy
told him that Sharpe forced her to become a prostitute at age 17 or 18.
Viewing this testimony in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Sharpe was guilty of count eight.
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Sufficient evidence supports count nine — assault with the use of a
deadly weapon
Finally, Sharpe challenges whether the State presented
sufficient evidence to convict of him of assault with a deadly weapon. A
person commits an assault by either "[u]nlawfully attempting to use
physical force against another person;" or "[i] ntentionally placing another
person in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm." NRS
200.471(1)(a)(1)-(2). This court has held that an assault must go beyond
[m]ere menace"; rather "[t]here must be an effort to carry the intention
into execution." Anstedt v. State, 89 Nev. 163, 165, 509 P.2d 968, 969
(1973) (quoting Wilkerson v. State, 87 Nev. 123, 126 482 P.2d 314, 316
(1971)).
Multiple witnesses testified that Grundy stated that Sharpe
had pointed a gun at her head and verbally threatened to shoot her if the
police showed up. The State also presented evidence of a loaded rifle that
was found behind the couch cushions in the living room and testimony
from an LVMPD forensic analyst who stated that Sharpe's palm print was
found on that rifle. We conclude that this evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of
fact to find Sharpe guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of count nine.
The State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct
Sharpe asserts that there were instances of prosecutorial
misconduct during his trial that mandate reversal of his convictions. In
assessing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, this court must first
determine whether the prosecutor's conduct was improper, and if so, the
court must then determine whether such conduct warrants reversal.
Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008). Acts of
misconduct will not warrant reversal if they are determined to be
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harmless error. Id. However, in order to apply harmless-error review, the
defendant must have objected to the misconduct at trial. Id. at 1190, 196
P.3d at 477. If not objected to, then this court applies plain-error review.
Id. Under plain-error review, an act of misconduct "does not require
reversal unless the defendant demonstrates that the error affected his or
her substantial rights, by causing 'actual prejudice or a miscarriage of
justice.' Id. (quoting Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95
(2003)).
Sharpe first claims that the State improperly implied the
existence of DNA evidence, which was not available at the time of trial,
when it questioned an LVMPD crime scene analyst as to whether she had
attempted to collect DNA samples from certain pieces of evidence found at
the scene. The State argues that it did not imply that such evidence was
inculpatory, but rather merely introduced evidence that samples had been
collected from certain pieces of evidence while acknowledging that testing
results from the DNA samples collected were not yet available. This was
so that the jury would not speculate as to why the State did not admit any
DNA evidence.
In United States v. Manning, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals considered comments made by a prosecutor concerning the lack of
useable fingerprint evidence on a key piece of evidence. 23 F.3d 570, 572
(1st Cir. 1994). The court stated that "[i]nfosfar as the comments were
intended to relieve the jury of any misapprehension that there were no
fingerprints on these items, these comments were not
improper . . . . [however, the insinuation that the partial prints were
inculpatory. . . was impermissible." Id. at 573. Here, because the
prosecutor did not attempt to imply that the DNA collected was
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inculpatory, we conclude that there was no prosecutorial misconduct in
this instance.
Sharpe next asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct
by commenting on facts not in evidence. Specifically, during the
prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument, she referenced a towel, visible in
one of the State's photographs, and indicated that perhaps the towel was
used to wipe any blood off the guns found in the home. 4 Sharpe contends
that because the State presented no evidence that this towel was ever
tested for blood or body fluid, and no witness testified about the towel, the
State went beyond fair comment on the evidence. The State argues that
the prosecutor can ask the jury to draw logical inferences from the
evidence, and it never specifically said that the towel contained blood.
Generally, it is improper for the prosecutor to make reference
to evidence not offered at trial. See Miller v. State, 121 Nev. 92, 100, 110
P.3d 53, 59 (2005). And, while the prosecutor may have gone too far in
commenting on evidence not introduced at trial, we nevertheless conclude
that her comments do not constitute plain error. 5 Sufficient evidence was
presented to show that Grundy was pistol-whipped by Sharpe, including
Grundy's statements and medical evidence as to her injuries.
Furthermore, the State clearly informed the jury that it had not received
4The prosecutor commented as follows: "Now, Mr. Stein also, going
back to the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, ridiculed the State's
evidence about the guns in the drawer saying there's no blood on those
guns either. . . . [There] is a towel. . . . Something got wiped off."
5 Sharpe made no objection during the trial to the prosecutor's
comments. Thus, they are reviewed for plain error. See Valdez v. State,
124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008).
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back any results from the testing done on DNA collected at the scene.
Therefore, Sharpe has failed to demonstrate "actual prejudice or a
miscarriage of justice" warranting reversal. Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1190, 196
P.3d at 477 (internal quotations omitted). 6
The district court did not err when it arraigned Sharpe on the superseding
indictment without informing him that he could continue the arraignment
until after he received a copy of the grand jury transcript
Sharpe next contends that the district court violated the Due
Process Clause when it arraigned him three days after a superseding
indictment was returned against him, which added four additional
charges. He contends the district court was required to inform him of his
right to continue the arraignment and the entrance of his plea until ten
days after receipt of the grand jury transcript under NRS 172.225(4). The
State argues that the Due Process Clause does not require the district
court to inform Sharpe of his right to review the grand jury transcripts
before arraignment, and that the plain meaning of NRS 172.225 required
Sharpe to make a motion for a continuance. The State further argues that
the district court did not commit error, even if the Due Process Clause
requires the court to inform Sharpe of the statute, because the court did
query Sharpe regarding his decision to waive his right.
In Nevada, a defendant who did not receive a copy of the
grand jury transcript "is entitled upon motion to a continuance of the
defendant's arraignment until a date 10 days after the defendant actually
6 Sharpealso contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
questioning a witness as to the maximum penalty for a misdemeanor
battery. However, Sharpe cites no authority for his contention that this
was error; thus, we do not consider this argument. See Tinch v. State, 113
Nev. 1170, 1175 n.3, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064 n.3 (1997).
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receives a copy." NRS 172.225(4). Here, Sharpe failed to make the
required motion under the statute. Moreover, during the arraignment, the
district court asked Sharpe if he had a chance to review the new charges
and if he wished to continue to invoke his right to speedy trial, "knowing
that [it would] preclude [his] attorney from being able to review the
transcript and possibly file a writ of habeas corpus." Sharpe responded in
the affirmative. Thus, even if the Due Process Clause required the district
court to inform Sharpe of his right to continue the arraignment, we
conclude that the district court complied with this requirement and no
error was committed. 7
The district court did not err by failing to sua sponte sever the newly added
fraudulent activities charges from the original charges
Sharpe argues that the district court had an affirmative duty
to sever the offenses under NRS 174.165 because "it appears that a
defendant or the State of Nevada is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses."
NRS 174.165(1). The State argues that Sharpe was required to make a
motion and that the district court has no duty to sua sponte sever the
charges.
Regardless of whether the district court should have sua
sponte severed the charges or whether Sharpe was first required to file a
motion for severance, Sharpe has failed to demonstrate substantial
prejudice or show that failure to sever the charges detrimentally affected
the jury's verdict. See Tabish v. State, 119 Nev. 293, 304, 72 P.3d 584, 591
7 We note that Sharpe fails to cite authority to support his position
that due process required the district court to specifically inform him of
his right to continue the trial, and we thus do not address this argument
here. See Tinch, 113 Nev. at 1175 n.3, 946 P.2d at 1064 n.3.
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(2003) (stating that "[t]he test is whether joinder is so manifestly
prejudicial that it outweighs the dominant concern with judicial economy
and compels the exercise of the court's discretion to sever" (quoting
Honeycutt v. State, 118 Nev. 660, 667, 56 P.3d 362, 367 (2002), overruled
on other grounds by Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765, 121 P.3d 592, 596
(2005))); see also Mitchell v. State, 105 Nev. 735, 739, 782 P.2d 1340, 1343
(1989) (stating that errors resulting from misjoinder will be reversed "only
if the error has a 'substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict" (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S.
438, 449 (1986))). Rather, Sharpe merely argues that the four additional
counts were unrelated to the original charges and "fundamentally changed
both the prosecution and defense at trial" without offering any explanation
of how that change was injurious or influenced the jury. Thus, we
conclude that reversal is not warranted.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding a defense
witness from testifying
Next, Sharpe argues that the district court impermissibly
excluded his cousin Eugene Smith from testifying in violation of the Sixth
Amendment. The State argues that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it did not permit Smith to testify because Sharpe knew
prior to trial that Smith was a potential witness, and Smith did not have
proper testimony to give. "This court reviews a district court's decision
whether to allow an unendorsed witness to testify for abuse of discretion."
Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 819, 192 P.3d 721, 729 (2008).
"A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not
unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions." United States
v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that the exclusion of evidence in a criminal trial abridges
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an accused's right to present a defense only where the exclusion is
"arbitrary or disproportionate to the purpose[ it is] designed to serve." Id.
at 308 (internal quotations omitted).
Under NRS 174.234(1), both the prosecution and the defense
must submit to each other, at least five days prior to trial, written notice
of all witnesses they intend to call. In this case, Sharpe first indicated his
intent to call Smith as a witness on the fifth day of trial. The district court
determined that Sharpe should have known of Smith's potential value to
his case prior to trial. We agree.
In Grundy's initial statements made to a detective on the day
of the altercation, she indicated that Smith was present in the house that
day. Furthermore, although defense counsel claimed to have only learned
of Smith during Grundy's trial testimony, in his opening statement, he
specifically referred to the fact that a "cousin" was present in the house
and witnessed the events. And, defense counsel specifically stated it was
the "cousin" who went across the street and escorted Grundy back into the
house. In addition, Grundy testified that Smith witnessed the whole
incident and was the one who brought her back into the house. If that
were the case, then Sharpe knew that Smith was an eyewitness who could
rebut many of the crimes charged against him, and he withheld that
information from his attorney. Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Smith's testimony.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sharpe's motions
for new trial
"The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on
appeal absent palpable abuse." Domingues v. State, 112 Nev. 683, 695,
917 P.2d 1364, 1373 (1996) (quoting Pappas v. State ex rel. Dep't of
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Transp., 104 Nev. 572, 574, 763 P.2d 348, 349 (1988)). Sharpe first argues
that the district court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial
based on the district court's exclusion of Smith. The State argues that
Sharpe has not shown how the court's enforcement of NRS 174.234
violated his constitutional rights or that the district court's denial of the
motion was an abuse of discretion. Because we conclude that the district
court properly excluded Smith from testifying at trial, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new
trial on this basis.
Sharpe also argues that newly discovered evidence of text
messages indicating a romantic relationship between Grundy and LVMPD
Detective Christopher Baughman created grounds for the district court to
grant Sharpe's motion for a new trial. Sharpe contends that the district
court should have granted the motion because the evidence was not
disclosed to Sharpe before trial and, if it had been presented to the jury, a
different outcome would have occurred.
If a defendant makes a motion within two years of conviction,
the district court may grant a motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. NRS 176.515(3). The test to apply when considering
whether to grant a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence is
as follows:
(1) the evidence must be newly discovered; (2) it
must be material to the defense; (3) it could not
have been discovered and produced for trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (4) it
must not be cumulative; (5) it must indicate that a
different result is probable on retrial; (6) it must
not simply be an attempt to contradict or discredit
a former witness; and (7) it must be the best
evidence the case admits.
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Hennie v. State, 114 Nev. 1285, 1289-90, 968 P.2d 761, 764 (1998).
Applying this test to the facts presented in this case, we conclude that the
district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Sharpe's motion
on this basis.
First, our review of the record demonstrates that the evidence
was not newly discovered. During trial, Sharpe's attorney specifically
asked Detective Baughman whether he exchanged text messages with
Grundy. When Detective Baughman stated that he had, Sharpe's attorney
then proceeded to question Detective Baughman about the content of
specific text messages, particularly those mentioning Sharpe. Looking to
third factor, even if Sharpe did not know about all of the text messages
prior to trial, it is evident that he had obtained at least some of them.
Thus, the rest could "have been discovered and produced. . . with the
exercise of reasonable diligence." Hennie, 114 Nev. at 1290, 968 P.2d at
764. Finally, Grundy testified unwillingly for the State, seemingly altered
her testimony in favor of Sharpe by changing her story, and claimed that
she lied to detectives at the scene. Thus, Grundy was clearly not biased
toward the State by this alleged relationship. Therefore, the only
potential impact of the text messages goes to Detective Baughman's bias.
A motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence should be
denied if it is "simply. . . an attempt to contradict or discredit a former
witness." Id.Cumulative error does not warrant reversal
Finally, Sharpe argues that cumulative error violated his right
to a fair trial. Cumulative error may deny a defendant a fair trial even if
the errors, standing alone, would be harmless. Valdez v. State, 124 Nev.
1172, 1195, 196 P.3d 465, 481 (2008). "When evaluating a claim of
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cumulative error, we consider the following factors: ``(1) whether the issue
of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the error, and (3) the
gravity of the crime charged." Id. (quoting Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1,
17, 992 P.2d 845, 854-55 (2000)).
Although Sharpe attempts to argue that the crimes charged
against him were not as serious as "crimes against children or violent
crimes that result in significant injury and/or death," there is no basis for
his argument. He was charged with a number of serious crimes, including
kidnapping and assault. Because we have concluded that Sharpe's
assignments of error are meritless, we further conclude that Sharpe's
cumulative error challenge is unavailing.
For the reasons set forth above, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
62.4
_1
664 (VP J.
Pickering
cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge
Donald J. Green
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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