Mehoves v. Mehoves ( 2013 )

 amount respondent had deducted from her spousal support obligation for
one child's oral surgery and orthodontics over the preceding months,
arguing that such expenses were not medically necessary. On July 20,
2011, the district court entered an order denying the motion. Appellant
appeals from that order.
On appeal, appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion in concluding that the expenses associated with the oral surgery
and orthodontics were medically necessary and that he should not be
responsible for those expenses because respondent took the children to
out-of-service care providers. The appellate record does not support
appellant's argument that the medical procedures at issue here were
unnecessary, and thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in rejecting this assertion and concluding that appellant was
responsible for those medical expenses. See Edgington v. Edgington, 119
Nev. 577, 588, 80 P.3d 1282, 1290 (2003) (explaining that this court
reviews a district court's child support award for an abuse of discretion);
see also NRS 125B.020(1) (requiring a parent to provide his or her child
with necessary health care); NRS 125B.080(7) (providing that parents
generally equally share the expenses for a child's healthcare, including
"medical, surgical, dental, orthodontic and optical expenses"). As for
appellant's argument pertaining to respondent allegedly taking the
children to out-of-service healthcare providers, this argument is being
raised for the first time on appeal, and thus, the argument has been
waived and we will not consider it in resolving this appeal. See State Bd.
of Equalizaiton v. Barta, 124 Nev. 612, 621, 188 P.3d 1092, 1098 (2008)
(providing that "this court generally will not consider arguments that a
party raises for the first time on appeal"). Accordingly, we affirm the
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district court's July 20, 2011, order requiring appellant to pay one half of
the children's medical expenses.
Appellant also challenges the district court's October 4, 2011,
order that denied his motion for an immediate release of his share of
respondent's retirement benefits acquired during the marriage.
Respondent worked at her current job throughout the marriage and
acquired retirement benefits. After the divorce decree was entered, a
qualified domestic relations order was entered, which provided that
appellant would receive his share of respondent's retirement benefits
acquired throughout the marriage upon respondent's retirement.
Appellant moved the district court for the immediate delivery of his share
of those retirement benefits upon respondent's eligibility to retire, and the
district court denied the motion.
Appellant argues on appeal that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion because the court had previously
informed him that he would receive his share of respondent's retirement
benefits upon her eligibility for retirement, instead of upon her retirement.
The previously entered qualified domestic relations order, however,
provided that appellant would receive his share of the retirement benefits
upon respondent's retirement, not upon her eligibility to retire. Thus, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
appellant's request for the immediate release of his share of those
retirement benefits, see Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 1359, 929 P.2d 916,
918-19 (1996) (providing that this court reviews a division of community
property for an abuse of discretion), and we affirm the district court's
October 4, 2011, order denying appellant's request for his share of
respondent's retirement benefits.
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Lastly, appellant argues that the district court was biased in
presiding over the underlying case, but he never properly sought
disqualification of the district court judge by filing an affidavit specifying
the basis for the disqualification. See NRS 1.235(1) (requiring a party
seeking disqualification of a district court judge to file an affidavit
detailing the facts demonstrating the disqualification is necessary). Thus,
appellant has waived this issue on appeal. See Brown v. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ins. Corp., 105 Nev. 409, 412, 777 P.2d 361, 363 (1989) (explaining that a
party waives the issue of disqualification on appeal if that party does not
properly request disqualification). For the reasons discussed above, we
ORDER the judgments of the district court AFFIRMED.
J.
Hardesty
Parraguirre
J.
cc: Hon. Michael P. Gibbons, District Judge
Jeffrey A. Mehoves
Barbara L. Mehoves
Douglas County Clerk
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