Bowles (Travis) v. State ( 2013 )

 (1986) (observing that trial courts retain wide latitude to impose
reasonable limits on cross-examination).
Bad acts evidence
Bowles contends that the district court erred by admitting
evidence of an uncorroborated, uncharged, and irrelevant prior bad act.
We review the district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence of
other bad acts for an abuse of discretion and will not reverse absent
manifest error. Ledbetter v. State, 122 Nev. 252, 259, 129 P.3d 671, 676
(2006). The record reveals that Bowles moved to redact the portion of the
police interview transcript where he had described "an instance where he
had gone into the bedroom and was masturbating and the younger girl
walked in on him and he explained what was going on." The district court
ruled that this statement was relevant to the victim's knowledge of
masturbation and when she may have secured this knowledge. See NRS
48.045(2). We conclude that Bowles has not demonstrated that the district
court committed manifest error in this regard. See Bigpond v. State, 128
Nev. 270 P.3d 1244, 1250 (2012) (describing the test for
admission of prior bad acts).
Psychological evaluations
Bowles contends that the district court erred by finding no
compelling need for an independent psychological evaluation of the
victims. "The decision to grant or deny a defendant's request for a
psychological examination of a child-victim is within the sound discretion
of the district court and will not be set aside absent an abuse of
discretion." Abbott v. State, 122 Nev. 715, 723, 138 P.3d 462, 467 (2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The record reveals that Bowles
argued for an independent psychological evaluation of the victims based
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on a psychological evaluation made by the Washoe County Department of
Social Services, a West Hills Hospital report indicating that other experts
"potentially questioned the emotional ability of these children to relate
information," and changes to the victims' statements over time. The
district court evaluated the documents, observed that the State was not
calling any psychological experts, and found no compelling need for an
independent psychological evaluation of the victims. We conclude that
Bowles has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion in this regard. See generally id. at 718, 138 P.3d at 464(reinstating the test in Koerschner v. State, 116 Nev. 1111, 13 P.3d 451(2000), for determining whether to order an independent psychological
evaluation of a child victim in a sexual assault case).
Bowles also contends that the district court erred by denying
his discovery request for existing reports on the victims and the State
committed misconduct by failing to provide them. "We review the district
court's resolution of discovery disputes for an abuse of discretion." Means
v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1007, 103 P.3d 25, 29 (2004). The record reveals
that the State filed a supplemental notice of expert witnesses and
indicated that these witnesses may be called during rebuttal. Bowles
requested the experts' written reports, stated that he was entitled to the
reports by statute, asserted that the reports contained exculpatory
information, and admitted that he had a copy of a report containing
exculpatory information. The district court ruled that the State did not
have to produce documents that Bowles already possessed and Bowles
could renew his motion if the State called the experts as rebuttal
witnesses. We conclude from this record that Bowles has failed to
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in resolving this
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discovery dispute or that the State committed misconduct by failing to
provide the expert witnesses' reports.
Defense witness testimony
Bowles contends that the district court erred by limiting
testimony offered to show inconsistencies in the victims' statements and
the State's allegations. "A trial court has broad discretion to determine
the admissibility of evidence, and its determination to admit or exclude
evidence is given great deference and will not be reversed absent manifest
error." Vega v. State, 126 Nev. „ 236 P.3d 632, 638 (2010) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). The record reveals that Bowles
presented Jeffrey Allen, a licensed marriage and family therapist, as a lay
witness and offered his testimony to the district court, outside the
presence of the jury, for consideration. Allen testified that he was a
mandatory reporter, had worked with children who were sexually abused,
had worked with the Bowles family in their home on a weekly basis, and
did not see anything to indicate that sexual abuse occurred in that home.
The district court ruled that Bowles had not fulfilled the expert notice
requirements, Allen could not testify as an expert that he would have
noticed if sexual abuse was occurring in Bowles' home, and the hearsay
testimony offered for consideration was inadmissible. We conclude from
this record that Bowles has failed to demonstrate that the district court's
ruling constituted manifest error. See NRS 50.265 (lay witness
testimony); NRS 51.035 (defining hearsay); Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1,
14, 992 P.2d 845, 853 (2000) (a witness who fails to qualify as an expert is
not permitted to testify unless he may otherwise be considered a lay
witness).
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•
Bowles also contends that the district court erred by
prohibiting testimony regarding a victim's mental health because the
testimony would have allowed the jury to better assess her credibility. We
review for manifest error. Vega, 126 Nev. at , 236 P.3d at 638. The
record reveals that Bowles argued that one of the victims attempted to
harm herself three months after she was removed from his residence, the
victim's attempt to harm herself indicates that she has emotional issues,
and the jury should know about these emotional issues so that it may fully
assess her credibility. The district court found that the victim's attempt to
harm herself occurred after the times relevant to this case, there was no
evidence that the victim's emotional issues were ongoing, and there was
no evidence that the victim lacked comprehension or was emotionally
compromised at the time of her testimony. The district court ruled that
the proposed testimony concerning the victim's attempt to harm herself
was irrelevant. We conclude from this record that Bowles has failed to
demonstrate that the district court's ruling constituted manifest error.
See NRS 48.015 (defining relevant evidence).
Jury instructions
Bowles contends that the district court erred by giving an
incomplete lewdness instruction and rejecting his reasonable doubt
instruction. "The district court has broad discretion to settle jury
instructions, and this court reviews the district court's decision for an
abuse of that discretion or judicial error." Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744,
748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). The record reveals that the district court
gave instructions on lewdness that accurately reflected Nevada law and
fully apprised the jury of the elements of that offense and gave the
reasonable doubt instruction required by statute. See NRS 175.211; NRS
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201.230(1); Garcia v. State, 121 Nev. 327, 339-40, 113 P.3d 836, 844 (2005)
(discussing the constitutionality of NRS 175.211(1)). Accordingly, we
conclude that Bowles has failed to demonstrate that the district court
abused its discretion or committed judicial error.
Jury voir dire
Bowles contends that the district court erred by unfairly
limiting his voir dire of the prospective jurors. "[T]he scope of voir dire
examination is within the sound discretion of the district court and the
court's determination is accorded considerable latitude on appeal."
Stephans v. State, 127 Nev. , 262 P.3d 727, 735 (2011) (citing
Cunningham v. State, 94 Nev. 128, 130, 575 P.2d 936, 937-38 (1978)). The
record reveals that the district court held a hearing on the parties'
proposed voir dire questions and ruled that Bowles could not ask questions
that were argumentative or covered topics that the jury would need to be
instructed on. We conclude that the district court did not unreasonably
restrict Bowles' examination of the prospective jurors and Bowles has
failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. See
NRS 175.031.
Having considered Bowles' contentions and concluded that he
is not entitled to relief, we
ORDER the judgwnt of conviction AFFIRMED.
Gibbons
t/Lvi IP-s
k ,J J.
Douglas Saitta
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cc: Hon. Connie J. Steinheimer, District Judge
Law Office of Thomas L. Qualls, Ltd.
Attorney General/Carson City
Washoe County District Attorney
Washoe District Court Clerk
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