Simmons (Kenneth) v. State ( 2013 )


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  •                 date of the crimes. The jury found Simmons guilty of all the crimes listed
    in the judgment of conviction.
    Simmons now appeals, arguing that (1) the district court erred
    in overruling his objection to the racial composition of the jury venire,
    where two of sixty-five prospective jurors were African-American; (2) the
    district court violated NRS 175.061(5) and committed reversible error in
    selecting the alternate jurors at the end of trial by means of a lottery
    system; and (3) cumulative error warrants reversal. We conclude that
    cumulative error warrants reversal because Simmons' constitutional right
    to a fair and impartial jury was compromised when the district court gave
    inadequate consideration to Simmons' objection to the jury venire and
    inhibited Simmons' statutory right to assert peremptory challenges.
    Because of the cumulative error, we reverse the judgment of conviction. 1
    1 Simmons    also contests that (1) the district court erred in providing
    a video playback of testimony and abused its discretion in playing part of
    the witnesses' testimony without admonishing the jury as to how to
    consider it; (2) the district court erred by giving various jury instructions;
    (3) the district court abused its discretion in admitting a DNA report into
    evidence, denying Simmons' motion for a mistrial because of this evidence,
    precluding Simmons from admitting into evidence photographs of his
    genitalia, admitting testimony about him being in foster care, and
    precluding him from cross-examining Smith about a sexually transmitted
    disease; (4) the district court erred in admitting Smith's testimony on
    Simmons' statements about being in a gang and getting away with murder
    and rape; (5) the district court engaged in prejudicial ex parte
    communications with the jury and abused its discretion in denying a
    motion for an evidentiary hearing and a new trial because of these
    communications; (6) the district court erred in allowing a nurse to give her
    opinion that Smith's injuries were consistent with the reported sexual
    assault; (7) the district court erred in violating NRS 193.165(1) by failing
    to state on the record its basis for imposing the additional penalties for
    continued on next page . . .
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    As the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do
    not recount them further except as necessary for our disposition.
    Simmons' objection to the racial composition of the jury venire
    Noting that two of the sixty-five prospective jurors were
    African-American, Simmons objected to the venire's racial composition,
    asserting that there was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a
    venire that included a fair cross-section of the community. Without asking
    the State for its response or asking Simmons if he could make a showing of
    a constitutional violation, the district court overruled the objection after
    stating that the selection process for the venire was random. As this issue
    implicates a constitutional right to a venire that is selected from a fair
    cross-section of the community, we review the issue de novo.        See Grey v.
    State, 
    124 Nev. 110
    , 117, 
    178 P.3d 154
    , 159 (2008) (providing that de novo
    review applies to constitutional challenges).
    A defendant "is entitled to a venire selected from a fair cross
    section of the community under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of
    the United States Constitution." Williams v. State, 
    121 Nev. 934
    , 939, 
    125 P.3d 627
    , 631 (2005). The Constitution mandates that the "'venires from
    . . . continued
    Simmons' use of a deadly weapon; (8) the district court erred in requiring
    Simmons to pay $250 to the indigent defense fund without a hearing on
    his ability to pay that amount; (9) the district court erred in denying
    Simmons' pretrial writ of habeas corpus; and (10) there was insufficient
    evidence for a verdict against him. As discussed later in this order within
    our cumulative error analysis, we conclude that the State presented
    sufficient evidence for the jury's verdict. But, we do not reach the
    remaining issues because we reverse on other grounds.
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    which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups
    in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative
    thereof." Id. at 939-40, 
    125 P.3d at 631
     (quoting Evans v. State, 
    112 Nev. 1172
    , 1186, 
    926 P.2d 265
    , 274 (1996)). In contesting the venire's
    composition, the defendant has the burden of proof and must show a
    prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement by exhibiting
    (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
    "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the
    representation of this group in venires from which
    juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in
    relation to the number of such persons in the
    community; and (3) that this underrepresentation
    is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
    jury-selection process.
    Duren v. Missouri, 
    439 U.S. 357
    , 364 (1979).
    Simmons objected to the venire's racial composition, which
    implicated his Sixth Amendment rights. Rather than giving due
    consideration to the objection, the district court was inattentive to the
    possibility of a constitutional right being violated. The district court did
    not ask Simmons if he could make a prima facie showing of a violation of
    the Constitution's fair-cross-section requirement, nor did it seek a
    response from the State. It noted the objection, stated that the selection of
    the jury venire was random, and moved on without developing a record
    that would permit this court to address the constitutional issue. As a
    result, the district court denied Simmons an opportunity for a meaningful
    review of whether his constitutional rights were violated. We do not
    address whether the district court's err was reversible error on its own
    because we conclude that it contributed to the cumulative error that
    requires reversal, as discussed below.
    4
    Simmons' right to use a peremptory challenge under NRS 175.061(5)
    The district court decided that the alternate jurors would be
    selected by a lottery system at the conclusion of closing arguments.
    Simmons objected, arguing that the lottery system prevented him from
    knowing the alternates' identities in advance, thereby hindering his right
    to use a peremptory challenge against them under NRS 175.061(5).
    Relying on Moore v. State, 
    122 Nev. 27
    , 
    126 P.3d 508
     (2006), the district
    court determined that the jury selection process did not affect Simmons'
    substantial rights and overruled the objection.
    On appeal, Simmons argues that the district court abused its
    discretion and committed reversible error in using a lottery system to
    select alternate jurors at the end of trial. He asserts that the system
    prevented him from knowing the identity of the alternate jurors in time to
    use the peremptory challenge that NRS 175.061(5) provides for such
    j urors   . 2
    We review the use of the lottery system for abuse of discretion.
    See United States v. Springfield,       
    829 F.2d 860
    , 863-64 (9th Cir. 1987)
    (reviewing a district court's process for the selection of jurors and the use
    of peremptory challenges for abuse of discretion). Yet, our review of the
    statutes that govern juror selection is de novo.       See State v. Lucero, 127
    2 Simmons,
    in passing and without pertinent authority, concludes
    that this abuse of discretion was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
    due process rights. We do not address this constitutional argument
    because Simmons does not cogently argue the purported constitutional
    violation of NRS 175.061(5), see Maresca v. State, 
    103 Nev. 669
    , 673, 
    748 P.2d 3
    , 6 (1987) (providing that this court need not address arguments
    that have not been cogently made), and because we consider the violation
    of NRS 175.061(5) as part of the cumulative error that requires reversal.
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    Nev.            
    249 P.3d 1226
    , 1228 (2011) ("[W]e review questions of
    statutory interpretation de novo.").       In interpreting a statute, we
    effectuate the Legislature's intent, which is first ascertained from the
    statute's plain meaning. 
    Id.
     In so doing, we do not go beyond the statute's
    language when it is clear and unambiguous. 
    Id.
    NRS 175.061(5) clearly provides for a peremptory challenge
    against an alternate juror and limits the use of that challenge to removing
    an alternate juror. It states that "[e]ach side is entitled to one peremptory
    challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed by law if one or two
    alternate jurors are to be impaneled."      
    Id.
       It further states that this
    "additional peremptory challenge[ ] may be used against an alternate juror
    only." 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    In Moore, the district court violated NRS 175.061(5) when it
    used a blind-alternate system for selecting alternate jurors that left the
    alternate jurors' identities unknown until jury selection ended. 122 Nev.
    at 36, 126 P.3d at 514. Without knowledge of the alternates' identities,
    the defendant's right to use a peremptory challenge under NRS 175.061(5)
    was inhibited. Id. But because the defendant did not object, the Moore
    court reviewed the statutory violation for plain error and concluded that
    the blind-alternate system did not violate any of the defendant's
    substantial rights. Id. at 37, 126 P.3d at 514.
    Here, much like the blind-alternate system in Moore, the
    lottery system impaired Simmons' right to use a peremptory challenge
    against an alternate juror under NRS 175.061(5). But, unlike the
    defendant in Moore, Simmons objected. The district court's demand that
    Simmons state a substantial right that was being harmed likely arose
    from its misapprehension as to why the Moore court focused on
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    substantial rights in its disposition—plain error review applied to the
    issue because of the absence of an objection. See id. at 36-37, 126 P.3d at
    514. Moreover, the district court overlooked the Moore court's conclusion
    that the use of blind alternates violated NRS 175.061(5). See id. at 37, 126
    P.3d at 514. Hence, the district court's decision here to use its lottery
    system, despite knowing that it violated NRS 175.061(5), was an abuse of
    discretion. We do not address whether this abuse of discretion was
    reversible error on its own because we conclude that it contributed to the
    cumulative error requiring reversal, as addressed below.
    Cumulative error
    The cumulative effect of errors, which alone could be
    harmless, "may violate a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial."
    Hernandez v. State, 
    118 Nev. 513
    , 535, 
    50 P.3d 1100
    , 1115 (2002). In
    evaluating cumulative error, we consider "(1) whether the issue of guilt is
    close, (2) the quantity and character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the
    crime charged."    Mulder v. State, 
    116 Nev. 1
    , 17, 
    992 P.2d 845
    , 854-55
    (2000).
    The issue of guilt
    In determining whether the issue of guilt is close, we start by
    resolving whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury's verdict. To
    assess the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask "whether, after viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
    of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt." Nolan v. State, 
    122 Nev. 363
    , 377, 
    132 P.3d 564
    , 573
    (2006) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
    Battery and battery with the intent to commit sexual assault
    Under both the battery statute and the battery with the intent
    to commit sexual assault statute, battery is defined as "any willful and
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    unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another." NRS
    200.400(1)(a); NRS 200.481(1)(a). 3 The term "use" is singular, thereby
    signifying that each single use of force or violence is subject to punishment
    as a battery; the term "any" modifies the word "use," thereby expanding
    the types of force and violence that are punishable as a battery.    See NRS
    200.400(1)(a); NRS 200.481(1)(a). Hence, the battery statutes' language
    permits the separate punishment for each unlawful use of force or violence
    that occurs during a criminal episode.
    Smith's and Bolt's testimonies identify two separate acts of
    battery—one at the crib and one on the bed. Smith and Bolt each testified
    that Simmons put his hand around Smith's throat and forcibly held her
    against the crib. This was an unlawful use of force. Thus, Smith's and
    Bolt's testimonies provided sufficient evidence to support Simmons'
    conviction of battery. According to Smith's testimony, Bolt broke up this
    violent altercation, after which the second battery occurred on the bed.
    Smith testified that after Bolt ended the first altercation, he showered,
    during which time Simmons forced Smith onto the bed, wrapped his hands
    around Smith's neck, made her undress, and sexually assaulted her.
    Thus, after a temporal break that followed the first battery, Simmons
    committed another unlawful use of force on the bed, which was followed by
    the sexual assault. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to sustain
    Simmons' conviction of battery with the intent to commit sexual assault.
    3 The 2013 Legislature amended NRS 200.481. 2013 Nev. Stat., ch.
    343, § 137, at 80. While the amended language does not appear to change
    the court's analysis, the appeal is governed by the pre-amendment version
    of NRS 200.481. See NRS 200.481 (2012).
    8
    Sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon and first-
    degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon
    One commits sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon if
    he or she "subjects another person to sexual penetration, or. . . forces
    another person to make a sexual penetration on himself or
    herself. . . against the will of the victim," NRS 200.366(1), and does so by
    using a deadly weapon. NRS 193.165(1), (5). One commits first-degree
    kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon if he or she "willfully seizes,
    confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries
    away a person by any means whatsoever with the intent to hold or detain,
    or who holds or detains, the person. . . for the purpose of committing
    sexual assault," NRS 200.310, and does so by using a deadly weapon.
    NRS 193.165(1), (5). A deadly weapon is an instrument that is "readily
    capable of causing substantial bodily harm." NRS 193.165(6)(b). Using a
    deadly weapon includes "conduct which produces a fear of harm or force by
    means or display of a deadly weapon."      Carr v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 
    95 Nev. 688
    , 690, 
    601 P.2d 422
    , 424 (1979).
    As to sexual assault with a deadly weapon, Smith testified
    that Simmons threw her on the bed and threatened to kill her. She
    further testified that Simmons waived a knife to her face while
    threatening to use it against her and that she saw Simmons bend over the
    bed with the knife and resurface without it—thus appearing to have
    placed the knife under the mattress. The knife was six to eight inches
    long and was deeply serrated. According to Smith's testimony, despite her
    not consenting, Simmons sexually penetrated her with his penis. Smith's
    testimony provided sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that
    Simmons displayed a knife to Smith just prior to the nonconsensual sex,
    thereby using a knife to overcome her will as part of the sexual assault.
    Thus, there was sufficient evidence for Simmons' conviction of sexual
    assault with a deadly weapon.
    As to first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon,
    Smith testified that before Simmons' first act of battery, she attempted to
    leave the studio, but Simmons grabbed her arm and stopped her. She
    tried numerous times to leave, but Simmons continued to physically
    prevent her from doing so. Bolt testified that just before the first act of
    battery, she overheard Simmons threaten to use the knife on Smith. She
    also testified that the knife was in plain sight because it was on a table.
    Smith's and Bolt's testimonies provided enough evidence for the jury to
    conclude that Simmons threatened Smith with a knife that was visible to
    Smith while Simmons physically kept Smith inside the studio, so as to
    sexually assault her. Hence, Smith's and Bolt's testimonies provided
    sufficient evidence to support Simmons' conviction of first-degree
    kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon.
    The evidence was not overwhelming
    Although the evidence of guilt was sufficient for the jury's
    verdict, it was not overwhelming. Smith's testimony provided much of the
    evidence of Simmons' guilt. Yet, with respect to how long Smith stayed in
    Bolt's studio, the people who stayed there, Smith's relationship with
    Simmons, and the timing and order of events, Smith's testimony conflicted
    with the testimonies of other witnesses. Of particular significance, while
    Smith denied using methamphetamines when at the studio, Bolt and
    others testified that Smith used methamphetamines on numerous
    occasions during that span of time. This use of drugs may account for why
    there were contradictions between Smith's testimony and the testimony of
    others. For the purpose of assessing the sufficiency of the evidence for the
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    verdict, we do not weigh the inconsistencies and credibility of Smith's
    testimony, as that was the province of the jury.     See Nolan, 122 Nev. at
    377, 
    132 P.3d at 573
    . But, in concluding that the evidence of guilt was not
    overwhelming, we acknowledge these inconsistencies and the possibility
    that Smith's ability to recall the events may have been inhibited by the
    use of methamphetamines while at the studio.
    The quantity and character of the errors and the gravity of the crimes
    A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by a
    fair and impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §
    1; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 3. Hence, the errors below that affected the process
    for empaneling a fair and impartial jury are concerning.
    Peremptory challenges are a "means to the constitutional end
    of an impartial jury and a fair trial."    Georgia v. McCollum, 
    505 U.S. 42
    ,
    57 (1992). Here, the district court's lottery process clearly violated the law
    that governs the use of peremptory challenges against prospective
    alternate jurors. See NRS 175.061(5). The district court denied Simmons
    his statutory right to use a peremptory challenge against alternate jurors
    and, incidentally, affected his ability to make informed peremptory
    challenges. See 
    id.
     Thus, the process for empaneling a fair and impartial
    jury was compromised.
    The United States Constitution provides for a defendant's
    right to a "venire selected from a fair cross section of the community."
    Williams v. State, 
    121 Nev. 934
    , 939, 
    125 P.3d 627
    , 631 (2005). In this
    matter, the district court gave inadequate consideration to this
    constitutional right when Simmons objected to the jury venire's racial
    composition. This dismissive attitude toward Simmons' objection resulted
    in a poorly developed record, which precluded a meaningful review of an
    issue regarding Simmons' constitutional right. We refuse to ignore the
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    oviala
    possibility that Simmons' objection had merit and, if the district court had
    given him the opportunity, that Simmons could have shown such merit on
    the record.
    Although the crimes charged against Nelson were grave, the
    evidence was not overwhelming, and the errors that compromised the
    process for selecting a fair and impartial jury were cumulatively
    substantial. Because Simmons' right and ability to use his peremptory
    challenges were compromised, and due to the poorly developed record that
    prevents us from concluding that the selection of the jury venire did not
    violate Simmons' constitutional rights, we cannot state with confidence
    "that the verdict would have been the same in the absence of [these]
    error[s]." Big Pond v. State, 
    101 Nev. 1
    , 3, 
    692 P.2d 1288
    , 1289 (1985).
    Thus, we conclude that the cumulative effect of the error requires a
    reversal of the conviction and warrants a new trial.
    For the foregoing reasons, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND
    REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
    this order.
    Gibbons
    --                .           J.
    Douglas
    J.
    Saitta
    12
    cc: Hon. Doug Smith, District Judge
    Clark County Public Defender
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney
    Eighth District Court Clerk
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