Stilwell v. City of N. Las Vegas C/W 59736 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •                             Stilwell moved the district court for his attorney fees and court
    costs, citing NRS 176.115, 1 which reads in full as follows:
    1. In all cases of criminal prosecution where the
    defendant is not found guilty, the court may
    require the complainant, if it appears that the
    prosecution was malicious or without probable
    cause, to pay the costs of the action, or to give
    security to pay the same within 30 days.
    2. If the complainant does not comply with the
    order of the court, judgment may be entered
    against the complainant for the amount thereof.
    3. Such judgments may be enforced and appealed
    from in the same manner as those rendered in
    civil actions.
    Stillwell argued that Nevada's helmet law is unconstitutionally
    indeterminate and that his ticketing and prosecution were without
    probable cause and malicious, entitling him to recover attorney fees as
    "costs of the action" under NRS 176.115. The district court disagreed. In
    its view, the municipal court convictions provided prima facie evidence of
    probable cause, see Chapman v. City of Reno, 
    85 Nev. 365
    , 369, 
    455 P.2d 618
    , 620 (1969), and malice was not independently claimed. 2 Because the
    district court denied Stillwell's motion for fees on this basis, it did not
    answer the statutory construction questions of whether NRS 176.115
    authorizes attorney fees to be awarded as a subset of "costs of the action,"
    'He simultaneously brought suit in federal court. The federal cases
    are not relevant to this appeal.
    2Acknowledging      Stillwell's request for an evidentiary hearing on
    entitlement to fees, the district court invited him to make an offer of proof.
    The offer of proof focused on the prosecution's dismissals following appeal,
    not the specifics of the charged offenses themselves.
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    2
    (0) 1947A
    or who the "complainant" is. The district court also rejected Stillwell's
    argument that dismissing the charges after they were appealed itself
    evidenced malice and lack of probable cause. From these orders, Stilwell
    appeals.
    Article 6, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution states that
    district courts "have final appellate jurisdiction in cases arising
    in. . . inferior tribunals as may be established by law." This court has
    repeatedly held that "[d]istrict courts have final appellate jurisdiction in
    cases arising in municipal courts," such that a municipal court conviction,
    once appealed to and decided by the district court, "is not subject to
    further review by appeal to this court."   Tripp v. City of Sparks, 
    92 Nev. 362
    , 363, 
    550 P.2d 419
    , 419 (1976); see Waugh v. Casazza, 
    85 Nev. 520
    ,
    521, 
    458 P.2d 359
    , 359-60 (1969) (noting appeal to Supreme Court from
    district court's review of justice court decision is improper, though there
    may be an exception if such an appeal is provided for by statute). This
    rule applies even when the district court reverses the municipal court,
    meaning its decision escapes direct appellate review. Compare City of Las
    Vegas v. Carver, 
    92 Nev. 198
    , 198, 
    547 P.2d 688
    , 688 (1976) (rejecting
    appeal by city from district court judgment reversing municipal court
    conviction and holding, "[w]e have no jurisdiction for appellate review of a
    district court judgment, which has been entered on an appeal from a
    municipal court"), with Tripp, 92 Nev. at 362, 550 P.2d at 419 (holding
    this court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal by defendant whose municipal
    court conviction was upheld by the district court).
    Nevada's Constitution and these cases are directly controlling
    here. Stilwell's cases originated in the municipal courts and were heard
    3
    by the district court on appeal. The district court's appellate jurisdiction is
    final, and this court therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear them.
    Stilwell argues that the above cases do not apply because in
    each, the inferior court and then the district court decided the issue on the
    merits, whereas here the municipal courts convicted Stillwell and so did
    not entertain his fee requests. But this is a distinction without a
    difference. If Stillwell had established that his ticketing and prosecution
    lacked probable cause and were malicious, NRS 176.115 would have been
    equally available to him in municipal as district court. While the
    prosecution's dismissal of the charges in district court may have
    strengthened Stillwell's claim to fees and costs, it did not change his
    fundamental position that the charges lacked probable cause and were
    malicious—claims he asserted both in municipal and district courts.
    Exercising its appellate jurisdiction, the district court rejected these
    claims based on the municipal court convictions and Stillwell's offer of
    proof. Here, as in Carver, "[w]e have no jurisdiction for appellate review of
    a district court judgment, which has been entered on an appeal from a
    municipal court," and, as for Stillwell's constitutional claims, his "remedy,
    if any, would have been to timely petition for certiorari, under NRS
    34.020(3)." 92 Nev. at 198-99, 
    547 P.2d at 688
    .
    As a fallback, Stillwell argues that NRS 176.115(3) licenses
    this appeal. But this argument is clearly wrong. Subparagraph 1 of NRS
    176.115 authorizes an order directing "the complainant" to pay the "costs
    of the action . . . within 30 days" if the defendant is "not found guilty" and
    it appears "the prosecution was malicious or without probable cause";
    subparagraph 2 provides that, if "the complainant" does not timely comply
    with the order, "judgment may be entered against the complainant for the
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    4
    (0) 1947A
    amount thereof'; and subparagraph 3 provides that "[s]uch judgments
    may be enforced and appealed from in the same manner as those rendered
    in civil actions." (Emphasis added.) "Such judgment[ I" in subparagraph 3
    refers back to its antecedent in subparagraph 2—the judgment
    subparagraph 2 says can be entered against a complainant who flouts an
    order entered pursuant to subparagraph 1 to pay the "costs of the action"
    within 30 days. As written, NRS 176.115 does not create an additional
    right of appeal in favor of a defendant who unsuccessfully seeks costs and
    has already been afforded a right of appeal.   See Blackburn v. State, 129
    Nev. „ 
    294 P.3d 422
    , 425 (2013) (in interpreting a statute, "[o]ur
    analysis begins and ends with the statutory text if it is clear and
    unambiguous").
    This court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
    Accordingly, we
    ORDER these consolidated appeals DISMISSED.
    C.J.
    J.
    Hardesty
    J.
    Parraguirre
    J.
    Saitta
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    5
    (0) 1947A
    1.71.     .; • :
    cc:   Chief Judge, The Eighth Judicial District Court
    Hon. J. Charles Thompson, Senior Judge
    Gallian Welker & Beckstrom, LC
    Marquis Aurbach Coffing
    Boulder City Attorney
    North Las Vegas City Attorney
    City of North Las Vegas City Attorney's Office
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 59735

Filed Date: 9/12/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014