Schofield v. State , 2016 NV 26 ( 2016 )

132 Nev., Advance Opinion 219
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
MICHAEL J. SCHOFIELD, No. 65193
Appellant,
vs. FILED
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. APR 21 2016
TRACIE K. LINDEMAN
CLE
BY teek
CHI F DEaiTY CLtRK
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant 11 a jury
verdict, of first-degree kidnapping and child abuse, neglect, or
endangerment. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Elissa F.
Cadish, Judge.
Reversed.
Karen K. Wong, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson,
District Attorney, Maria E. Lavell and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorneys, Clark County,
for Respondent.
BEFORE HARDESTY, SAITTA and PICKERING, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:
Nevada's first-degree kidnapping statute makes it a category
A felony to "lead( 1,, take[ ] , entice[], or carrbrl away or detain( ] any minor
with the intent to keep, imprison, or confine the minor from his or her
parents, guardians, or any other person having lawful custody of the
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minor NRS 200.310(1) (emphasis added). Appellant argues NRS
200.310(1)'s "intent to keep" language is ambiguous, and there was
insufficient evidence to convict him using the proper interpretation of
"intent to keep." In addressing appellant's contention, we conclude that
(1) NRS 200.310(1)'s "intent to keep" language is ambiguous; (2) pursuant
to the canons of statutory interpretation, NRS 200.310(1) requires proof
that the accused intended to keep the minor for a protracted period of time
or permanently; and (3) reversal is warranted because there is insufficient
evidence to support appellant's first-degree kidnapping conviction under
the proper legal standard.
FACTS
Appellant Michael John Schofield (Schofield) is the father of
Michael Joshua Schofield (Michael). At the time of the incident, and for
more than a decade prior, Schofield's mother and stepfather (Patricia and
Norman, respectively) had legal custody of Michael.'
As was typical, Schofield came to visit Michael at Patricia and
Norman's house on a Sunday. During the visit, Schofield realized he left
something behind at the grocery store and asked Michael to go with him to
get it. Michael said no. Schofield insisted that Michael go, and when
Michael continued to say no, the argument became physical. Michael tried
to walk, then run, away from Schofield inside the house. Eventually,
'The record is silent as to the precise extent of Schofield's parental
rights; however, the parties agree Patricia and Norman had legal custody
of Michael and acted as his primary caregivers. There is no indication in
the record that Schofield was seeking, or had ever sought, a change to the
custody rights for Michael. Indeed, the record shows that Schofield
typically visited Michael a couple times a week, and that arrangement
worked well for all parties.
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Schofield caught up with Michael and put him in either a chokehold or a
headlock. Schofield then dragged Michael outside and threw Michael into
his van, which was parked in the driveway. During these events, Patricia
called 911 for help, and Norman repeatedly told Schofield to stop. Two off-
duty police officers who lived next door tackled Schofield before he could
get in the van and leave with Michael.
Schofield was arrested and charged with child abuse, neglect
or endangerment; domestic violence (strangulation); burglary; and first-
degree kidnapping. Schofield initially had counsel, but he opted to
represent himself toward the end of trial. A jury convicted him of child
abuse and first-degree kidnapping but acquitted him of domestic violence
(strangulation) and burglary. Schofield now appeals from the judgment of
conviction, challenging his first-degree kidnapping (NRS 200.310(1))
conviction. 2
DISCUSSION
Schofield argues NRS 200.310(1)'s "intent to keep"
requirement is ambiguous, and, under the proper interpretation of that
requirement, there is insufficient evidence to support his first-degree
kidnapping conviction. 3 NRS 200.310(1) states:
2 Schofield has not challenged his child abuse conviction on appeal.
Schofield also argues that the child-kidnapping provisions of NRS
3
200.310(1) do not apply to the minor's parents, guardians, or other person
who has lawful custody. For a general discussion, see William B. Johnson,
Kidnapping or Related Offense by Taking or Removing of Child by or
Under Authority of Parent or One in Loco Parentis, 20 A.L.R.4th 823 (1983
& Supp. 2016) (collecting cases). We do not reach this issue, as it is
unnecessary to our disposition of this appeal, and it was neither raised nor
developed in the district court.
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[Al person who leads, takes, entices, or carries
away or detains any minor with the intent to keep,
imprison, or confine the minor from his or her
parents, guardians, or any other person having
lawful custody of the minor. . . is guilty of
kidnapping in the first degree which is a category
A felony.
(Emphasis added.) 4 Schofield argues that the "intent to keep" language in
NRS 200.310(1) requires an intent to keep a minor permanently or
indefinitely. Based on this argument, we must determine (1) whether
NRS 200.310(1)'s "intent to keep" language is ambiguous; (2) if so, what
"intent to keep" means; and (3) whether there was sufficient evidence to
convict Schofield of first-degree kidnapping under the appropriate legal
standard.
NRS 200.310(1)'s "intent to keep" language is ambiguous
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de
novo review." State v. Catanio, 120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590
(2004). "We must attribute the plain meaning to a statute that is not
ambiguous." Id. "An ambiguity arises where the statutory language lends
itself to two or more reasonable interpretations." Id.In material part, NRS 200.310(1) requires proof that the
accused intended "to keep . . . the minor from his or her parents,
guardians, or any other person having lawful custody" before criminal
liability attaches for first-degree kidnapping. Schofield argues that the
word "keep" unambiguously means "keep permanently or indefinitely," or,
alternatively, that the term is ambiguous and should be narrowly defined.
4 The material jury instruction here mirrored NRS 200.310(1)'s
language.
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We conclude the verb "to keep," as employed in NRS 200.310(1), is
ambiguous and therefore not susceptible to a plain meaning analysis. See
id.The verb "to keep," as used in NRS 200.310(1), is ambiguous
because it can reasonably be interpreted in at least two different ways.
See id. First, "keep" can mean "[preserve, maintain]: as ... to continue to
maintain," or similarly, "to retain or continue to have in one's possession
or power." Keep, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (2002).
Such definitions of the word "keep" focus on dominion or possession for a
period of time, either permanently or for a protracted period. Second,
"keep" can mean "to restrain from departure or removal," which envisions
possession against some countervailing force, rather than possession for a
period of time. Id. Therefore, a person attempting to interpret NRS
200.310(1) could reasonably conclude that first-degree kidnapping
requires an intent (1) to possess a minor permanently or for a protracted
period, or (2) to possess a minor for any period of time against his legal
guardian's wishes. Thus, we conclude that NRS 200.310(1)'s "intent to
keep" language is ambiguous.
The word "keep" in NRS 200.310(1) must mean "keep permanently or for a
protracted period of time"
"If the statute is ambiguous, then this court will look beyond
the statutory language itself to determine the legislative intent of the
statute." Haney v. State, 124 Nev. 408, 412, 185 P.3d 350, 353 (2008). The
rule of lenity, which "demands that ambiguities in criminal statutes be
liberally interpreted in the accused's favor.... only applies when other
statutory interpretation methods, including the plain language, legislative
history, reason, and public policy, have failed to resolve a penal statute's
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ambiguity." State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 99, 249 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
NRS 200.310(1)'s legislative history sheds no light on the
Legislature's intended meaning for the word "keep." Similarly, NRS
200.310(1)'s legislative history does not provide meaningful guidance
about how the word "keep" should be interpreted in light of the underlying
rationale and public policy that induced the Legislature to adopt NRS
200.310(1). Therefore, we must invoke the rule of lenity to resolve this
ambiguity and interpret NRS 200.310(1) in Schofield's favor.
Interpreting "keep" to mean "possess for any amount of time
against a legal guardian's wishes" is exceptionally broad. Indeed, that
interpretation would require a jury to convict Schofield of first-degree
kidnapping—a category A felony with a five-year mandatory minimum
sentence—even if it believed he merely intended to take Michael to the
store and immediately return him to Patricia and Norman's custody.
Alternatively, "keep" could be read more narrowly to mean "exercise
continuous and enduring possession or dominion" Such a definition of
"keep" would require a first-degree kidnapping charge to be supported by
proof that, at the moment the defendant took possession of the minor, the
defendant either intended to keep the minor permanently or for a
protracted period of time. Based on the foregoing, we now conclude that
the rule of lenity requires that we interpret NRS 200.310(1)'s "intent to
keep" requirement as requiring an intent to keep a minor permanently or
for a protracted period of time.
Schofield's first-degree kidnapping conviction must be reversed
"When determining whether a jury verdict was based on
sufficient evidence to meet due process requirements, we will inquire
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Rose v. State, 123 Nev.
194, 202, 163 P.3d 408, 414 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Using the proper definition of "intent to keep," there is insufficient
evidence to support Schofield's first-degree kidnapping conviction because
there was no evidence that he intended to keep Michael permanently or
for a protracted period. In fact, the overwhelming evidence at trial showed
Schofield intended to take Michael to the store and then return him to
Patricia and Norman.
Although NRS 200.310(1) allows a first-degree kidnapping
charge to be supported by an intent "to keep, imprison, or confine," the
arguments at trial—including closing arguments—and on appeal have
focused solely on whether Schofield intended "to keep" Michael.
(Emphasis added.) The State has never meaningfully argued that
Schofield intended to confine or imprison Michael. Indeed, the State's
closing argument argued that (1) it only needed to show Schofield
intended to take Michael; and (2) "Where's nothing in that statute . . . that
says he has to permanently keep the child, [or] have the intention of
permanently keeping the child."
Thus, Schofield was convicted of first-degree kidnapping when
no rational juror could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he
intended to keep Michael permanently or for a protracted period.
Accordingly, Schofield's first-degree kidnapping conviction is reversed as
unsupported by the evidence against him. 5 See Vega v. State, 126 Nev.
5 We decline to address Schofield's remaining arguments as our
reversal renders them moot.
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332, 345, 236 P.3d 632, 641 (2010); accord Rose, 123 Nev. at 202, 163 P.3d
at 414.
J.
Hardesty
We concur:
J.
Saitta
Adm. J.
Pickering
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