Gardner (Carlton) v. State ( 2013 )


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  •                             A criminal defendant has the right to represent himself so
    long as the district court finds "that [he] is competent and that the waiver
    of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent," Hymon v. State, 
    121 Nev. 200
    , 212, 
    111 P.3d 1092
    , 1101 (2005); "a criminal defendant's ability
    to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose self-
    representation," Vanisi v. State, 
    117 Nev. 330
    , 341-42, 
    22 P.3d 1164
    , 1172
    (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Gardner gave the
    district court timely notice that he wished to represent himself at trial.
    After conducting a canvass pursuant to Faretta V. California, 
    422 U.S. 806
    (1975), the district court denied Gardner's request because it concluded
    that his limited legal knowledge and memory problems would make him a
    "sitting duck" for the experienced prosecution. The district court made no
    findings as to whether Gardner's waiver was knowing, voluntary, or
    intelligent. We conclude that the district court erred by denying Gardner's
    request for self-representation based upon the stated grounds. Although
    Gardner frequently displayed trouble understanding the law and legal
    terminology, this did not compel the conclusion that he was incapable of
    understanding the significance of the waiver of counsel and the risks of
    self-representation—the relevant consideration under Faretta. See Graves
    v. State, 
    112 Nev. 118
    , 124, 
    912 P.2d 234
    , 238 (1996) ("Faretta makes clear
    that the defendant's technical knowledge is not the relevant inquiry. . . .
    [T]he judge need only be convinced that the defendant made his decision
    with a clear comprehension of the attendant risks." (citation omitted)).
    The error requires reversal.   Hymon, 121 Nev. at 212, 111 P.3d at 1101
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    2
    (0) 1947A
    ("Denial of [the right to self-representation] is per se reversible error.").
    Accordingly, we grant rehearing and we
    ORDER the judgment of conviction REVERSED AND
    REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
    this order.'
    Gibbons
    Saitta
    cc:   Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge
    Clark County Public Defender
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    'In light of this order, we decline to reach the remainder of the
    claims raised on appeal or in Gardner's petition for rehearing, except to
    comment that although we find the district court's practice of directly
    inquiring into the race of potential jurors when resolving a Batson v.
    Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 79
     (1986), challenge appropriate, we disapprove of
    limiting individuals' responses and requiring them to state their race as
    either black, white, or Asian.
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    3
    (0) 1947A
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 60568

Filed Date: 7/10/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021