Evans (Stacie) v. State ( 2013 )


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  •                 support a conviction, Lisle v. State, 
    113 Nev. 679
    , 691-92, 
    941 P.2d 459
    ,
    467 (1997), holding limited on other grounds by Middleton v. State, 
    114 Nev. 1089
    , 1117 n.9, 
    968 P.2d 296
    , 315 n.9 (1998), and the jury's verdict
    will not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, substantial evidence
    supports the verdict. See Bolden v. State, 
    97 Nev. 71
    , 73, 
    624 P.2d 20
    , 20
    (1981); see also McNair v. State, 
    108 Nev. 53
    , 56, 
    825 P.2d 571
    , 573 (1992).
    Second, Evans contends that the district court abused its
    discretion by denying his motion to dismiss because insufficient evidence
    was presented at the preliminary hearing to support each charge. We
    review a district court's decision to grant or deny a pretrial motion to
    dismiss for an abuse of discretion. Hill v. State, 
    124 Nev. 546
    , 550, 
    188 P.3d 51
    , 54 (2008). Even assuming that Evans' motion was procedurally
    proper, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
    denying it because the State presented sufficient evidence to support each
    charge. See Sheriff v. Hodes, 
    96 Nev. 184
    , 186, 
    606 P.2d 178
    , 180 (1980)
    (to bind an accused over for trial, "the state is not required to negate all
    inferences which might explain [his] conduct, but only to present enough
    evidence to support a reasonable inference" that the accused committed
    the offense); Wyatt v. State, 
    86 Nev. 294
    , 298, 
    468 P.2d 338
    , 341 (1970) (we
    will affirm the district court if it reaches the right result).
    Third, Evans contends that the district court abused its
    discretion by allowing the State to introduce into evidence outdated field
    identification cards in order to establish his gang affiliation and that
    evidence regarding his gang affiliation was unduly prejudicial. This claim
    lacks merit because evidence that Evans was a member of a gang was
    necessary to prove the gang enhancement of the charged crime and the
    field identification cards were relevant evidence of Evans' gang
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    membership. See NRS 193.168; Somee v. State, 
    124 Nev. 434
    , 446, 
    187 P.3d 152
    , 160 (2008). And, no prejudice resulted because Evans was
    ultimately acquitted of the gang enhancement. We conclude that the
    district court did not abuse its discretion.
    Fourth, Evans contends that the district court erred by
    granting the State's pretrial motion to admit Eric Dimas' preliminary
    hearing testimony because it was untimely and the State failed to
    demonstrate good cause to excuse the untimely filing.              See NRS
    174.125(1); Hernandez v. State, 
    124 Nev. 639
    , 648-49, 
    188 P.3d 1126
    , 1132-
    33 (2008). Even assuming that the district court erred by granting the
    State's motion and allowing Dimas' preliminary hearing testimony to be
    read into the record, we conclude that any error was harmless because we
    are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Dimas' testimony did not
    contribute to Evans' conviction. See Hernandez, 124 Nev. at 652, 
    188 P.3d at 1135
    .
    Fifth, Evans contends that the district court abused its
    discretion by rejecting his proposed instruction defining "affray." A
    defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on his theory of the case if some
    evidence supports it, Rosas v. State, 
    122 Nev. 1258
    , 1262, 
    147 P.3d 1101
    ,
    1104 (2006), but he is not entitled to instructions that are misleading or
    inaccurate, Crawford v. State, 
    121 Nev. 744
    , 754, 
    121 P.3d 582
    , 589 (2005),
    and a request for a lesser-included offense instruction is conditioned on
    that offense being necessarily included in the charged offense, Rosas, 122
    Nev. at 1263, 
    147 P.3d at 1105
    . Because "affray" is not a lesser-included
    offense of the charged crimes, compare NRS 199.480(3)(a), and NRS
    200.481(2)(f), with NRS 203.050, and the instruction was misleading
    because "affray" was not charged, we conclude that the district court did
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    not abuse its discretion, see Ouanbengboune v. State, 
    125 Nev. 763
    , 774,
    
    220 P.3d 1122
    , 1129 (2009).
    Sixth, Evans contends that cumulative error deprived him of a
    fair trial. Balancing the relevant factors, we conclude that this contention
    lacks merit. See Valdez v. State, 
    124 Nev. 1172
    , 1195, 
    196 P.3d 465
    , 481
    (2008).
    Accordingly, we
    ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
    Hardesty
    Parr irre
    J.
    Cherry
    cc: Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, District Judge
    Law Office of Betsy Allen
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney
    Eighth District Court Clerk
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