Duenas (Antonio) v. State ( 2013 )


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  •                 older. Thereafter, the district court instructed the jury to complete a
    special verdict form, containing four options—(1) all jurors find Duenas
    guilty based on premeditated and deliberate murder, (2) all jurors find
    Duenas guilty based on felony murder, (3) some of the jurors find Duenas
    guilty based on premeditated and deliberate murder and some jurors find
    Duenas guilty based on felony murder, and (4) all jurors find Duenas
    guilty based on premeditated and deliberate and felony murder. The
    jurors chose the third option. Duenas contends that the special verdict
    form shows that at least some of the jurors based their verdicts on a
    premeditated-murder theory, thereby rejecting the alternative theory of
    felony murder, and because the State presented insufficient evidence of
    premeditated murder, his first-degree murder conviction must be
    reversed.
    A special verdict was unnecessary in this case because the
    jury does not need to be unanimous on a particular theory of culpability to
    sustain a conviction for a single offense, see generally Anderson v. State,
    
    121 Nev. 511
    , 515, 
    118 P.3d 184
    , 186 (2005), and we discourage the use of
    special verdicts absent circumstances requiring a special verdict. See e.g.,
    McConnell v. State,    
    120 Nev. 1043
    , 1069, 
    102 P.3d 606
    , 624 (2004)
    (requiring a special verdict in death penalty cases where the State
    charges alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder and bases
    a felony aggravating circumstance on the predicate felony underlying the
    felony-murder theory). Moreover, we are not convinced that the special
    verdict form establishes that the jurors who found Duenas guilty based on
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    a premeditated-and-deliberate-murder theory rejected the felony-murder
    theory. For example, the special verdict form did not offer an option
    stating that all jurors concluded that the evidence supported a felony-
    murder theory but some of them also concluded that the evidence
    supported the premeditation theory.
    The evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly supports a
    felony-murder theory, see Origel-Candido v. State, 
    114 Nev. 378
    , 381, 
    956 P.2d 1378
    , 1380 (1998); Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979), and
    that is sufficient to uphold the conviction, see generally Anderson, 121
    Nev. at 515, 
    118 P.3d at 186
     ("A unanimous general verdict of guilt will
    support a conviction so long as there is substantial evidence in support of
    one of the alternate theories of culpability."). The evidence shows that the
    victim worked as a store clerk at the Loco Liquor Store in Las Vegas. As
    requested by his supervisor, the victim kept a Glock 9mm handgun with
    him during his shift. On the night of August 7, 2009, Duenas entered the
    liquor store with a Ruger P75 handgun. At some point, the victim and
    Duenas exchanged gunfire. Shortly thereafter, the victim's body was
    discovered behind the sales counter. Six shell casings were discovered
    near the sales counter—four behind the counter, one on top of the
    counter, and one in front of the counter. The victim fired those shots.
    One of the shots hit Duenas in the left hip. Duenas fired at least four
    shots, two of which inflicted substantial injuries to the victim, resulting in
    his death.
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    Having considered Duenas' argument and concluded that it
    lacks merit, we
    ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
    J.
    Douglas                                Saitta
    cc: Hon. Linda Marie Bell, District Judge
    Clark County Public Defender
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney
    Eighth District Court Clerk
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Document Info

Docket Number: 60114

Filed Date: 9/20/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014