Garner v. Nc-Dsh, Inc. ( 2013 )

 judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and other evidence on file, viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate that no
genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. "[D]istrict courts
have wide discretion, within the parameters of NRS 50.275 . . . to evaluate
the admissibility of expert testimony." Williams v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 127 Nev. 262 P.3d 360, 366 (2011) (internal quotation
omitted); Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. , ,222 P.3d 648, 658 (2010).
Having considered the parties arguments and the record, we
conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of respondent. This court has held that the proper measure for
evaluating whether a witness can testify as an expert is "whether that
witness possesses the skill, knowledge, or experience necessary to
[testify]." Staccato v. Valley Hosp., 123 Nev. 526, 527, 170 P.3d 503, 504
(2007). This court has also recognized several nonexhaustive factors to
assess whether an expert witness is appropriately qualified to testify
under NRS 50.275: "(1) formal schooling and academic degrees, (2)
licensure, (3) employment experience, and (4) practical experience and
specialized training." Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 499, 189 P.3d
646, 650-51 (2008).
Although this court declined to per se preclude nurses from
testifying as to medical causation in Williams, we stated that whether a
nurse could testify as to medical causation "depends upon a case-by-case
examination of a nurse's actual skill, knowledge, experience, or training
that is gained through practicing . . . [his or] her profession." Williams,
127 Nev. at , 262 P.3d at 366-67. This court held in Williams that a
nurse, who had extensive experience in cleaning and disinfecting
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endoscopy equipment but no experience in diagnosing the cause of
hepatitis C, was not qualified to testify as to medical causation as he did
not possess the requisite skill, knowledge, or experience regarding the
medical cause of hepatitis C transmission. Id. at , 262 P.3d at 367.
Here appellants provided evidence in opposition to
respondent's summary judgment motion that their expert witness has
experience as a registered nurse in cardiac care. Appellants did not
provide any evidence or argument that showed that their nurse expert
possessed the requisite skill, knowledge, or experience to diagnose cardiac
injuries, like the one alleged to have been suffered by Mr. Garner, or to
testify to Mr. Garner's chances of survival if he had been placed on
telemetry at the time of his heart attack. The district court therefore did
not err in finding that appellants' nurse expert witness was not qualified
to render medical causation testimony as to Mr. Garner's death or
testimony regarding his chance of survival. NRCP 56(e); Williams, 127
Nev. at , 262 P.3d at 366-67. As NRS 41A.100 requires proof of
causation in order for liability for personal injury or death to be imposed
on a provider of medical care, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment in respondent's favor. Wood, 121 Nev. at 731, 121
P.3d at 1030-31. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgm,ent_of th9itistrt court AFFIRMED.
Gibbons
J.
Douglas Saitta
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cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge
Stephen E. Haberfeld, Settlement Judge
Cliff W. Marcek
Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC/Las Vegas
Eighth District Court Clerk
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