Jess Arndell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Mogul 41 Lots, LLC ( 2014 )

 readministration. Appellant argues that, while the exact reasons for
reopening the bankruptcy proceedings are unclear, it is possible that the
trustee will seek to revoke the abandonment and bring the property back
into the bankruptcy estate.
Since the property at issue in this appeal was abandoned by
the bankruptcy trustee, it is not currently property of the estate. See In re
Hermosillo, 375 B.R. 20, 25 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (recognizing that
property abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee was no longer a part of the
bankruptcy estate). As a result, we conclude that the automatic stay does
not prevent the continuation of this appeal. See 11 U .S.0 § 362(a) (2012)
(providing that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates to stay,
automatically, the continuation of any judicial action against the
bankruptcy debtor and various other acts with respect to property of the
estates). Thus, no action will be taken on the notice.
Motion to dismiss
Appellant filed its first notice of appeal in the district court on
April 17, 2013, challenging an interlocutory order dismissing its
counterclaims. That appeal was docketed as Jess Arndell Construction Co.
v. Mogul 41 Lots, Docket No. 63029. On October 8, 2013, the district court
entered a final judgment dismissing the entire action below. Notice of the
October 8 judgment's entry was served electronically that same day, but
no notice of appeal from the October 8 judgment was filed. Shortly
thereafter, appellant's appeal in Docket No. 63029 was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, and remittitur issued on November 25, 2013. After
remittitur was received by the district court two days later, appellant filed
a motion in the district court seeking reentry of the October 8 final
judgment on the basis that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
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matter while the appeal was pending. That motion was granted in a
March 19, 2014, order, and appellant then filed this appeal from the
March 19 order. In its motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, respondent argues that the October 8 judgment was the final
judgment and that appellant's April 18, 2014, notice of appeal was thus
untimely. Appellant maintains that the district court lacked jurisdiction
to enter the October 8 judgment, rendering the October 8 judgment void.
In Buffington v. State, a criminal case, we recognized that this
court retains sole jurisdiction over a matter on appeal until remittitur
issues transferring jurisdiction back to the district court. 110 Nev. 124,
126, 868 P.2d 643, 644 (1994) (citing NRS 177.155 and NRS 177.305).
Four years later, however, we further explained in Dickerson v. State that
when remittitur issues in an appeal over which we lack jurisdiction, its
purpose is not to transfer jurisdiction back to the district court but to
notify the district court that the notice of appeal did not divest it of
jurisdiction in the first place. 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1134
(1998). Moreover, our opinions in the civil context have long recognized
that notices of appeal from nonappealable orders do not divest the district
court of jurisdiction. See Rust v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 688,
747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987) (explaining that the proper and timely filing of
a notice of appeal is jurisdictional); Knox v. Dick, 99 Nev. 514, 516, 665
P.2d 267, 269 (1983) ("An appeal from a non-appealable order does not
divest the trial court of jurisdiction."); Wilmurth v. Dist. Court, 80 Nev.
337, 340-41, 393 P.2d 302, 303 (1964) (same); see also NRAP 4(a)(6) ("A
premature notice of appeal does not divest the district court of
jurisdiction."). Therefore, the October 8 judgment was proper and
constituted the final judgment in the case below, appealable under NRAP
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3A(b)(1), and appellant's failure to timely appeal from that judgment
renders this court without jurisdiction. NRAP 4(a)(1); cf. Campos-Garcia
u. Johnson, 130 Nev. , 31 P.3d 890, 890 (2014) ("[A]n appeal must
be taken from an appealable order when first entered; superfluous or
duplicative orders and judgments—those filed after an appealable order
has been entered that do nothing more than repeat the contents of that
order—are not appealable."). Accordingly, we grant respondent's motion
and
ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.
Pitim J.
P ering
tick
eribOaare., , J.
Parra irre
Saitta
cc: Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge
Charles R. Kozak
Walsh, Baker & Rosevear, P.C.
Early Sullivan Wright Gizer & McRae, LLP
Washoe District Court Clerk
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