Gibson (Ronald) v. State ( 2013 )

expired, he was given 22 days' credit for presentence confinement. He argues that he is entitled to additional presentence credit from March 18, 2009, when A.M. first denied to authorities that appellant had sexually abused her—less the 22 days credited to him (totaling 1,323 days)— because "he could not control when [the charges involving A.M.] would be filed against him and could not control when he would expire his first sentence [for the conviction involving A.S.]." He reasons that A.M.'s initial denial of sexual abuse resulted in the two cases being resolved at separate times and that "the entire process would have been vastly different in every way from the decision to go to trial or negotiate the potential sentence" had the cases been prosecuted simultaneously. And because he has not committed a new offense while in custody, appellant argues, "fairness requires that [he] receive credit for the time he was deprived of his liberty, even if in custody on another offense." Because the additional presentence credit appellant sought concerned confinement pursuant to a judgment of conviction for another offense, he was not entitled to additional credit. See NRS 176.055(1) (providing that the district court may order presentence credit for confinement "for the amount of time which the defendant has actually spent in confinement before conviction, unless the defendant's confinement was pursuant to a judgment of conviction for another offense"). And appellant has provided no legal authority supporting his 2 contention that he is entitled to additional presentence credit under the circumstances presented here. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED." ,J. Hardesty J. Varraguirre 1/4) Cherry cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge Clark County Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk 'Despite counsel's verification that the fast track response complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the fast track response does not comply because it is not double-spaced. See NRAP 3C(h)(1). We caution respondent's counsel that future failure to comply with the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure when filing briefs with this court may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n); NRAP 28.2(b). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A