Robbins (Darin) v. State ( 2013 )

 grant a continuance, see Evans, 117 Nev. at 638, 28 P.3d at 518 (the
district court does not abuse its discretion "absent a showing that the
State acted in bad faith or that the nondisclosure caused substantial
prejudice to the defendant"), we conclude that these claims lack merit.
Second, Robbins argues that his conviction for first-degree
kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon cannot stand because it was
incidental to the underlying robbery. We disagree. The jury heard
evidence that either Robbins or his accomplice attacked the victim with a
crowbar, shocked him with a taser, and bound his wrists with an electrical
cord. The victim was held down and beaten further by one of the suspects
while the other removed goods from the home. After the victim told the
suspects where his wallet was, either Robbins or his accomplice forced the
victim upstairs—away from the open front door—and stated that he was
going kill him. The jury was properly instructed pursuant to Mendoza v.
State, 122 Nev. 267, 275-76, 130 P.3d 176, 181 (2006), and we conclude
that a rational juror could have found that the kidnapping was not
incidental to the robbery, see Langford v. State, 95 Nev. 631, 638-39, 600
P.2d 231, 236-37 (1979) (where adequately instructed, the question of
whether the movement of the victim is incidental to the robbery is "to be
determined by the jury in all but the clearest cases").
Third, relying on NRS 50.075, Robbins argues that the district
court abused its discretion by restricting him from cross-examining the
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department's Forensic Laboratory
technician who performed the DNA testing in this case regarding mistakes
and malfeasance committed by other lab technicians. "The decision to
admit or exclude evidence rests within the trial court's discretion, and this
court will not overturn that decision absent manifest error." Collman v.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A
9.
State, 116 Nev. 687, 702, 7 P.3d 426, 436 (2000). Here, the district court
prohibited this line of questioning because the witness had no personal
knowledge of the specific instances of mistakes and malfeasance
committed by other technicians, but allowed the defense to cross-examine
her regarding the potential for human error generally. We conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion. See NRS 50.025(1)(a).
Having considered Robbins' contentions and concluded that
they lack merit, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
/ .e.e...40t..\ J.
Hardesty
arraguirre
CHERRY, J., concurring:
I concur in the result.
J.
erry
cc: Hon. Carolyn Ellsworth, District Judge
The Law Office of Dan M. Winder, P.C.
Mario D. Valencia
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A
- - • '' - 41: , .4 1 • - II r • r= ETZE IEA