Schwiger (Lawrence) v. State, Dep'T Of Corr. ( 2022 )


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  • SUPREME Court
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    Nevaba
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    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    LAWRENCE E. SCHWIGER, No. 84866
    Petitioner,
    VS.
    THE STATE OF NEVADA
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; # FI L. E DB
    AND THE STATE OF NEVADA BOARD . JUL 13 2022
    OF PAROLE COMMISSIONERS,
    Respondents. CLERK OF SUPREME CcURT
    \
    CO ea CLERK
    ORDER DENYING PETITION
    This is an original pro se petition for a writ of mandamus
    seeking the application of credits to petitioner’s parole eligibility date.
    This court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus
    and the issuance of such extraordinary relief is within this court’s sole
    discretion. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4; NRS 34.160; NRS 34.170: DLR.
    Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 
    123 Nev. 468
    , 474-75, 
    168 P.3d 731
    , 736-37 (2007). Petitioner bears the burden to show that extraordinary
    relief is warranted and such relief is proper only when there is no plain,
    speedy, and adequate remedy at law. See Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
    Court, 
    120 Nev. 222
    , 224, 228, 
    88 P.3d 840
    , 841, 844 (2004).
    Having considered the petition and supporting documentation,
    we are not convinced that our extraordinary and discretionary intervention
    is warranted. The application of credits to petitioner's parole eligibility date
    is a matter that should be raised in a petition for a writ of mandamus filed
    in the district court in the first instance so that factual and legal issues are
    fully developed, giving this court an adequate record to review. See Round
    Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 
    97 Nev. 601
    , 604, 
    637 P.2d 534
    ,
    536 (1981) (recognizing that “an appellate court is not an appropriate forum
    AA-AAVTX
    in which to resolve disputed questions of fact”); State v. Cty. of Douglas, 
    90 Nev. 272
    , 276-77, 
    524 P.2d 1271
    , 1274 (1974) (noting that “this court prefers
    that such an application [for writ relief] be addressed to the discretion of
    the appropriate district court” in the first instance), abrogated on other
    grounds by Cortez Masto v. Gypsum Res., 
    129 Nev. 23
    , 33-34, 
    294 P.3d 404
    ,
    410-11 (2013). Petitioner may appeal to this court from a final decision.
    Therefore, we decline to exercise our original jurisdiction in this matter. See
    NRAP 21(b). Accordingly, we
    ORDER the petition DENIED.
    Gane CJ.
    Parraguirre
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    Agi oJ.
    Stiglich
    ec: Lawrence E. Schwiger
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Supreme Court
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    Nevapa
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