Walsh (Robert) v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                 treatment, thereby suggesting that the district court has no duty
    regarding notice of such treatment). Moreover, Walsh has failed to
    demonstrate that his substantial rights were violated, because he admits
    that he was aware the State was seeking such treatment.       See LaChance,
    130 Nev., Adv. Op. 
    29, 321 P.3d at 928
    ("[Tlhe clear purpose of NRS
    207.010(2) is to ensure that the defendant has notice that the State will
    request habitual criminal adjudication."). He acknowledges that written
    notice was served on his attorney and states that he was personally made
    aware of the State's intent during his jury trial. Accordingly, Walsh has
    failed to demonstrate that the district court committed plain error in
    regard to the habitual criminal notification.'
    Walsh next argues that the district court erred in accepting
    certified judgments of conviction as proof of two of his prior convictions in
    support of the habitual criminal adjudication, because the State's notice of
    intent to seek habitual criminal treatment also included for the same two
    prior cases guilty plea agreements that did not appear to be properly
    executed. Again, because he did not object below, we review Walsh's claim
    for plain error. LaChance, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 
    29, 321 P.3d at 928
    . Walsh
    has not demonstrated error that is plain from the record. The certified
    judgments of conviction are prima facie evidence of the prior convictions,
    NRS 207.016(5), and they are facially constitutional as they indicate that
    'Walsh contends for the first time in his reply brief that the State
    did not comply with statutory procedure because it filed a notice of intent
    to seek habitual criminal treatment instead of amending the information.
    See NRS 207.010(2). Because this argument was not raised in Walsh's
    opening brief, we do not consider it. See NRAP 28(c) (providing that a
    reply brief "must be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the
    opposing brief').
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    Walsh was represented by counsel and was convicted of a felony in each
    case, see Dressler v. State, 
    107 Nev. 686
    , 698, 
    819 P.2d 1288
    , 1296 (1991).
    Any irregularity, in the signatures in accompanying guilty plea
    agreements does not rebut that presumption of validity. Moreover, Walsh
    has failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were violated as he
    does not dispute that the judgments of conviction are accurate or that he
    was represented by counsel. Accordingly, Walsh has failed to demonstrate
    that the district court committed plain error in regard to the habitual
    criminal adjudication.
    Walsh next argues that the district court improperly admitted
    testimony about the results of narcotics field testing because it did "not
    meet the applicable 'general acceptance' standard for the admission of
    expert testimony" as set forth in Frye v. United States, 
    293 F. 1013
    (D.C.
    Cir. 1923). Trial counsel objected to the testimony, but on different
    grounds. Accordingly, we review Walsh's claim for plain error. See Grey v.
    State, 
    124 Nev. 110
    , 120, 
    178 P.3d 154
    , 161 (2008). Walsh has not
    demonstrated error that is plain from the record. First, the testimony was
    not "expert" testimony, because the record indicates that it was admitted
    for the purpose of establishing why the witness submitted the substance to
    the forensic laboratory for further testing, and not as "scientific, technical
    or other specialized knowledge" introduced to "assist the trier of fact to
    understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." NRS 50.275
    (defining expert testimony). Second, even if it were expert testimony, NRS
    50.275, not Frye, would govern its admissibility. Higgs v. State, 126 Nev.,
    Adv. Op. 1, 
    222 P.3d 648
    , 659 (2010); Santillanes v. State, 
    104 Nev. 699
    ,
    704 n.3, 
    765 P.2d 1147
    , 1150 n.3 (1988). Moreover, Walsh has failed to
    demonstrate that his substantial rights were violated because the forensic
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    scientist, who was qualified as an expert in the identification of controlled
    substances, testified shortly thereafter as to her methodology and
    conclusions, which confirmed the results of the narcotics field test.
    Finally, Walsh argues in his reply brief that the prosecutor
    committed repeated acts of misconduct. Because this argument was not
    raised in Walsh's opening brief, we do not consider it. See NRAP 28(c).
    Having reviewed the claims Walsh raised in his opening brief,
    we conclude they are without merit for the foregoing reasons. Accordingly,
    we
    ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
    CJILett
    Saitta
    , J.
    , J.
    Gibbons
    &km.
    Pickering
    cc: Hon. Kimberly A. Wanker, District Judge
    David H. Neely, III
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Nye County District Attorney
    Nye County Clerk
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Document Info

Docket Number: 66107

Filed Date: 10/16/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021