State v. Okroi (Patrick) ( 2013 )

 not manifestly abuse its discretion by rejecting written waivers that did
not conform to Sargent. The State argues that the justice court should be
allowed to question the adequacy of a written waiver and require Okroi to
provide clear documentation that he is aware of the rights he is
relinquishing by waiving his appearance at the preliminary hearing.
A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, NRS 34.160, or control discretion when it is manifestly abused or
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v.
Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981); see also State v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. „ 267 P.3d 777,
780 (2011) (defining manifest abuse and arbitrary or capricious exercise of
discretion in context of mandamus). The writ will not issue if the
petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. NRS 34.170. And, because a writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy, the decision to entertain a petition for a writ of
mandamus lies completely within the court's discretion. Hickey v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 105 Nev. 729, 731, 782 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1989). As a
general rule, we review a district court's decision to grant or deny a writ
petition under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Koller v. State, 122 Nev.
223, 226, 130 P.3d 653, 655 (2006).
In Sargent we determined that NRS 178.388 does not apply to
preliminary hearings, 122 Nev. at 213, 128 P.3d at 1054, and we stated
that justice courts "do not have authority to order the defendant's personal
appearance when the defendant files a waiver of personal appearance and
retains counsel who appears on his behalf," id. at 217, 128 P.3d at 1056-
57. Nowhere in Sargent did we require a defendant's waiver to follow a
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specific format or to enumerate the rights a defendant relinquishes by
waiving his personal appearance at the preliminary hearing.
Consequently, the district court properly determined that "the justice
court ignored a clear duty to follow binding precedent by requiring
petitioner to provide a more exacting waiver instead of proceeding with
the preliminary hearing as requested by the petitioner" and did not abuse
its discretion by granting Okroi's petition for a writ of mandamus. We
therefore
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 1
Gibbons
cp Lui J.
Douglas
cc: Hon. Steve L. Dobrescu, District Judge
Attorney General/Carson City
Eureka County District Attorney
State Public Defender/Ely
State Public Defender/Carson City
Eureka County Clerk
'The fast track statement and reply do not comply with formatting
requirements of NRAP 3C(h)(1) and NRAP 32(a)(4) because they are not
double-spaced, and the fast track response does not comply with
formatting requirements of NRAP 3C(h)(1) and NRAP 32(a)(4) because it
does not have one-inch margins on all four sides. We caution counsel for
the parties that future failure to comply with the applicable rules when
filing briefs in this court may result in the imposition of sanctions. See
NRAP 3C(n).
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