MYERS v. HASKINS (CHILD CUSTODY) , 2022 NV 51 ( 2022 )

138 Nev., Advance Opinion 51
lN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
LISA S. MYERS, No. 83576-COA
Appellant,
vs.
CALEB OBADIAH HASKINS,
Respondent. t:. JUN 30 20
ELIZ
BY
EF DEPUTY CLERK
Appeal from a district court order denying a motion to modify
custody of a minor child. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court
Division, Clark County; T. Arthur Ritchie, Jr., Judge.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Patricia A. Marr, Ltd., and Patricia A. Marr, Henderson,
for Appellant.
Caleb Obadiah Haskins, Philomath, Oregon.
Pro Se.
BEFORE THE COURT OF APPE.ALS, GIBBONS, C.j., TAO and. BULLA,
Jj.
OPINION
By the Court., GIBBONS, C.J.:
Nearly 30 years ago, the Nevada Supreme Court held that
district courts may deny a motion to modify child custody without holding
an evidentiary hearing' if the movant fails to demonstrate a prima facie case
for modification. Rooney v. Rooney, 109 Nev. 540, 542-43, 853 P.2d 123, 124-
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25 (1993). Since that d.ecision, district courts have struggled with an
unanswered question: what sources may a district court consider :in
determining whether a movant has demonstrated a prima facie case for
modification? Today, we answer this question. We hold that when a distriCt
court seeks to determine if the movant has demonstrated a prima facie case
for modification under Rooney, it must generally consider ,only the properly
alleged fa.cts in the rnovant's verified pleadings, affidavits, or declarations.
It. must not consider the alleged facts or offers of proof the nonmovant
provides.
Despite this general rule. we also announce an exception. We
hold that a district court may look to the nonmovant's evidentiary support
when it "conclusively establishes" the falsity of the movant's • allegations.
The rules we announce today will help align current practice with Rooney's
central purposeS: discouraging challenges to temporary custody orders and
preventing repeated and. insubstantial motions to modify custody. See id,
at 543 n.4, 853 P.2d at 125 n.4. While Nevada courts generally adhere to
the policy of deciding a case fully upon its merits, especially in child custody
cases, see .Dagher Dagher, 1.03 Nev. 26, 28, 731 P.2d 1329, 1.330 (1987),
this opinion reiterates that a movant must first shoW the district court:—
using specific, properly alleged facts--that his or her motion is-potentially
meritorious on its face. •
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Caleb Obadiah Haskins and Lisa S. Myers married in 2009 an.d
divorced in 2012. They have o.n.e minor. child together: S.H. (now 12 years
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old). Under the current custody order,1 they share joint legal custody of
S.H., except Caleb has sole legal custody for medical decisions. Caleb has
primary physical custody of S.H. Because Caleb lives in Oregon and Lisa
lives in Nevada, Lisa is allotted, at a minimum, spring break and summer
break for parenting tirne.
In 2020, Lisa failed to return S.H. to Caleb after summer break.
According to Lisa, she purchased S.H.'s plane ticket and took her to the
airport. But upon arrival, S.H. expressed fear about returning to Caleb,
had a panic attack, vomited twice in the restroom, and refused to board the
plane. Lisa alleged that she tried later that same day to get S.H. to board
the plane, but S.H. "began crying, stated her stomach was still ill, and she
again, refused to go." Lisa then notified Caleb that she would not return
S.H.
Caleb consequently filed a motion requesting that the court
enforce the custody order by ordering Lisa to return S.H., rnbdify the form
of Lisa's parenting time to virtual, and issue a standard behavior order.
Lisa in turn opposed Caleb's motion and filed a countermotion to modify
physical custody. In that opposition and Counterm.otion, Lisa alleged
generally, and with specific examples, thatCaleb medically, physically, arid
educationally neglected S.H.; verbally and emotionally abused S.H.; made
S.H. sleep in a nonbedroom on a foam mattress on the floor because of an
'Between 2010 (when the parties filed for divorce) and 2014 (when
Caleb petitioned for and was granted permission to relocate to Oregon with
S.H.), Lisa filed ten different appeals---all of which the sunreme court
dismissed on procedural grounds. Lisa more recently filed a.n unsuccessful
motion to modify physical custody in. 2018. The record does not reveal the
extent to which modifications of custody have been 5ought between 201.4
a.nd 2018.
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overcrowded house: and denied Lisa parenting time and substantially
interfered with it when it did. occur. Lisa supported her opposition and
.countermotion with a declaration, See NRS 53.045 (permitting an unsworn
declaration signed by the declarant under penalty of perjury in lieu of an
affidavit). Caleb responded, denied the allegations, and provided
documents and reports in support of his position.
The district, court then held a nonevidentiary hearing on Caleb's
motion, which it granted. However; the court also found sua sponte that
Lisa had demonstrated adequate cause to reopen discovery and provided
her the opportunity to gather sufficient proof of her claims . in her
countermotion to modify physical custody.2 It then granted the parties 90
days to conduct discovery.
At the end of the discovery peri.od, Lisa submitted informal3
offers of proof she claimed supported h.er allegations. Caleb likewise offered
documents that he claimed contradieted Lisa's allegationS. At the
2 NRCP 16.21(a) generally prohibits postjudgment discovery in family
law matters. NRCP 16 does, however, allow a court to order postjudgment
discovery in family law matters in two situations: (1) .if a courthas ordered
an evidentiary hearing in a postjudgment child custod.y matter, or (2) if a
court finds "good cause" for the discovery. NRCP 16.21(b). In this case, the
district court apparently ordered the discovery under the second exception
rather th.an the first; however. it labeled. it as "adequate cause."
3 Lisadid not provide any affidavits or declarations from:the witnesses
she planned to call at an evidentiary hearing. Rather, she noted the
substance of specific individuals' anticipated testim.ony. The individuals
included both a police officer .and a school counselor from Oregon,. Caleb's
former spouse; and S.H.'s maternal grandmother.. 'Lisa's original
allegations were supported by a declaration, as was her reply to. Caleb's
"discovery." However, Caleb did not object to these offers of proof under any
of the grounds listed in Rooney. See 109 Nev. at 543, 853 P.2d at 125.
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subsequent nonevidentiary hearing, the district court stated that it was a
"close cair as to whether Lisa had demonstrated adequate cause for an
evidentiary hearing because of the documents Caleb provided and th.e
statements he made in his supporting declaration. But the court was
concerned that Lisa did not have a full opportunity to respond to Caleb's
documents and allegations,4 so it allowed Lisa time to submit a responsive
declaration herself. Lisa did so, largely contesting Caleb's allegations,
explaining some of the d.ocuments he provided and arguing some of those
documents even supported her . clairns. •
• After Lisa filed her responsive declaration, the district court
denied Lisa's countermotion to modify physical custody, without holding an
evidentiaery hearing. In d.enying the countermotion, 'the •court summarily
cOncluded that
the countermotion filed by Li.sa Myers and her
supporting filings de not state facts that would
support a substantial change in circumstances
affecting the welfare of the child, and that the
child's best •interest. is served by the modification...
The countermotion lacks merit and should be
denied..
This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Now on appeal, Lisa argues that th.e district court abused its
discretion in denying her countermotion to modify physical custody without
first holding an evidentiary hearing: .She claims that she oresented a prima
facie case for modificatiOn because She provided declarations andinforrnal
offers of proof in the form of summaries of anticipated witness testimony,
4 Caleb provided his disclosures, which were lengthy, just days prior
to the nenevidentiary hearing.
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documents, and video. CateL., however, argues the court did net abuse its
discretion in denying Lisa's countermotion wi.thout h.olding an evidentiary
hearing. He claims instead that Lisa. failed to demonstrate a prima facie
case for modification because his "discovery responses addressed and
disapproved [sic] all [of Lisa's] allegations."5
We review a district court's decision to deny a motion to modifý
physical custody without holding an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of
discretion. See Bautista v. Picone, 1.34 NeV. 334, 338, 419 P.3a 157, 160
(2018). A district court abuses its discretion Only when ''no reasonable judge
could reach a similar conclusion under the same circumstances." In re
Guardianship of Rubin, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 27, 491 P.3d 1,- 6 (2021.). (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting. Leavitt c. Sierns, 130 Nev. 503, 509, 330 P.3d
1, 5, (2014)). But "defere.nce is not owed tb legal error, or to findin.gs so
conclusory they may mask legal error." Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450,
352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015) (internal cita.tions omitted). We "must be
satisfied that the court's . deterniination. was made for the appropriate
reascins." Sims v. SiMs, 109 Nev.. 1146; 1148, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993).
Generally, "[1]itigants ih a custody battle have the right to a full
and fair hearing .concerning the ultiniate diSposition of a child." Moser v.
Moser, 1.08 Nev. 572, 576; 836 P.2d 63, 66 (1992). But when a rnovant.seeks
to modify physical custody, a district court. only needs to hold an evidentiary
hearing if the rnovant demonstrates "adequate cause" for one. Rooney; 109
5Caleb primarily relies on. an Oregon Child Protective Services (CPS)
report he submitted to the district court., which determined the.clainas made
a.gainst him were unsubstantiated. Apparently, after Lisa returned S.H.
pursuant to the district court's ord.er, she requested a welfare check fbr S.H.,
which resulted in a CPS .investigation. Caleb claims that this CPS report
addresses the "bulk of [Lisa's] allegations [from her offers of proof]."
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Nev. at 542, 853 P.2d at 124.. "Adequate cause" arises i.f the rnovant
demonstrates a prima facie case for modification. Id. at 543, 853 P.2d at
125. And to modify physical custod.y in Nevada, the movant must show that
"(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the
welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the
modification." Romano v. Rorn.ano, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 1, 501 P.3d 980, 983
(2022) (quoting Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 150, 161 P.3d 239, 242
(2007)).
This case asks us to address what evidence and allegations the
district court may consider in determining whether the • movant has
demonstrated a prima facie case for modification. In determining whether
a movant has demonstrated a prima facie case for modification of physical
clistody, the court must accept the movant's specific allegations as true. See
Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (prOviding that,
in evaluating whether the rnovant established a prima facie case for custody
modification, district courts must accept the movant's allegations as true)
Volz v. Peterson, 667 N.W.2d 637, 641 (N.D. 2003) (same);6 4. BareHi I),
'In Rooney, the supreme court patterned the adequate cause standard
after custody modification standards used in other states. 109 Nev. at 542-
43, 853 P.2d at 124-25. The supreme court also stated that the Rooney
standard "comports with section 410 of the Uniforrn Marriage and Divorce
Act KUMDA)]." Id. at 543 n.4, 853 P.2d at 125 n.4. We therefore look to
section 410 of the UM DA, the cases interpreting it, and the authority the
supreme court relied on in adopting the Rooney standard for instruction i.n.
interpreting Rooney. Cil Las Vegas Dev. Assocs., LLC v. Eighth Judicial.
Dist. Court, 130 Nev. 334, 341, 325 .P.3d 1259, 1264 (2014) (finding federal
court interpretations of FRE 612 "instructive" in interpreting NRS 50.125—
Nevada's parallel provision to FRE 612); Beazer Homes Neu., in.c. v. Eighth.
judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 575, 583, 97 P.3d 1132, 1137 (2004) (holding
that. because NRS 78.585 "was- patterned after Section, 105 of the .1969
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Bareili, H3 Nev. 873, 879-80, 944 P.2d 246, 249-50 (1997) (requiring district
courts to accept a movant's allegations as true in considering Whether the
movant demonstrated a prima facie case under NRCP 41(b)); Mann v. State,
118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002):C[W]here . . . something m.ore
than a naked allegation has been asserted, it is error to resolve the apparent
factual dispute without granting . . . an evidentiary hearing . . . ." (quoting
Vaillancourt v. Warden, 90 Nev. 431, 432, 529 P.2d 204, 205 (1974))). Thus,
the district court should .not require that the moVant .pfove his or her
allegations before holding an evidendary hearing. See Betzer u. Be6zer, 749
S.W:2d '694, 695 (Ky. Ct. AI*. 1988) (holding affidavits alone m.aY be
considered in déterthining adequate cause for a hearing); Geibe,. 571 N.W .2d
at 777; cf. DCR 13(6) ("Factual contentions involved in any pre-trial or post-
trial 'motion shall be initially presented and heard . u.pon affidavits."):
Rooney, 109 Nev. 'at 542-43, 853 P.2d at 124-25 (permitting a cdurt to• deny
motion to modify physical ctistodY based solely on affidavits and points
and authorities--both of-which are not evidence).7
Furthermore. a district court should not. weigh the evidence or
make credibility determinations before holding an evidentiary hearin.g. cf.
Barelli, 113 Nev. at 879-80, 944 P.2d at 249-50 (holding that, in evaluating
Model Act, we may look to the. . case law interpreting provisions bas.ed
on" that act).
7Section 410 of the UMDA references only ,affidavits as. the
evidentiary mechanism through 'which a movant establishes adequ.ate
cause for a hearing: •Unit. Marriage & Divorce Act § 4.10 (1973), RA U.L..A.
538 (1998): see also Rooney, 109 Nev. at 543 m4, 853 P.2.3. at 125 n.4. This
is why Kentucky, which also adopted. section' 410, relies solely upOn
affidavits in determining whether a movant has demonstrated. adequate
cause for a hearing. Betzer, 749 S.W.2d at 696.
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whether the movant has ciern.-instrated a prima facie case for the purposes
of NRCP 41, a court must neicher "paf.4s upon th.e credibility of the witnesses
nor weigh th.e evidence" and will • 'disregard any contradictory evidence
presented by the defense" (internal quotations omitted)); Fernandez v.
Admirand, 108 Nev. 963, 968, 843 P.2d 354, :358 (1992) ("The credibility of
the witnesses and the weight of the evidence are iMmaterial to the
presentation of a prima fa.cie case:). Notably, the supreme court has
iMplicitly held that, 'Under -ROóney;-•the place to present evid.ence
district cou.rt to.weigh i$ at a.n evid.entiary hearing. See Arcella u. Arcella,
133 Nev. 868; 872, 407. P.3d 341, 346 (2017) (noting that, in the Rooney
context, a district court may not decide a motion to modify custody upon
contradictory sworn pleadings [a.nd] arguments of counsel" (alteration in
original) (quoting Mizrachi Mizrachi, 132 Nev. 666, 678, 385 P.3d 982,
990 (Ct. App. 2016))).8 Ind.eed, evid.entiary hearings are designed. with this
purpose in 'mind: to resolve • disputed questions of fact.. • See DCR 13(6)
(recognizing that disputed factual points may be resolved at evidentiary
8See also Pridgeon v. Superior Court, 655 P.2d 1, 5. (Ariz.: 1982)
(holding that a court cannot condu.ct a "trial by affidavit" and attempt to
"weigh the credibility of the opposing statements" in determining adequate
cause for a hearing); Bolar4 v..MUrtha, 800 N.W.2c1 .179, 183 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2011) (holding that district courts must "disregard the contrary
allegations in the nonmoving party's affidavits" when determining if the
movant dernonstrates a prima facie case for modification sufficient to hold
an evidentiary hearing); O'Neill v. O'Neill. 619 N.W.2d 855, .858 (N.D. 2000)
(holding that the district court abused its discretion by weighing conflicting
testimony in determining if the movant presented a prima facie case
warranting an evidentiary hearing)..
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hearings); EDCR 5.205(g)" (providing that exhibits attached to motions do
not constitute substantive eviden.ce unless admitted); cf. Neu. Power Co. v.
Fluor 111., 108 Nev. 638, 644-45, 837 13.2d 1354, 1359 (1992) (recognizing
that conducting an evidentiary hearing is the only way to properly resolve
questions of fact concerning whether to dismiss a party's suit as a discovery
sanction).
Despite this holding, section 410 of the UMDA and persuasive
authority from other states contemplate that a nonmovant may file an
opposing affidavit. See, e.g., Unif. Marriage.& Divorce Act § 410 (1973),-9A
U.L.A. 538 (1998); Boland, 800 N.W.2d at 183; Mock v. Mock, 673 N.W.2d
635, 637-38 (N.D. 2004); In re .Parentage of Jannot, 37 P.3c1 1.265, 1268
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002). We consequently recognize that nonmovants rnay
allege facts and provide offers of proof that may address the allegation.s the
movant has presented. And while district courts may only wei h 'credibility
and evidence at an evidentiary hearing, they nonetheless need not blind
themselves to evidence a nonmovant presents i.t "conclusively
establish[esr the rnovant's claims are false. See Mock, 673 N.W.2d at '637-
38 (internal quotations omitted). Adopting this limited exception serves the
purposes for which Rooney was adopted in the first place: "(1) discourag[ing]
contests over temporary custody; and (2) prevent[ing] repeated or
insubstantial motions for modificati.on." See Rooney, 109 Nev. at 543 n.4,
853 P..2d at 125 n.4 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted)..
Additionally, in -determining whether the m.ovant 'has
demonstrated a prirna facie case for modification, district courts need not
9The EDCR has been amended while this case has been pending On
. appeal, but the rule changes do not affect this rule. *We cite to the rules in
effect while this litigation was taking place in the district court.
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consider facts that are irrelevant to the grounds for rnodification,1° that are
cumulative,il or that are impeaching. Rooney, 109 Nev. at 543, 853 P.2d at
125. Nor need courts consider allegations which, even if proven, would only
,
``permit inferences sufficient to establish grounds for a custody change." Id.
Additionally, courts are not required to consider a movant's general, vague,
broad, or conclusory allegations. See, e.g., DCR 13(5) ("Affidavits shall.
contain only factual, evidentiary matter, shall. conform with the
requirements of NRCP 56(e), and shall .avoid mere general conclusions or
argument. AffidavitS substantially defective in these respects -may be
10 In demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances, the
movant must allege facts that have occurred "since the last custody
determination." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 151, 161 P.3d at 243. Th.is prong of the
test for modifying custody "prevents persons dissatisfied with custody
decrees [from filing] immediate, repetitive, serial motions until the ,right
circumstances or the right judge all.ows them to achieve a d.ifferent result,
based on essentially the same facts." id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 103-04, 86 P.3d 1042, 1046 (2004) (internal
quotations omitted)).
While district courts are barred from considering facts that preexisted
the current custody order in considering whether a substantial. change in
circumstances has occurred, see id., courts are not barred from looking at
that evidence to determine Whether modification is in the child's best
interest. See Nance v. Ferraro, 134 Nev. 152, 16.3, 418 P.3d 679, 688 (Ct.
App. 2018) ("[Prior orders] do not, however, bar. district courts from
reviewing the facts and . evidence u.nderpinning th.eir prior ruling's . in
deciding whether the modification of a prior custody order is in the
best interest:"). This is because "Nevada law is clear: the district court must
consider all the best interest factors in ... deciding whether to modify
custody," and a court's decision to ba.r evidence simply because it preexisted
t.he custody order amounts to an ahuse of discretion. Id. at i 61-62, 418 P.3d
at. 686-87.
nCum.ulative evidence has been defined as "tending to prove the same
thing." Cumulative, Black's Law Dictiona.ry (11th ed. 2019).
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stricken; wholly or in part"); see also, e.g.. Pridgeon, 655 P.2d at 5; .Betzer,
749 S.W.2d at 695; Madgett Madg'ett, 360 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn.. Ct.
App. 1985); Schurnacker Schurnacker, 796 N.W.2d 636, 640 (N.D. 2011);
In. re Marriage of MacLaren, 440 P.3d 1055, 1067 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
Finally, the district court need not consider facts alleged or
exhibits filed that are not supported by verified pleadings, declarations, or
affidavits. Rooney, 109 Nev. at 543 & 11.4, 853 P.2d at 125 & n.4 (alluding
only to facts established in affidavits and citing section 41.0 of the UMDA,
Which requires establishing adequate- cause via affidavits alone); see also
NRS 15.010 (permitting verification of pleadings via affidavit); NRS 53.045
(permitting an unsWOrn declaration signed by the declarant under penalty
of perjury in lieu of an affidavit); EDCR 5.102 ("Unless the context indicates
otherwise, 'affidavit' includes an affidavit, a sWorn declaratieri, and an
unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury."); DCR . 13(6) (reqtiiring
.factual contentions first be presented upon affidavits). For these reasons,
demonstrating a Prima facie case for modification is a. 'heavy 'burden on a
petitioner which mu.st be satisfied befOre a h.earing is convened." Roorda v.
RoOrda, 611 P.2d 794. 796 (Wash. Ct. APp. 1980) .(emphasis added.),
•
ouerruled on other grounds by in re Parentage of Jannot, 65 P.3d 664, 666
(Wash. 2003).
Here,• Lisa alleged facts that, if proven at an evidentiary
hearing, could constitnte a substantia change in circum.stances affecting
the welfare of S.H. and establish that. it is in .S.H.'s best. intereSt to.modify
custody. Specifically, Lisa alleged that Caleb, Valeri (Caleb's current Wife),
and Valeri's sons (ail of whom live in the home) have threatened' harm tO
S.H., and that Valeri struck a child living with S.H. in front of S.H. See
NRS 1.25C.•0035(4)(k) (specifying that a child's best interest includes a
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determination whether a parent has engaged. in an act of domestic violence
against the child or a person residing with the child); NRS 125C.0035(5)
(creating a rebuttable presumption that. sole or primary physicalcustody by
the perpetrator of domestic violence against the child or someone living with
the child is not in the child's best interest); NRS 125C.0035(1)(b) (defining
domestic violence as committing acts described in NRS 33.018(1)). Lisa also
alleged that Caleb and Valeri use specific derogatory terms to demean S.H.
in front of S.H. and directly to her. See. NRS 125C,0035(4)(f)-(h)
(collectively, the custody best interest factors related to the mental health
of the parents; the physical, developmental, and emotional needs of the
child; and the nature of the relationshiP of the child with. each parent).
LiSa also alleged that S.H. has overcrowded teeth that cause
her pain when eating certain foods and that Caleb will not remedy the
situation or allow Lisa to remedy it for him. See NRS 125C.0035(4)(g), (j)
(the parents' ability to .cooperate to meet. the needs of the child and parental
neglect). Additionally, Lisa alleged that S.H. is often forced to clean up fir
the other children, care entirely for two minor children youn.ger than S.H.
on Wednesdays for Valeri, and care for Valeri's nonambulatory son by
bringing him meals, and that Caleb and Valeri are not providing S.H.
proper clothing—leaving her in ripped and dirty clothing.: See NRS
125C.0035(4)(g), (h), (i). Not only did Lisa make these allegations, but:she
provided two declarations and informal offers of proof, summarizing
pro:posed witness testimony for most of them.
Furthermore, Lisa has alleged that S.H. sleeps in a nonbedroom.
on a foam mattress in a house overcrowded. with people and animals and
that S.H. wants to live with her, not Caleb. See NRS 125C.0035(4)(a)
(wishes of the child), (g), (h). Lisa has alleged that 'Caleb has both. deprived.
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her of parenting tifne and substantially interfered with any that did occur.
See NRS 125C.0035('l)(c), (di, (e) (collectively; the custody best interest
factors related to which parent is more likely to allow the child to have .
frequent associations and a continuing relationship with non.custodial
parent; level of conflict between the parents; and the parents ability to
cooperate to meet the need.s of the child); Martin v. Martin„ 120 Nev. 342,
346, 90 P.3d 981, 983 (2004) (holding that a custodial parent's substa.n.tial
or pervasive interference with a noncustodial Parent's parenting. tiMe
cOnstitutes changed circumstances), abrogated On other grounds by Ellis,
123 Nev. 145, 161 P.3d 239. 'She has alleged that Caleb a.nd Valeri do not
help S.H. with her homework, do not• review it, and do not check that it is
done and that, as a result, S.H. has fallen behind in math. See Ellis, 123
Név.. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244 (holding a four-mon.th slide in a.cademic
performance constituted a substantial change in circumstances); see also
N RS 125C.0035(4)(e), (g), (h).
However, rather' than rely ut,on the Allegations Lisa inade• in
her pléadings,• papers, and. declarations, the district court inStea.d relied
upon Caleb's allegations and purported .eVidence in determining Wh.ether
Lisa met her burden of dem-mstrating a prima facie case -for modification.
Indeed, at the second nonevidentiary hearing, the court noted that it was a
"close call" precisely because•Caleb had provided a CPS report investigating
some of' Lisa's claims, S,H.'s unauthenticated medical and dental records,
see NRS 52.325(2), and Lisa's email Allegedly waiving spring' -brea.k
parenting time. The court thus •acknowledged that, before holding An
evidentiary hearing, it Weighed the allegations LiSa provided against the
allegations and offers of proof that Caleb offered. The district court thus
abilsed its discretion when it wei.ghed the respective allegations and. 'offers
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of proof without holding an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Lisa
failed to demonstrate a prirna facie case for modification.
Furthermore, the CPS report that Caleb provided the district
court did not "conclusively establish" the falsity of Lisa's allegations, despite
the similarity between the claims the CPS worker investigated and some of
the allegations Lisa presented to the court. Generally, a CPS case worker
not substantiating similar claims to the ones alleged will not conclusively
establish the falsity of a movant's allegations.'2 Such a decisiOn, as in this
case. would require evaluating the credibility of the CPS worker's testimony
and the quality of her investigation versus Lisa's sworn allegations. While
in many cases an admissible CPS report can be helpful in resolving a case
on the merits, making such determinations is best left to an evidentiary
hearing so the parties can challenge or support the accuracy of the report
and its conclusions, and so the court can review the thoroughness of the
CPS investigation and make credibility determinations." Thus, the'district
12Indeed, such reports are not automatically admissible and are
subject to most of Nevada's typical evidence rules. See In re Parental Rights
as to J.D.N., 128. Nev. 462, 469-70, 283 P.3d 842, 847-48 (2012). The
problem with relying on a nonmovant's documents to determine a movant
has not denionstrated a prima facie case for modification-is that it disposes
of the movant's case upon conflicting evidence that might not even be
admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Denial determinations under Rooney
that effectively end a case for a litigant should not be made on confticting
and potentially inadmissible evidence.
°Finally, even with a reliable CPS report and credible testimony, the
CPS report's recomm.endations may not be applicable because the
conclusion from a child protection investigation haS a different purpose than
a motion to modify custody. See, eg., NRS 432B.180 (detailing the duties of
the Division of Child and Family ServiCes (DCFS)); NRS 432B.330
(describing when a child may need protecti.on by DCFS); NRS 432B.340
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court abused its discretio.n in weighing the evidence and making credibility
determinations resulting in a case-ending custody decision based upon
conflicting evidence without holding an evidentiary hearing.
And here, even accepting the CPS report as admissible and
accurate, Lisa made many other specific allegations that establish a prima
facie case for modification. The district court therefore abused its discretion
when it weighed Caleb's proposed evid.ence against Lisa's relevant
allegations and determined. that• Lisa had not made a prima facie showing
for modifying phYsical custody. The district court therefore should haVe
found adequate cause to hold an evidentiary hearing based on Lisa's
allegations.14 The district court cOnsequently abused its discretion becanse
(noting that a child not in imminent danger from abuse or neglect need not
necessarily be placed in protective custody).
"To clarify, once a movant establishes a prima facie case for
modification based upon his or her verified pleadings, • declarations; or
affidavits, the district court cannot deny the movant's motion to modify
without first holding an evidentiary hearing. .Rooney, 109 Nev. at 542, 853
P.2d at 124. It generally therefore does not matter if postjudgment
discovery has occurred because courts are only concerned, as discussed
above, with what the movant has alleged in his or her verified pleadings,
declarations, and affidavits. For this reason, postjudgment discovery is
generally not permitted in child custody cases without setting a subsequent
evidentiary hearing because what is discovered should not be considered in
the district court's Rooney analysis.. See supra note 2. But compare NRCP
16.21(b)(2) (recognizing postjudgment discovery may be permitted for good
cause), with supra discussion in text between notes 9 and 10 (adopting an
exception wherein a district court rnay rely on evidence the nonmovant
presents that "conclusively establish{esr the falsity of the .movarit's
all.egations in determining if the rnovant presented a prim.a facie case for
modification). Thus, under the ideal situation, the.district court would ha:ve
reviewed Lisa's motion, found that she had demonstrated 6. prima facie, case
for modification, ordered • postjudgment discovery regarding Lisa's
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no reasonable judge could. have found that Lisa failed to demonstrate a
prima facie case for modification had that judge accepted the allegations
Lisa provided in her declarations as true.
From the record, it appears that Caleb argued., and the district
court may have believed, that Lisa's declarations or offers of proof contained
allegations that were either cumulative, impeaching, or inappropriate to
consider in evaluating whether there had been a substan.tial change of
circumstances. As discussed above, the court would. not have needed to
con.sider any insufficient allegations in deterrnining whether Lisa
demonstrated a prima facie case for modification. But in the order denying
Lisa's motion to modify, the district cOurt did not provide specific findings
or adequately explain why Lisa failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for
modification.
In modification of child.custody cases; district courts must make
specific findings and provid:e adequate explanation for their child custod.y
determinations. Davis Ewalefo. 131 Nev. 445, 452, 352 P.3d 1139. 1143
(2015). The supreme court requires these findings, and especially the
explanation, for two reasons: (1) to aid appellate review by ensurir.g the
court made its determination for appropriate reasons. and (2) to help
parents understand why the motion was decided the way that it was
because it may affect future motions to modify custody.15 See id. at 452, 352
allegations, then . set an evidentiary hearing for , Lisa to pfove those
allegations.
thImportantly, when a district court denies a motion to modify custody
under Rooney, which is a threshold determination, it has the same practical.
effect as a denial on the merits: custody is not Modified. Davis's purposes
in requiring findings and an adequate explanation are no 1.ess served in the-
Rooney context, because in either case parents will not u.nderstand what
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P.3d at 1143-44. And without these findings and explanation,' 6 appellate
courts—and parents--are relegated to speculate about how and why the
court ruled as it did, which we will not do. Cf. Somee'v. State, 124 Nev. 434,
442, 187 P.3d 152, 158 (2008);
We now hold that the district coUrt must provide an adequate
explanation when it denies a motion to modify custody without holding an
evidentiary hearing given that su.:-.:11 a denial has the same practical
implications for a movant as a denial on the merits. See supra note 1.6; cf.
NRCP 52(a)(3) ("The court is not required td state findings or conclusion§
when ruling on a motion under Rule 12 or 56 or. . on. any oth.er motion..
The court should, however, state on the record the reasons for granting or
denying a motion." (emphasis added)). And when a district court fails to
provide an adequate explanation for its 'denial, it makes it difficult for this
needs to h.appen before custody may be modified. Consequently, a district
court's failure to follow Davis may encourage repetitive, insubstantial
motions to modify custody, which is antithetical to Rooney's stated purpose.
See Rooney, 109 Nev. at 543 .n.4, 853 P.2d at 125 n.4.. Explaining to parents
why their allegations are insufficient to Modify custody is especially
important given that many parents who seek to modify custody do so pro
se. Cf. Stephan Landsman, Pro Se Litigation, 8 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc, Sci.
231, 239 (2012) (noting an increase in self-representation in the domestic
relations context and a "clear trend" towards it).
1,6We recognize th.at findings or an adequate explanation in this
Rooney context is different and will be limited to the sufficiency of the
allegations contained in the verified pleadings, affidavitS, declarations, and
exhibits filed with the court because no evidence will have been admitted
yet. See, e.g., EDCR 5.205(g) ("Exhibits rnaY be deemed offers of proof but
shall not be considered substantive evidence unless admitted.").
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court to review the district court's decision.I 7 An explanation that follows
the framework of Davis is certainly adequate, but the court gave no such
explanation in this case—just a concluSory one that mirrored Rooney's legal
requirements.
Additionally, even thou.gh Lisa demonstrated a prima facie case
requiring the court to hold an evidentiary hearing, we Strongly reiterate
that the forrn of that evidentiary hearing—both in this case and. generally—
is entirely within the district court's broad discretion. Arcella, 133 Nev. at
872, 407 P.3d at 346 ("While these circumstances obligated the district coUrt
to conduct an evidentiary hearing, the form of that hearing remains within
the district court's discretion."). For example, a district court may dictate
when the hearing takes place, the arnount of discovery to take place before
the hearing (if any), the time each party has to offer evidence, and the scope
of the evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., id. (rioting that the court had discretion
tO interview the child if it .fcund it appropriate under the circumstances);
see also NRCP 16.215 (establishing procedures for child interview's a.nd
testimony). And these determinations will be overturned on appeal only if
the district court clearly abuses its discretion. Primm v. Lopes, 109 Nev.
502, 504, 853 P.2d 103, 104 (1993).
CONCLUSION
District courts wield 'substantial discretion in child custody
cases. See NRS 125C.0045(1) This includ.es the discretion to deny a motion
to modify custody without hol.ding an evidentiary hearing. Roon.ey,109 Nev.
'Tor example, we do not have on the record before us Lisa's
previously filed motions that may bar .under res judicata principles some of
th.e claims she has presented in her most recent declarations. Compare
su,pra note 10, with, Castle, 120 Nev. at 104-05, 86 P.3d at 1047.
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at 542-43, 853 P.2d at 124-25. To exercise that discretion, however, the
district court must first find that the movant has failed to demonstrate a
prima facie case for modification. See id. And today, we further require
that—subject to the exception announced—district courts must make that
determination by looking solely to the rnovant's proper allegations,
generally presented in the movant's verified pleadings, declarations, or
affidavits. The district court in this case thus abused its discretion when it
relied upon the nonmovant's allegations and Offers of proof to find Lisa
failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for modification. Because Lisa's
declarations established a prima facie case for modification, the district
court abused its discretion in denying her motion to modify custody without
holding an evidentiary hearing. We consequently reverse and remand the
district court order with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Gibons im'*.#"-°.
We concur:
J.
Tao
d opiTimmagmastainms ___ J.
Bulla
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