Hasija, M.D. v. Med. Revenue Sols., Llc ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
DEEPA HASIJA, M.D., AN No. 82212
INDIVIDUAL; AND DEEPA HASIJA
MD PLLC, A NEVADA PROFESSIONAL
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
Appellants, FILE
vs.
MEDICAL REVENUE SOLUTIONS, AUG 0 3 2022
LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY ELIZABETh A. BROWN
CLER9t 9UPRENIE COURT
COMPANY, BY •
Res s ondent. DEPUTY CLERItY
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a
default judgment under NRCP 60(b) in a contract and torts action. Eighth
Judicial District Court, Clark County; Mark R. Denton, Judge.' The
underlying action arises from a billing services agreement between the
parties. The day a responsive pleading to the underlying complaint was
due, appellant Deepa Hasija, M.D., filed a pro se document purporting to be
an affidavit requesting additional time to file her answer. The court's
electronic filing system (EFS) rejected the document the next day because
of formatting issues, after which Hasija refiled the document. Neither
Hasija nor appellant Deepa Hasija MD PLLC answered the complaint, and
the district court ultimately entered a default judgment against them. The
district court later denied appellants' motions to set aside the default
•judgment and this appeal followed. We denied respondent's motion to
dismiss this appeal, explaining that the issues that may be raised in this
appeal "are limited to challenges to the order denying the second motion to
vacate the judgment." Hasija v. Med. Rev. Sols., LLC, Docket No. 82212
'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
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OF is not warranted.
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01-62 -?(-4303
(Order Denying Motion and Reinstating Briefing, Jan. 25, 2021). After
briefing, this court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing to
address the following: (1) whether Hasija made an appearance that entitled
her to notice and a hearing on respondent's application for default judgment
under NRCP 55(b)(2), and (2) whether this issue was raised below or
forfeited. See id. (Order Directing Supplemental Briefing, Mar. 11, 2022).
In response to our order directing supplemental briefing,
respondent argues that this court may not reach the issue of whether
appellants were entitled to notice and a hearing under NRCP 55(b)(2) and
EDCR 2.70(b)(2) because they did not raise this issue below; and more
specifically, did not raise it in their second motion to vacate, to which this
court has limited the appeal. We agree.
As noted above, this court's order reinstating briefing limited
the appellate issues to those raised by appellants in their second motion to
vacate. Those arguments include whether that the district court should set
aside the default judgment because their failure to file a timely responsive
pleading was due to excusable neglect, and whether the district court was
required to deem Hasija's affidavit as submitted when she attempted to file
due to a "technical error." Because appellants did not raise the issue of
whether either appellant made an appearance in the action such that they
were entitled to notice and a hearing under NRCP 55(b)(2) in their second
motion to vacate, we decline to address this argument. In so holding, we
necessarily reject appellants' invitation to adopt the test outlined by the
First Circuit Court of Appeals in National Association of Social Workers v.
Harwood, for determining whether to address an issue on appeal which was
not raised below. 69 F.3d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1995).
Nevertheless, appellants argue that even if we decline to
address the notice and hearing issue, the district court should have granted
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their motion for relief from the default judgment under NRCP 60(b)(1)
because it was based on Hasija mistakenly filing an improperly formatted
document. See NRCP 60(b)(1) (allowing a court to set aside a judgment that
is based on a mistake or excusable neglect). More specifically, they argue
that EDCR 8.10(b) required the district court to treat the document as if it
were filed the day a responsive pleading was due. See EDCR 8.10(b)
(providing that, if technical problems with the court's electronic filing
system delay the filing of a document, the court "must" treat the document
as filed on the day the filer attempted to file it). But for the mistake in
filing, appellants argue that the court would have granted them additional
time to answer the complaint rather than entering a default judgment. We
review the denial of NRCP 60(b) relief for an abuse of discretion, Willard v.
Berry-Hinckley Indus., 136 Nev. 467, 469, 469 P.3d 176, 179 (2020), but
review de novo the interpretation of EDCR 8.10, see Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev.
260, 264, 350 P.3d 1139, 1141 (2015) (holding that where a district court's
decision relies on interpretation of court rules, we review de novo).
Appellants' argument lacks merit. As counsel for appellants
conceded below, the EFS rejected the document requesting additional time
because it was improperly formatted. This does not constitute a technical
problem under EDCR 8.10, as the plain language of the rule is limited to
where "technical problems with the EFS preclude the court from accepting
electronic filings." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, even if this argument had
merit, it would not warrant relieving the PLLC from the default judgment.
Hasija filed the document pro se and the PLLC never sought additional time
to file an answer.2 See Salrnan v. Newell, 110 Nev. 1333, 1336, 885 P.2d
2Indeed, the PLLC's first appearance in the action was a motion to set
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aside the default judgment.
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607, 608 (1994) (providing that a proper person litigant may represent
themselves in court, but that only attorneys may represent companies and
other entities). Because appellants' EDCR 8.10 argument lacks merit, and
their second motion to vacate was premised on this rule, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants' request
for NRCP 60(b)(1) relief. See Willard, 136 Nev. at 469, 469 P.3d at 179.
Additionally, we conclude that appellants did not otherwise
establish grounds for NRCP 60(b)(1) relief because they did not promptly
apply to remove the judgment, there was no lack of knowledge of the
procedural requirements for when a responsive pleading is due, and the
merits of the case are not at issue because only the extent of damages would
remain. See id. at 470, 469 P.3d at 179 (quoting Yochum v. Davis, 98 Nev.
484, 653 P.2d 1215 (1982)) (outlining the relevant factors for determining
whether grounds for NRCP 60(b)(1) relief exists). Appellants did not
promptly apply to remove the judgment; they did not challenge the entry of
default 'and instead waited several months to claim excusable neglect.3
Additionally, because appellants' arguments regarding EDCR 8.10 lack
merit, and because appellants thus can only challenge the .entry of default
judgment, the merits of the case are not at issue, only the extent of damages.
See Est. of Lomastro v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 124 Nev. 1060, 1068, 195 P.3d
339, 345 (2008) ("Entry of default ... generally resolves the issues of
3Notably, appellants could have challenged the default on the same
grounds that they now use to challenge the default judgment. See NRCP
55(c) (providing that a district court may set aside default upon a showing
of good cause); Tahoe Vill. Realty v. DeSmet, 95 Nev. 131, 134, 590 P.2d
1158, 1160 (1979) (holding that "good cause" under NRCP 55(c)
encompasses the "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect"
referred to in Rule 60(b)(1)), abrogated on other grounds by Ace Truck &
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Equip. Rentals, Inc. v. Kahn, 103 Nev. 503, 746 P.2d 132 (1987).
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liability and causation and leaves open only the extent of damages."). And
appellants fail to demonstrate that there was "a lack of knowledge of
procedural requirements." To the contrary, the record reflects that Hasija
understood that she was required to file a responsive pleading, and indeed,
attempted to file such a document.4 As there was a valid entry of default,
and appellants fail to demonstrate an NRCP 60(b)(1) ground occurring after
entry of default that led to the default judgment, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants' motion. See
Willard, 136 Nev. at 469, 469 P.3d at 179. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.5
Parraguirre
Hardesty
cc: Hon. Mark R. Denton, District Judge
Kristine M. Kuzemka, Settlement Judge
Nicholas R. Shook
Garg Golden Law Firm
Eighth District Court Clerk
4We have reviewed appellants' additional arguments and conclude
that they lack merit and/or were not raised as part of appellants' second
motion to vacate the default judgment. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown,
97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial
court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been
waived and will not be considered on appeal.").
5The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.
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