Gonzalez v. State ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
DAVID A. GONZALEZ, AN No. 82762
INDIVIDUAL,
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA; THE STATE
OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF FILE
CONSERVATION AND NATURAL
RESOURCES; THE STATE OF AUG El 4 N21
NEVADA, DIVISION OF FORESTRY; fH A. BPOWN
'UPREME U
STEVE SISOLAK, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF DEP Y CLERK
NEVADA; BRADLEY CROWELL, IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR OF NEVADA
DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION
AND NATURAL RESOURCES; AND
KACEY KC, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS NEVADA STATE
FORESTER FIREWARDEN;
COLLECTIVELY,
Res eondents.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a district court order dismissing a
complaint for unpaid wages. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
Adriana Escobar, Judge.
Appellant David Gonzalez, an inmate in the Nevada
Department of Corrections, was contracted by the Nevada Division of
Forestry "to perform work related to firefighting_ and other work
projects" in accordance with NRS 209.457(2)(a). He was paid approximately
$3 per day and an additional $1 per hour for emergency incident response
assignments. In the underlying action, Gonzalez claimed backpay, arguing
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that he was entitled to minimum wage for his employment with the inmate
work program pursuant to Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada State
Constitution, the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA). See Nev. Const. art.
15, § 16(C). The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss after
determining that an inmate working pursuant to an inmate work program
in Nevada does not meet the definition of an "employee" under the MWA.
This appeal followed. We affirm.
The MWA was approved and ratified by Nevada voters in 2004
and 2006 "to provide higher wages to employees . . . in order to fight poverty
and ensure that workers who are the backbone of our economy receive fair
paychecks that allow them and their families to live above the poverty line."
See MDC Rests., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 315, 324, 419
P.3d 148, 155 (2018) (internal quotations omitted); see also Nev. Const. art.
15, § 16(C). In many significant aspects, such as determining whether an
employment relationship exists, the standards under the MWA run parallel
to those of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). See Doe Dancer I
v. La Fuente, Inc., 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 3, 481 P.3d 860, 866-67 (2021); Terry
v. Sapphire Gentlemen's Club, 130 Nev. 879, 883-86, 336 P.3d 951, 955-56
(2014).
Federal courts have considered the issue of whether inmates in
work programs are guaranteed a minimum wage under the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and concluded that they are not. We find these
decisions persuasive. In Morgan v. MacDonald, 41 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th
Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit held that the minimum wage provisions of
FLSA did not apply to a Nevada inmate because he was not an employee
under the economic realities test. In doing so, the court reaffirmed its
holding in Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993), explaining that:
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Under [NRS] 209.461, all inmates are required to
work or receive training for 40 hours each week.
Thus, Morgan was in no sense free to bargain with
would-be employers for the sale of his labor; his
work at the prison was merely an incident of his
incarceration. Morgan and the prison didn't
contract with one another for mutual economic
gain, as would be the case in a true employment
relationship; their affiliation was penological, not
pecuniary. Because the economic reality of
Morgan's work at the prison clearly indicates that
his labor belonged to the institution, he cannot be
deemed an employee under the FLSA.
Morgan, 41 F.3d at 1293 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Similarly, in Vanskike v. Peters, the Seventh Circuit explained that federal
courts have generally declined to extend the FLSA's minimum wage
provision to prisoners who work in prison. 974 F.2d 806, 807-08 (7th Cir.
1992). While an employee's status is determined by the totality of the
circumstances rather than any technical label, id. at 808, the court noted
that the evil of substandard wages does not apply where a worker's welfare
is not a function of wages. Id. at 810-11.
The federal cases are instructive here. The primary goals of the
MWA are two-fold: (1) raise the minimum wage and, (2) broaden the class
of workers with access to the minimum wage, so that workers are prevented
from falling into substandard living conditions. See MDC Rests., 134 Nev.
at 324, 419 P.3d at 155; see also Terry, 130 Nev. at 884, 336 P.3d at 955
(noting that the MWA signals "voters' wish that more, not fewer, persons
would receive minimum wage protections"). Likewise, the central purpose
of the FLSA is to ensure a minimum standard of living for workers. See
Morgan, 41 F.3d at 1292; Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 810-11. As observed in
Morgan, Vanskike, and other cases applying the FLSA, the fundamental
relationship between employers and employees vastly differs from the
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relationship between the State and inmates. The concern of falling into
substandard living conditions, or the evils of substandard wages, do not
apply to inmates, who are guaranteed housing, meals, medical attention,
and the ability to participate in work programs in exchange for sentence-
reduction credits. Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 810-11. The realities of
incarceration, and the working relationship that stems from inmate work
programs, are not based on an economic relationship between inmates and
the State, but rather a penological and rehabilitative relationship. Morgan,
41 F.3d at 1293. Thus, Gonzalez was not an "employee" for purposes of the
MWA. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of district court AFFIRMED.
C.J.
Parraguirre
J.
Hardesty
J.
Stiglich
J.
Cadish
•
Silver
J.
Herndon
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PICKERING, J., concurring:
I join the order affirming the district court's dismissal. I write
separately to note that, while the circumstances under which an
incarcerated individual has been held entitled to minimum wage are rare,
the law does not categorically exclude such individuals from the protections
of the FLSA and other minimum wage laws. See Henthorn v. Dep't of Navy,
29 F.3d 682, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[M]ost courts refuse to hold that
prisoners are categorically barred from ever being 'employees' within the
meaning of the FLSA merely because of their prisoner status.") (emphasis
omitted); Barnett v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, Inc., No. 98-3625, 1999
WL 110547 (8th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5th
Cir. 1990). The complaint in this case does not allege circumstances
entitling the plaintiff to minimum wage. But the outcome could be different
under different circumstances.
J.
Pickering
cc: Hon. Adriana Escobar, District Judge
Gallian Welker & Beckstrom, LC/Las Vegas
Attorney General/Carson City
Eighth District Court Clerk
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