Loo v. Loo ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    ROY H. LOO,                                          No. 66403
    Appellant/Cross-Respondent,
    vs.
    JEFFREY LYNN DEETS, AN
    INDIVIDUAL,
    FILED
    Respondent/Cross-Appellant.                               APR 1 5 2016
    and
    TRACE K. LINDE.MAN
    WENDY L. LOO, AN INDIVIDUAL.                           CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
    BY ___S__Y_Oft.j&31,4aor
    Respondent.                                                DEPUTY CLERK
    ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART,
    VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING
    This is an appeal from district court orders dismissing a
    contract and tort action and a cross-appeal from a district court order
    denying a request for attorney fees. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
    County; Joanna Kishner, Judge.
    Having considered the parties' arguments and the record, we
    conclude that the district court properly dismissed appellant's complaint
    based on issue preclusion. 1 See Alcantara v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 130
    Nev., Adv. Op. 28, 
    321 P.3d 912
    , 914 (2014) (reviewing de novo a district
    court's application of issue preclusion); Five Star Capital Corp. u. Ruby,
    
    124 Nev. 1048
    , 1055, 
    194 P.3d 709
    , 713 (2008) (setting forth the elements
    of issue preclusion). In particular, the claims asserted in appellant's
    complaint implicated the issue of how the Loos' marital assets should be
    allocated. This identical issue was actually and necessarily litigated in
    the Loos' divorce proceeding, as evidenced by the language in the Loos'
    marital settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce
    'In light of this conclusion, we need not address whether dismissal
    SUPREME COURT   was also appropriate based on claim preclusion.
    OF
    NEVADA
    (0) IY47A
    1 (9 '. I /?7
    1,.
    decree, and which constituted a final judgment on the merits.      Five 
    Star, 124 Nev. at 1055
    , 194 P.3d at 713; York v. York,     
    99 Nev. 491
    , 493, 
    664 P.2d 967
    , 968 (1983); Spilsbury v. Spilsbury, 
    92 Nev. 464
    , 466, 
    553 P.2d 421
    , 422 (1976). Therefore, the district court properly determined that the
    elements of issue preclusion were satisfied, and we are not persuaded by
    appellant's arguments otherwise. 2
    To the extent that appellant's claims against Jeffrey Deets
    were premised on an agreement other than the Loos' marital settlement
    agreement, the district court properly determined that appellant's
    complaint failed to sufficiently allege the existence of a contract. See Buzz
    Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas,    
    124 Nev. 224
    , 228, 
    181 P.3d 670
    , 672
    (2008) (reviewing de novo a district court NRCP 12(b)(5) dismissal). In
    particular, appellant's bare assertions that he had an "implied oral
    contract" with Deets and that the unidentified terms of that contract were
    breached due to various violations of the Nevada Physical Therapy Code of
    Ethics were insufficient to satisfy Nevada's notice-pleading standard.    See
    Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 
    109 Nev. 842
    , 846, 
    858 P.2d 1258
    ,
    1260 (1993) ("The test for determining whether the allegations of a
    complaint are sufficient to assert a claim for relief is whether the
    allegations give fair notice of the nature and basis of a legally sufficient
    2 Even if appellant's complaint were treated as an action in equity
    challenging the divorce decree, see Doan v. Wilkerson, 130 Nev., Adv. Op.
    48, 
    327 P.3d 498
    , 501-02 (2014); Day v. Day, 
    80 Nev. 386
    , 389, 
    395 P.2d 321
    , 322 (1964), appellant still would not have been entitled to relief
    because, among other reasons, his complaint failed to identify any
    particular asset or property that was omitted from the decree or the value
    of which Ms. Loo misrepresented.
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    2
    (0) I947A
    claim and the relief requested."). Accordingly, we affirm the district
    court's dismissal of appellant's complaint. 3
    On cross-appeal, Deets contends that the district court
    improperly denied his motion for attorney fees without considering his
    arguments as to why fees were warranted under NRS 18.010(2)(b), NRS
    7.085, and EDCR 7.60. We agree. Accordingly, we vacate the appealed
    orders insofar as they denied Deets' motion for attorney fees and remand
    this matter for the district court to consider Deets' request for attorney
    fees under the relied-upon statutes and rule. Consistent with the
    foregoing, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN
    PART AND VACATED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the
    district court for proceedings consistent with this order.
    10   vti
    Douglas
    Cherry
    >9:Ider"
    Gibbons
    cc: Hon. Joanna Kishner, District Judge
    Lansford W. Levitt, Settlement Judge
    E. Brent Bryson
    Law Office of Michael P. Carman
    Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    3Appellant did not explain to the district court how he could have
    cured the pleading defects in his original complaint with an amended
    complaint, nor has he done so on appeal. We therefore perceive no
    reversible error in the district court's decision to dismiss appellant's
    original complaint.
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    3
    (P) 1947A    e