In Re: Parental Rights As To R.M.M. ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL No. 82550
RIGHTS AS TO R.M.M., A MINOR.
HEATHER M.,
Appellant,
vs.
.-. MAR 17 2022
STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT
A. BROWN
OF FAMILY SERVICES; AND R.M.M., A COURT
MINOR.
Res • ondents.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal frorn a district court order terminating
appellant's parental rights. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
Cynthia N. Giuliani, Judge.'
Appellant Heather M. is the biological mother of four-year-old
R.M.M.2 Respondent State of Nevada Department of Family Services (DFS)
removed R.M.M. from Heather's custody when Heather was arrested with
R.M.M. in an unsafe house where drugs were present. DFS placed R.M.M.
with paternal relatives out of state and adopted a case plan listing several
terms and conditions for Heather to satisfy before she could be reunited
with her son. Heather's case plan generally required her to address her
1Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted.
2 R.M.M.'s father's rights are not at issue in this appeal.
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substance abuse and mental health issues, obtain stable housing, and
demonstrate that she can provide for R.M.M.'s basic needs. After
approximately two years, the district court granted DFS petition to
terminate Heather's parental rights, concluding that DFS had proven
several grounds of parental fault by clear and convincing evidence and that
terminating Heather's parental rights was in R.M.M.'s best interest. See In
re Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 133 (2000)
(explaining that to terminate parental rights, the district court must find
clear and convincing evidence of parental fault and that termination is in
the child's best interest); see also NRS 128.105(1)(b) (listing grounds of
parental fault).
Here, the district court found that two statutory presumptions
applied, establishing parental fault and creating a rebuttable presumption
that terminating Heather's parental rights was in R.M.M.'s best interest.
First, because R.M.M. had resided outside of Heather's home for more than
14 of the past 20 consecutive months at the time of trial, the presumption
that Heather had only demonstrated token efforts to care for him and that
terminating her parental rights was in R.M.M.'s best interest applied. See
NRS 128.109(1)(a) (concerning token efforts), (2) (concerning the child's best
interests). And second, because Heather did not "substantially [comply]
with the terms and conditions of a plan to reunite her with R.M.M. within
6 months of his removal, the presumption of a failure of parental
adjustment also applied. NRS 128.109(1)(b); see also NRS 128.0126
(defining "failure of parental adjustment" as "when a parent [is] unable or
unwilling within a reasonable time to correct substantially the
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circumstances, conduct or conditions which led to" the child being placed
outside of the home).
Heather does not dispute that the district court properly
applied these presumptions. Instead, she argues that the district court
committed reversible error by failing to make specific findings as to whether
her supporting witnesses testimony sufficiently rebutted the presumptions.
See In re Parental Rights as to C.C.A., 128 Nev. 166, 170, 273 P.3d 852, 854-
55 (2012) (requiring the district court to identify the factual bases for
finding that the statutory grounds for termination existed). We disagree.
Unlike in C. C.A., where the district court's order "d[id] not reference any
specific facts or evidence presented by the partiee and only "recite[d] the
statutory grounds required to terminate a parent's parental rights," id. at
170, 273 P.3d at 854, the district court here made explicit factual findings
explaining why it found Heather did not overcome the statutory
presumptions, see Matter of T.MR., 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 23, 487 P.3d 783,
789 (2021) (holding that overcoming the best interest presumption requires
a party to "establish that termination is not in the child's best interests by
a preponderance of the evidence"); Matter of A.D.L., 133 Nev. 561, 568, 402
P.3d 1280, 1287 (2017) (applying the saxne standard to rebut NRS 128.109s
presumption due a lack of parental adjustment); see also NRS 128.107
(listing factors the district court must consider when determining whether
the parent has rebutted the best interest presumptions). Contrary to
Heather's assertions, the district court found that although Heather
presented testimony from several witnesses that she was committed to her
sobriety and to reunifying with her son, she also failed to show behavioral
change due to her inconsistent therapy attendance, several missed drug
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tests, and minimal efforts to maintain regular visitation with R.M.M.
despite having over two years to do so. See NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6) (listing
factors that demonstrate that the parent has made only token efforts to care
for the child); NRS 128.107(3) (providing that when the child is not in the
parent's physical custody, the district court must consider "[t]he effort the
parent . . . [has] made to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions
to make it in the child's best interest to return the child to his [parent's]
home after a reasonable length of time). As such, we conclude that the
district court made adequate findings and substantial evidence supports its
findings that Heather only made token efforts for reunification and failure
of parental adjustment.3 See In re N.J., 116 Nev. at 795, 8 P.3d at 129(stating that this court "will uphold termination orders based upon
substantial evidence).
The district court also made specific findings supporting its
conclusion that terminating Heather's parental rights was in R.M.M.'s best
interest. Specifically, the district court found that there was a lack of a bond
between Heather and her son and noted concerns that R.M.M. could not
achieve permanency with Heather in the near future. See NRS 128.107
(1isting factors the district court should consider when the child is not in the
parent's custody). The district court also found that R.M.M. was placed with
his grandmother, an adoptive resource, was well bonded to her, fully
integrated into her home, and that she was able to meet all of R.M.M.'s
3Because only one ground of parental fault is required to support the
termination of parental rights, see NRS 128.105(1)(b) (requiring a finding
of at least one ground of parental fault), we need not review the other
findings of parental fault.
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needs. See NRS 128.108 (listing additional considerations where the child
is living in a foster home). Therefore, we conclude the district court's best
interest finding is supported by substantial evidence. Based upon the
foregoing, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.4
C.J.
arraguirre
.41.4CAX J. Sr.J.
Stiglich
cc: Hon. Cynthia N. Giuliani, District Judge
Maria A. Perez Avilez
Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP/Las Vegas
Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc.
Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division
Eighth District Court Clerk
4The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.
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