CARDENAS-GARCIA v. DIST. CT. (DEPT. OF FAMILY SERV.) ( 2024 )

140 Nev., Advance Opinion 5e9
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
YUMILA CARDENAS-GARCIA, No. 87414
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
FILE
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
STEPHANIE CHARTER, DISTRICT
JUDGE,
Respondents, C • IEF DEPUTY CLERK
and
CLARK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
FAMILY SERVICES; AND Z.K., A
MINOR,
Real Parties in Interest.
Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district
court order denying petitioner's rnotion to determine application of a
statutory presumption against reunification in a child protection matter.
Petition denied.
Resch Law, PLLC, d/b/a Conviction Solutions, and Jamie J. Resch, Las
Vegas,
for Petitioner.
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
Attorney, and Donella M. Rowe, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark
County,
for Real Party in Interest Clark County Department of Family Services.
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Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc., and Kimberly M. Abbott, Las
Vegas,
for Real Party in Interest Z.K.
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HERNDON, LEE, and BELL, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, LEE, J.:
When interpreting a statute, this court aims to effectuate the
plain meaning of every word. The statute at issue, NRS 432B.555, requires
parents in child protection proceedings who have "ever been convicted" of
felony child abuse, neglect, or endangerment to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the child subject to the proceedings will not be
harmed by reunification before the child can be released to the parent.
Petitioner Yumila Cardenas-Garcia pleaded guilty to felony child abuse but
was later allowed to withdraw that plea after the successful completion of
probation. Cardenas-Garcia now seeks extraordinary writ relief directing
the district court to find that NRS 432B.555's presumption against
reunification does not apply to her since her felony conviction has been
voided. Because we conclude NRS 432B.555 applies to anyone who has ever
previously been convicted of felony child abuse, regardless of the legal
status of that conviction, we decline to issue the writ.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Real party in interest, six-year-old Z.K., was removed from
Cardenas-Garcia's custody when conditions in her home were determined
to be unlivable. Z.K. was placed in protective custody, and Cardenas-Garcia
was charged with felony child abuse, neglect, or endangerment under NRS
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,( 9-t721
200.508. Cardenas-Garcia pleaded no contest at the original custody
hearing, and Z.K. remained in protective custody. As to the separate
criminal case, Cardenas-Garcia pleaded guilty to the felony as part of a
drop-down plea agreement.' A judgment of conviction was entered. Still,
the terms of this drop-down agreement allowed Cardenas-Garcia to
withdraw the felony guilty plea after successful completion of the terms of
her probation and instead enter a plea of guilty to contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, a misdemeanor.
After the criminal court entered the judgment of conviction but
before she had completed probation, Cardenas-Garcia requested that the
district court grant a hearing in the protective custody action to determine
whether she had rebutted NRS 432B.555's presumption against
reunification for parents who have "ever been convicted" of felony child
abuse, neglect, or endangerment. The court conducted an evidentiary
hearing and determined Cardenas-Garcia had not proven by clear and
convincing evidence that Z.K. would not suffer physical or psychological
harm if allowed to return to the home. The district court further noted that
the statute would continue to bar reunification until Cardenas-Garcia could
satisfy her burden of proof.
Several months later, Cardenas-Garcia successfully completed
probation and was allowed to withdraw the felony guilty plea. With the
felony conviction now vacated, Cardenas-Garcia again moved the district
court for a determination regarding the continuing application of NRS
1A drop-down plea agreement refers to a plea that allows a defendant
to plead guilty to a felony, complete probation, then withdraw the guilty
felony plea and instead plead guilty to an associated misdemeanor. See,
e.g., Ames v. State, No. 69640-COA, 2016 WL 4070215 (Nev. Ct. App.
July 26, 2016) (Order of Affirmance).
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432B.555. The court noted that because of the withdrawn plea, "mother
does not have a convictionN however, at the 555 presumption hearind]
mother did not overcome the presumption." The court's written order
confirms the court's reasoning that because NRS 432B.555's presumption
clearly applied at the prior hearing on the matter, Cardenas-Garcia failed
to rebut the presumption. Cardenas-Garcia now petitions this court for a
writ of mandamus instructing the district court to find that she does not
have a felony conviction and need not meet the standard set under NRS
432B.555 to be eligible for possible reunification with Z.K.
DISCUSSION
A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise
of discretion. NRS 34.160; Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct.,
124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008). This court retains sole
discretion on whether to grant extraordinary relief, and petitioners bear the
burden of proving such intervention is necessary. Smith v. Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991); Pan v. Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). We elect to consider
the merits of this petition because it offers the opportunity, not otherwise
available through appeal, to review an important statute regarding child
custody in the first instance. Int'l Garne Tech., 124 Nev. at 197, 179 P.3d at
558. But because we determine NRS 432B.555 is properly applied to
parents previously convicted of felony child abuse, neglect, or endangerment
who have later had that conviction withdrawn, we decline to issue the
requested relief.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See
Id. at 198, 179 P.3d at 559 ("Statutory interpretation is a question of law
that we review de novo, even in the context of a writ petition."). "Where a
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statute is clear and unambiguous, this court gives effect to the ordinary
meaning of the plain language of the text without turning to other rules of
construction." Chandra v. Schulte, 135 Nev. 499, 501 454 P.3d 740, 743
(2019). "In interpreting the plain language of a statute, we presume that
the Legislature intended to use words in their usual and natural meaning."
McGrath v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 123 Nev. 120, 123, 159 P.3d 239, 241
(2007). Importantly, plain text analysis "should not render any part of a
statute meaningless, and a statute's language should not be read to produce
absurd or unreasonable results." Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 405, 168 P.3d
712, 716 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
At issue is NRS 432B.555, which states, in relevant part, that
in matters of child custody,
if the court determines that a custodial parent or
guardian of a child has ever been convicted of a
violation of NRS 200.508 [felony child abuse,
neglect, or endangerment] or the law of another
jurisdiction that prohibits the same or similar
conduct, the court shall not release the child . . . to
that custodial parent or guardian unless the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence presented at
the proceeding that no physical or psychological
harm to the child will result from the release of the
child to that parent or guardian.
The plain text of NRS 432B.555, specifically the Legislature's use of the
word "ever," persuades us that NRS 432B.555 does not provide an exception
for parents who have had their convictions voided for certain legal purposes.
"Ever" means "always," "at any time," "in any way." Ever,
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2011). Cardenas-Garcia
cannot dispute the clear fact that at one point, the court entered a judgment
of conviction on the underlying felony. Giving effect to the term "ever" in
the statute, Cardenas-Garcia's previous conviction is all NRS 432B.555
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requires. Unlike our dissenting colleague, we do not construe our existing
caselaw to mandate a different result. In Standen v. State, this court
addressed whether a legally withdrawn or judicially invalidated guilty plea
is admissible evidence at the subsequent trial where the jury will determine
the defendant's guilt to the same crime that was the subject of the
withdrawn or invalidated plea. 101 Nev. 725, 728, 710 P.2d 718, 720 (1985).
This court held that where a jury is tasked with determining the guilt of a
defendant, the jury cannot be allowed to hear evidence of the defendant's
withdrawn or invalidated guilty plea. Id. The facts of Standen go no further
than this basic proposition and do not otherwise speak to the collateral
consequences of a guilty plea.
Likewise, we do not construe our precedent regarding
withdrawn pleas to require this court to ignore the judgment of conviction
entered prior to the withdrawn plea where the Legislature unambiguously
intended all possible convictions be considered by including the word "ever"
in the statute. In In re Tiffee, this court noted that after a guilty plea is
withdrawn, the conviction based upon the withdrawn plea "no longer
exist[s]." 137 Nev. 224, 226, 485 P.3d 1249, 1252 (2021). Nonetheless, NRS
432B.555's use of the word "ever" unambiguously directs courts to look
backwards and beyond the legal fiction of a withdrawn guilty plea. Given
the statute's instruction to look at any conviction of felony child abuse,
neglect, or endangerment "ever" sustained, we simply cannot ignore the
entry of a judgment of conviction to the underlying felony on the record here.
Thus, we conclude NRS 432B.555 applies to those who later have their
felony conviction vacated.
Standen and In re Tiffee are further distinguishable, as both
reference criminal proceedings where the issue is confined to the impact on
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the criminal defendant of a withdrawn guilty plea. However, in the context
of the child welfare statutes, priority is placed, as it should be, on the impact
on minor children, specifically, avoiding harm to minor children, and we are
convinced the plain text of NRS 432B.555 references all possible convictions
of felony child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. While the plain text is
determinative, the policy rationales underpinning our interpretation of
NRS 432B.555 are consistent with the overarching intent of the Legislature
to structure child custody matters around the child's best interest. When a
parent has been adjudicated guilty of felony child abuse, there are valid
reasons to create a higher burden of proof before reunification regardless of
any subsequent status change as a result of a withdrawn plea. We perceive
no undue burden when parents remain free to present evidence to rebut the
presumption reasonably put in place by the statute.
We note that NRS 432B.555 recognizes a parent's continued
ability to attempt to rebut the presumption. Cardenas-Garcia has now
successfully completed probation, and while that does not categorically
remove her from the statute's purview, the district court can hear further
evidence on whether she has, in fact, rebutted NRS 432B.555's presumption
along with her progress in the criminal justice system. A parent does not
have only one opportunity to rebut the NRS 432B.555 presumption. A
district court should ensure the higher burden of proof imposed by the
statute does not become, in practice, an insurmountable bar to reunification
based on a prior conviction, particularly when that conviction has been
vacated. Thus, a court should freely grant leave to present evidence
relevant to the NRS 432B.555 determination throughout the protective
custody proceedings when requested by a party who demonstrates a
significant change in circumstances.
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CONCLUSION
NRS 432B.555 imposes a higher burden of proof on
reunification for parents who have "ever" been convicted of felony child
abuse, neglect, or endangerment. A voided conviction does not alter the fact
that Cardenas-Garcia was at one point convicted of the underlying offense,
so we give effect to the Legislature's use of "ever" in the statute, confirming
the NRS 432B.555 presumption unambiguously applies here. We therefore
decline to issue the extraordinary relief sought and order this petition
denied.
Lee
concur:
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BELL, J., dissenting:
Until today, this court has never considered a judgment based
on a withdrawn plea to have any legal effect and, in fact, has consistently
held the opposite. The majority relies exclusively on the legislature's use of
the word "ever" in NRS 432B.555 to contradict this court's clear precedent.
Yet, by exercise of law, Cardenas-Garcia never had a conviction for felony
child abuse, neglect, or endangerment, and the statute cannot apply. For
this reason, I dissent.
Nevada caselaw has consistently held the withdrawal of a
guilty plea voids the underlying judgment as if the plea never existed. In
Standen v. State, a criminal defendant pleaded guilty to murder. 99 Nev.
76, 77, 657 P.2d 1159, 1159 (1983). This court vacated the judgment and
set aside the guilty plea. Id. at 80, 657 P.2d at 1162. At trial on remand,
the jury was allowed to hear evidence that the defendant had previously
pleaded guilty. Standen v. State, 101 Nev. 725, 727, 710 P.2d 718, 719
(1985). This court. reversing the subsequent judgment, held "[a] prior guilty
plea that has been legally withdrawn or judicially invalidated is deemed
never to have existed." Id. at 728, 710 P.2d at 720.
Just three years ago, in In re Tiffee, this court reaffirmed that
a withdrawn plea must be treated, in all respects, as a nullity. 137 Nev.
224, 226, 485 P.3d 1249, 1252 (2021). Tiffee concerns facts similar to this
case. There, a criminal defendant pleaded guilty to the felony of luring
children. After completing probation, the defendant was allowed to
withdraw the felony plea and enter a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor. Id.
at 225, 485 P.3d at 1251. The defendant then sought to seal his criminal
record. Id. The State opposed because a statute prohibits the sealing of
criminal records of an individual with a conviction for felony luring. Id.
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bar sealing because, after successfully withdrawing the initial guilty plea,
the defendant "legally and factually returned to the situation he occupied
before he entered the initial guilty plea, subject to the subsequent guilty
plea." Id. at 226, 485 P.3d at 1252. This court prevented the district court
from considering the luring conviction when deciding whether to seal
Tiffee's records because the conviction did not exist. Id.
Likewise, based on this court's binding precedent, after
Cardenas-Garcia legally withdrew the felony guilty plea, she is deemed to
have never been convicted of the requisite offense to trigger NRS 432B.555.
Because Cardenas- Garcia's felony conviction does not exist, I would issue
the requested writ. The majority attempts to distinguish Tiffee on the basis
of the term "ever" in NRS 432B.555; yet, as a matter of clear law, we must
consider Cardenas-Garcia to have never been convicted of felony child
abuse, neglect, or endangerment. "Ever" is entirely inapplicable to the
current dispute. I would apply Tiffee directly here and issue the requested
writ; the district court erred in considering a voided conviction to apply NRS
432B.555. The statute contemplates burdening only those who have a
conviction of' child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. No such conviction
exists here, and so Cardenas-Garcia falls outside the plain language of NRS
432B.555.
By reading "ever" in NRS 432B.555 to reach a legally voided
conviction, the majority suggests the presumption is appropriately applied
to Cardenas-Garcia because, as a matter of fact, Cardenas-Garcia
committed acts that constitute felony child abuse. I cannot accept this
reading of NRS 432B.555. The legislature has indicated elsewhere in NRS
Chapter 432B an intent to recognize certain acts defined by criminal statute
without requiring a legal conviction but has not done so here. See, e.g., NRS
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432B.157 (imposing a rebuttable presumption when the court determines
that the party seeking custody of a child has committed acts of domestic
violence); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fackett, 125 Nev. 132, 138, 206 P.3d
572, 576 (2009) (explaining that this court reads a statutory scheme as a
whole to harmonize its provisions and to prevent unreasonable results); cf.
Clover Valley Land & Stock Co. v. Larnb, 43 Nev. 375, 380-81, 187 P. 723,
725 (1920) (recognizing that courts should take notice of differences within
closely related statutory provisions).
The majority contravenes our precedent on withdrawn pleas to
hold Cardenas-Garcia's voided judgment is not, in fact, void, seemingly
because it is convinced, in the context of child welfare, that protectionary
interests weigh out. Yet consistent application of our caselaw does not
entitle Cardenas-Garcia to custody, nor prevent the Department of Family
Services from raising the underlying substantive protectionary concerns as
a compelling reason reunification is not appropriate; it merely removes a
single barrier to reunification. See NRS 432B.530(5); NRS 432B.550; NRS
432B.590. The district court remains free to prevent reunification on the
basis of Z.K.'s best interests.
Finally, I note concern with the majority's contention that the
fact a parent can rebut the application of NRS 432B.555 prevents its harm.
While Cardenas-Garcia did not cogently argue a constitutional violation,
the possibility of rebutting a presumption unfairly imposed does not
appropriately preserve the parental interest, especially when the statute at
issue concerns a parent's fundamental right to the care, custody, and
management of their child. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753
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(1982). Cardenas-Garcia has demonstrated extraordinary relief is
warranted to prevent the erroneous application of NRS 432B.555 to a party
with no relevant prior conviction. Respectfully, I dissent.
J.
Bell
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