DAYANI (FAHD) v. DIST. CT. (STATE) , 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 50 ( 2024 )


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    140 Nev., Advance Opinion 5
    ?)
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    FAHD MASHIN DAYANI,                                  No. 86847
    Petitioner,
    vs.
    THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
    IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
    CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE ERIC                            AUG 2 2 202
    JOHNSON, DISTRICT JUDGE.
    EL JFTRA. BR
    Respondents,                                         CLE    • SUkJEMEQURT
    and                                               BY
    IEF DEPUTY CLERK
    THE STATE OF NEVADA,
    Real Party in Interest.
    Original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
    challenging a district court order denying a motion to dismiss a criminal
    indictment.
    Petition granted.
    Clark Hill PLLC and Dominic P. Gentile, Austin T. Barnum, and Tiffany
    Solari, Las Vegas,
    for Petitioner.
    Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
    Attorney, Christopher J. Lalli, Assistant District Attorney, and Jonathan
    E. VanBoskerck, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,
    for Real Party in Interest.
    BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH,                   PICKERING, and
    PARRAGUIRRE. JJ.
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    OPINION
    By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:
    This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
    challenges a district court order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment
    based on alleged violations of NRS 172.145(2). We clarify that a challenge
    •
    under NRS 172.145(2) may properly be brought through a motion to
    dismiss. Here, because the district court had a duty to hear Dayani's motion
    on its merits, we grant the petition.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Petitioner Fand Dayani was on house arrest pending an
    unrelated trial.      Pursuant to the terms of his house arrest, officers
    conducted a warrantless compliance check on his residence and found
    rnethamphetamine and heroin in a hallway bathroom. Dayani was arrested
    and charged with two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance. On
    the same day as Dayani's arrest, his cousin, Alina Jagshi, made
    incriminating statements to police officers indicating that the drugs
    belonged to her rather than Dayani.         Leading up to the grand jury
    proceedings regarding Dayani's trafficking charges, Dayani's counsel sent
    emails to the district attorney's office bringing their attention to Jagshi's
    apparent third-party confession, which he claimed was recorded on an
    officer's body-worn camera.
    Prosecutors brought the charges before a grand jury in July
    2022. The State did not provide the grand jury with the video recording of
    Jagshi's confession but did briefly recount what Dayani's counsel had stated
    in the email correspondence about Jagshi's confession. There was also
    testimony from two officers present during the search of Dayani's residence,
    both of whom testified that the bathroom in which the drugs were found
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    was the only bathroom in the house. The prosecution did not question the
    officers' statements even though there was, in fact, a second bathroom
    attached to the room in which Dayani stayed, and Dayani mentioned the
    second bathroom to officers when he was arrested. The grand jury indicted
    Dayani on both counts, and he was arraigned on the indictment on July 14,
    2022. Over 200 days later, on February 2, 2023, Dayani filed what was
    titled, "Defendant Fand Mohsin Dayani's Motion to Dismiss." The motion
    argued that the State violated NRS 172.145(2) by failing to introduce
    exculpatory evidence, namely, the video recording of Jagshi's confession,
    other evidence that may have corroborated the confession, and the existence
    of a second bathroom.
    The district court construed the motion as a pretrial petition for
    a writ of habeas corpus and denied it as untimely pursuant to NRS
    34.700(1)(0's 21-day deadline. Dayani then filed the instant petition for a
    writ of mandamus or prohibition with this court, arguing that the district
    court improperly construed the motion as an untimely pretrial habeas
    petition. He asserts that his arguments were properly brought as a motion
    to dismiss and, thus, the 21-day time limit for filing a pretrial habeas
    petition does not apply to his motion and the district court should have
    considered the motion on its merits.
    DISCUSSION
    This court may issue a writ of mandamus "to compel the
    performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an
    office, trust, or station." Inel Garne Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124
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    Nev. 193, 197, 
    179 P.3d 556
    , 558 (2008); NRS 34.160.1        Writ relief is an
    extraordinary remedy, and it is therefore "within the discretion of this court
    to determine if a petition will be considered." Clay v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
    
    129 Nev. 445
    , 450, 
    305 P.3d 898
    , 901 (2013). This court will exercise its
    discretion to consider petitions for extraordinary writs "where there is not
    a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," NRS
    34.170, especially where "there are either urgent circumstances or
    important legal issues that need clarification in order to promote judicial
    economy and administration," Cheung v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 
    121 Nev. 867
    , 869, 
    124 P.3d 550
    , 552 (2005).
    We exercise our jurisdictional discretion to review this
    mandamus petition because it presents an important legal issue requiring
    clarification to promote judicial economy and administration: the proper
    procedure for bringing challenges under NRS 172.145(2). Challenges under
    NRS 172.145(2) have come before this court through both motions to
    dismiss and pretrial habeas petitions, and we have not previously addressed
    the proper vehicle by which to bring such a challenge. Further, Dayani's
    underlying motion was based on an alleged error in the grand jury
    proceeding, and "any error in the grand-jury proceeding is likely to be
    harmless after a conviction." Clay, 
    129 Nev. at 450
    , 
    305 P.3d at 901
    . Thus,
    Dayani may not have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 
    Id. at 449-50
    , 
    305 P.3d at 901
    .
    1Dayani filed   a petition for a writ of mandamus or, alternatively,
    prohibition. Mandamus is the appropriate procedure here because Dayani
    does not allege that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his motion,
    See NRS 34.320. Thus, this opinion addresses only mandamus.
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    NRS 172.145(2) states, "If the district attorney is aware of any
    evidence which will explain away the charge, the district attorney shall
    submit it to the grand jury." There is no Nevada caselaw directly discussing
    whether a challenge under this statute should be brought via a habeas
    petition or a motion to dismiss, though the answer to that question
    significantly impacts the available time frame for bringing such a challenge.
    In fact, our caselaw is somewhat supportive of both methods. For example,
    in State v. Babayan, we upheld the granting of a motion to dismiss partially
    based on violations of NRS 172.145(2). 
    106 Nev. 155
    , 
    787 P.2d 805
     (1990);
    see also King v. State, 
    116 Nev. 349
    , 358-59, 
    998 P.2d 1172
    , 1178 (2000)
    (reviewing, but not commenting on the propriety of, a motion to dismiss
    partly based on alleged violations of NRS 172.145(2)). But we have also
    reviewed decisions on pretrial petitions for a writ of habeas corpus alleging
    violations of NRS 172.145(2) without commenting on whether those
    challenges were brought through the correct procedural vehicle. See, e.g.,
    Moran v. Schwarz, 
    108 Nev. 200
    , 202, 
    826 P.2d 952
    , 953 (1992); Sheriff v.
    Harrington, 
    108 Nev. 869
    , 871, 
    840 P.2d 588
    , 588-89 (1992); Ostman v.
    Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 
    107 Nev. 563
    , 565, 
    816 P.2d 458
    , 459 (1991).
    Our lack of discussion regarding the correct method by which
    to bring NRS 172.145(2) challenges merely reflects a lack of procedural
    challenges brought by the parties in such cases. Nonetheless, we recognize
    that this silence may have led to confusion among courts and practitioners
    as to the proper vehicle through which a challenge of this nature may be
    brought. See, e.g., Schuster v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 
    123 Nev. 187
    , 188, 
    160 P.3d 873
    , 874 (2007) (noting that the defendant filed a "pretrial petition for
    a writ of habeas corpus and/or motion to dismiss a grand jury indictment"
    implicating questions under NRS 172.145(2), presumably because the
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    defendant's attorney was unsure which was the correct procedure
    (emphasis added)). Thus, we turn to statutory interpretation to resolve the
    matter at hand.
    "Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo
    review." State v. Catanio, 
    120 Nev. 1030
    , 1033, 
    102 P.3d 588
    , 590 (2004).
    NRS 172.155(2) states, "The defendant may object to the sufficiency of the
    evidence to sustain the indictment only by application for a writ of habeas
    corpus." (Emphases added.)             Pretrial habeas petitions must be brought
    "within 21 days after the first appearance [by the defendant] in the district
    court."   NRS 34.700(1)(a).        On the other hand, NRS 174.105(1) states,
    "Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the
    prosecution, other than insufficiency of the evidence to warrant an
    indictment, ... may be raised only by motion before trial."           (Emphasis
    added.) The only statutory time limit for bringing such a motion to dismiss
    is "before trial."2   
    Id.
     Based on the plain language of these statutes, the
    question a district court must answer in deciding whether the 21-day time
    limit applies is whether the motion or petition challenges the sufficiency of
    the evidence to sustain the indictment. Cf. Srnith v. Zilverberg, 
    137 Nev. 65
    , 72, 
    481 P.3d 1222
    , 1230 (2021) ("If a statute's language is plain and
    unambiguous, we enforce the statute as written, without resorting to the
    rules of construction.").
    Turning back to NRS 172.145(2), we hold that a challenge
    alleging a failure to submit exculpatory evidence under this statute is not a
    challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the indictment.
    2However, local courts often prescribe their own deadlines for
    bringing a motion to dismiss an indictment.
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    R.ather, in cases in which we have concluded that the State violated NRS
    172.145(2), we have considered whether the violation "irreparably impaired
    the independent function of the grand jury," Ostrnan, 107 Nev. at 565, 816
    P.2d at 459, which is a distinct inquiry from whether the State submitted
    sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment. A challenge under NRS
    172.145(2) goes to the heart of the grand jury proceeding and asks whether
    the State has lived up to its mandate to ensure a fundamentally fair grand
    jury process. It is therefore a challenge "based on defects in the institution
    of the prosecution, other than insufficiency of the evidence to warrant an
    indictment." NRS 174.105(1). Thus, challenges alleging a failure of the
    State to submit exculpatory evidence may be properly brought through a
    motion to dismiss.3
    Here, Dayani's motion to dismiss argued that the State violated
    NRS 172.145(2) by failing to present evidence of Jagshi's confession, other
    evidence that may have corroborated the confession, and evidence of the
    existence of a second bathroorn within Dayani's residence. In essence,
    Dayani challenged the fairness of his grand jury proceedings, not whether
    the State's submitted inculpatory evidence was sufficient to sustain the
    indictment. Consequently, the district court had a duty to review the
    allegations and dismiss the indictment if it concluded that the State did, in
    fact, violate NRS 172.145(2) in a manner requiring dismissal. See Ostinan,
    107 Nev. at 565, 816 P.2d at 459 (noting the district court "had a duty to
    dismiss [the] indictment" where the prosecutor failed to present exculpatory
    3 While issues involving exculpatory evidence under NRS 172.145(2)
    may be raised by motion to dismiss, nothing in this opinion should be read
    as limiting pretrial habeas petitions to arguments challenging the
    sufficiency of the evidence.
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    ''t.i.tl.aAZgtftilstzfrswa                               PA151
    evidence). By declining to consider the motion on its merits, the district
    court neglected its duty.
    CONCLUSION
    Challenges alleging violations of NRS 172.145(2) may be
    properly brought via a motion to dismiss and are not confined by the time
    limits NRS 34.700(1)(a) imposes for pretrial habeas petitions. Here, the
    district court had a duty to consider Dayani's motion on the merits. We
    therefore grant the petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ
    of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its order denying
    Dayani's motion to dismiss and to consider the motion on the merits.
    j
    Parraguirre
    We concur:
    J.
    Stiglich
    J.
    Pickering
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Document Info

Docket Number: 86847

Citation Numbers: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 50

Filed Date: 8/22/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/28/2024