In re Estate of Lucien Couture ( 2014 )


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    THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    ___________________________
    7th Circuit Court – Dover Probate Division
    No. 2012-850
    IN RE ESTATE OF LUCIEN COUTURE
    Argued: November 14, 2013
    Opinion Issued: February 21, 2014
    McNeill, Taylor & Gallo, P.A., of Dover (R. Peter Taylor on the brief and
    orally), for the petitioner.
    Wing & Weintraub, P.C., of Milford (David C. Wing on the brief and
    orally), for the respondent.
    CONBOY, J. The respondent, Hellen Couture, appeals an order of the
    7th Circuit Court – Dover Probate Division (Cassavechia, J.), which granted the
    petition of the petitioner, Thomas Couture, the adult son of the decedent,
    Lucien Couture, to impose a constructive trust, for the benefit of the decedent’s
    heirs, over certain life insurance proceeds paid to the respondent upon the
    decedent’s death. We affirm and remand.
    I. Background
    The parties either do not dispute, or the record establishes, the following
    facts. The petition for a constructive trust is grounded upon the claim that the
    respondent, the decedent’s wife, through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation,
    induced the decedent to marry her after she gave birth to a daughter whom she
    claimed was his. The $140,000 life insurance proceeds were paid equally to
    the respondent and to the daughter pursuant to the decedent’s beneficiary
    designation. The petitioner sought a constructive trust over only the
    respondent’s portion of the insurance proceeds, which were placed in escrow
    when the petition was filed.
    The respondent and the decedent married in September 2003, a few days
    after the child was born. The child’s birth certificate lists the decedent as her
    father. Although the decedent had had a vasectomy many years before the
    respondent’s pregnancy, he did not question whether the child was his
    biological child. Nor did he seek medical confirmation or further evaluation as
    to whether he could have fathered the child.
    Following their marriage, the decedent, the respondent, and the child did
    not live together as a family. Instead, the decedent lived in Rochester, and the
    respondent and the child lived together in Somersworth. Unbeknownst to the
    decedent, the respondent had a concurrent relationship with John Tamara.
    The trial court found the relationship was “more likely than not” a marriage.
    The respondent and Tamara continued their relationship throughout the
    respondent’s marriage to the decedent.
    In December 2005, the decedent designated the respondent and the child
    as his beneficiaries of a death benefit payable under an employer-provided life
    insurance policy. In October or November 2007, Tamara, the respondent, and
    her daughter moved to Hawaii. The respondent and her daughter returned to
    New Hampshire in 2008 and lived with the decedent for approximately one
    month. In August 2008, the decedent filed a petition to divorce the
    respondent. On January 7, 2009, only days before the final divorce hearing
    was scheduled to occur, the decedent committed suicide. He died intestate.
    Pursuant to the subject beneficiary designation form, fifty percent of the death
    benefit was paid to the respondent and fifty percent was paid to the child.
    In February 2009, the decedent’s sister brought the petition for a
    constructive trust. When it was determined that the sister lacked standing, the
    court allowed the petitioner to be substituted as a party. In November 2011,
    the respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the trial
    court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust on her
    share of the life insurance proceeds, and that the instant claim was not yet
    justiciable. The trial court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial.
    Based upon the evidence at trial, the trial court found that the petitioner
    had established by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent
    wrongfully induced the decedent to marry her, even though she was already
    married to Tamara, “or at least in a more intimate marriage-like relationship
    with him.” The trial court further found that the decedent provided life
    2
    insurance death benefits to the respondent that “were spousal-based,” and that
    it would be unconscionable for her to retain them “given her bad faith, deceit
    and misrepresentations.” The trial court decided that if the respondent were
    allowed to retain the proceeds, she would be unjustly enriched. Accordingly,
    the court imposed a constructive trust on the respondent’s share of the life
    insurance proceeds. The trial court denied the respondent’s subsequent
    motion for reconsideration, and this appeal followed.
    II. Analysis
    Our standard of review of a probate division decision is determined by
    statute: “The findings of fact of the judge of probate are final unless they are so
    plainly erroneous that such findings could not be reasonably made.” RSA 567–
    A:4 (2007). Consequently, we will not disturb the probate division’s decree
    unless it is unsupported by the evidence or plainly erroneous as a matter of
    law. See In re Angel N., 
    141 N.H. 158
    , 161 (1996).
    A. Standing
    The respondent first argues that the petitioner lacks “standing” in the
    instant dispute, even though he is one of the decedent’s heirs, and even though
    she concedes in her brief that “[i]n the event that the constructive trust is
    upheld,” the life insurance proceeds will be “award[ed] . . . to the Estate.” “In
    evaluating whether a party has standing to sue, we focus on whether the party
    suffered a legal injury against which the law was designed to protect.”
    Libertarian Party of N.H. v. Sec’y of State, 
    158 N.H. 194
    , 195 (2008) (quotation
    omitted). Here, the petitioner has standing to seek a constructive trust
    because, as one of the decedent’s heirs, he has a direct legal or equitable
    interest in the decedent’s estate. See RSA 561:1 (2007); cf. In re Estate of
    Kelly, 
    130 N.H. 773
    , 778 (1988) (“[A] will contestant must generally have some
    direct legal or equitable interest in the decedent’s estate” to have standing in an
    action challenging a will’s validity.).
    We disagree with the respondent’s argument that the petitioner lacks
    standing because, she, as the decedent’s surviving spouse, will be the ultimate
    recipient of the life insurance proceeds pursuant to the intestate succession
    statute. See RSA 561:1. As the trial court correctly observed, upon imposition
    of the constructive trust, the respondent merely holds the life insurance
    proceeds “as constructive trustee for the benefit of [the decedent’s] heirs.”
    We similarly reject the respondent’s contention that the petitioner “has
    no legal or equitable rights at stake in the life insurance proceeds” because he
    is not the decedent’s named beneficiary. Her reliance upon the beneficiary
    form is mistaken. Because the proceeds have already been distributed
    according to the beneficiary form, the fact that the petitioner is not named as a
    3
    beneficiary is immaterial, and does not divest him of standing to pursue a
    constructive trust on the respondent’s share of those proceeds.
    B. Jurisdiction
    The respondent next asserts that this case falls within the exclusive
    jurisdiction of federal courts pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
    Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2006 & Supp.
    2012). Although there is no dispute that the life insurance plan at issue is an
    ERISA-covered benefit plan, the respondent is mistaken in her assertion that
    federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over this petition for a constructive
    trust.
    ERISA’s jurisdictional provision states: “Except for actions under
    subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the district courts of the United States shall
    have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by
    the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or any person referred
    to in § 1021(f)(1) of this title.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (2006). Section 1021(f)(1)
    refers to: (1) the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation; (2) plan participants;
    (3) plan beneficiaries; (4) employers; and (5) labor organizations. 29 U.S.C. §
    1021(f)(1) (Supp. 2012). As we explain below, this is not a “civil action under
    [ERISA].” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). However, even if it were, the exclusive
    jurisdiction provision does not apply because the petitioner is not a person to
    whom section 1021(f)(1) refers. The respondent’s reliance upon Appeal of A & J
    Beverage Distribution, 
    163 N.H. 228
    (2012), is misplaced. In that case, the
    petitioner was a plan participant. See Appeal of A & J Beverage 
    Distribution, 163 N.H. at 230
    , 235.
    C. ERISA Preemption
    1. Express Preemption
    Alternatively, the respondent contends that the petitioner’s state law
    constructive trust claim is preempted by a section of ERISA, which provides
    that ERISA “supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
    hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” described in the statute. 29
    U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); see Appeal of A & J Beverage 
    Distribution, 163 N.H. at 232
    . As we explained in Appeal of A & J Beverage 
    Distribution, 163 N.H. at 232
    , “[e]arly interpretations of this language by the United States Supreme
    Court relied heavily upon textual analysis and a dictionary definition of ‘relate
    to’ and led to the conclusion that ERISA preemption was ‘conspicuous for its
    breadth.’” (Quotation omitted.) Thus, in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 
    498 U.S. 133
    , 139 (1990), the Court held that “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee
    benefit plan, . . . if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”
    (Quotation omitted.)
    4
    Relying upon those early interpretations of ERISA preemption, the
    respondent argues that the petitioner’s claim is preempted because it “is a
    claim against death benefits from a life insurance policy pursuant to an
    employee welfare benefit plan.” (Quotation omitted.) However, as we also
    explained in Appeal of A & J Beverage 
    Distribution, 163 N.H. at 232
    , the
    Supreme Court has since “abandon[ed] strict textualism in favor of a more
    nuanced approach” to ERISA preemption. (Quotation omitted.) Under the new
    approach, “preemption issues must be decided by examining the objectives of
    the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress
    understood would survive, as well as the nature of the state law’s effect on
    ERISA plans.” Appeal of A & J Beverage 
    Distribution, 163 N.H. at 232
    (quotation omitted). Thus, the Court identified three categories of state laws
    that “relate to” ERISA plans such that their preemption furthers the purpose of
    ERISA: (1) state laws that mandate employee benefit structures or their
    administration; (2) state laws that bind plan administrators to a particular
    choice; and (3) state law causes of action that provide alternative enforcement
    mechanisms to ERISA’s enforcement regime. 
    Id. at 233;
    see Hampers v. W.R.
    Grace & Co., Inc., 
    202 F.3d 44
    , 51 (1st Cir. 2000).
    In Appeal of A & J Beverage Distribution, we concluded that the
    petitioner’s state law whistleblower claim implicated the third category. See
    Appeal of A & J Beverage 
    Distribution, 163 N.H. at 233
    . We then held that
    because ERISA provides a remedy for the conduct alleged in the petitioner’s
    state law whistleblower complaint, his state law claim constituted a cause of
    action that provided an alternative enforcement mechanism to ERISA’s
    enforcement regime, and, therefore, was preempted by ERISA. 
    Id. at 234.
    Although the respondent argues that the petitioner’s action here is also
    an action to redress an ERISA violation, we disagree. The petitioner’s action is
    a state law action to impose a constructive trust on benefits that have already
    been paid according to the life insurance policy. Here, the plan administrator
    complied with ERISA by paying the benefits pursuant to the decedent’s benefit
    designation form. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2006) (directing administrator
    of ERISA-covered benefit plan to discharge her duties “in accordance with the
    documents and instruments governing the plan”); see also Kennedy v. Plan
    Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan, 
    555 U.S. 285
    , 304 (2009)
    (holding that an ERISA plan administrator must distribute benefits to the
    beneficiary named in the plan). As the trial court here stated: “None of the
    parties to this action have any issue with the employment benefit plan.” To the
    extent that the respondent contends that ERISA provides a remedy equivalent
    to a common law constructive trust, she has failed to brief this argument
    sufficiently for appellate review.
    5
    2. Conflict Preemption
    We also reject the respondent’s assertion that the petitioner’s state law
    constructive trust claim conflicts with, and, therefore, is preempted by, ERISA’s
    anti-alienation provision, see 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006). The anti-alienation
    provision provides: “Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided
    under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.” 
    Id. The respondent
    argues
    that this provision not only required the plan administrators in this case to
    distribute the life insurance proceeds to her, but also precluded the petitioner
    from seeking to prevent her from retaining them.
    “By its terms, the antialienation provision . . . requires a plan to provide
    expressly that benefits be neither ‘assigned’ nor ‘alienated.’” 
    Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 292
    . There is nothing in the plain language of the provision to indicate
    Congressional intent to preclude an action by the estate of a deceased plan
    participant to recover benefits already paid to a plan beneficiary. See Hoult v.
    Hoult, 
    373 F.3d 47
    , 54 (1st Cir. 2004). “If Congress had intended [ERISA’s
    anti-alienation provision] to reach that far, it could easily have employed the
    type of language found [in other statutes], which prohibit[ ] attachment of
    benefits ‘either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.’” 
    Id. The respondent
    contends that the policy objectives of the anti-alienation
    provision will be thwarted if she is not permitted to retain her share of the life
    insurance proceeds. In so arguing, she relies primarily upon the Supreme
    Court’s decision in Kennedy. Kennedy involved a suit by the estate of a
    deceased plan participant against an ERISA plan administrator for wrongfully
    distributing the plan’s proceeds to the participant’s ex-spouse. 
    Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 289-90
    . Before the couple divorced, the participant (husband) had
    designated his then-wife as the sole beneficiary of his savings and investment
    plan. 
    Id. at 289.
    In the divorce decree, the wife purported to waive her right to
    the plan proceeds. 
    Id. However, the
    husband never removed the wife as
    beneficiary. 
    Id. Despite the
    divorce decree, the plan administrator paid the
    proceeds to the wife. 
    Id. at 290.
    The Supreme Court ruled that the plan administrator did not violate
    ERISA by ignoring the wife’s purported waiver. 
    Id. at 299-300.
    The Court
    decided that an ERISA plan administrator must distribute benefits to the
    beneficiary named in the plan regardless of any state-law waiver purporting to
    divest that beneficiary of her right to them. 
    Id. at 304.
    However, the Court
    explicitly left open the question of whether, once the plan administrator
    distributes the benefits, the decedent’s estate may enforce the waiver against
    the plan beneficiary. See 
    id. at 299,
    n.10.
    The Court “emphasized two important policy considerations in explaining
    its holding.” Estate of Kensinger v. URL Pharma, Inc., 
    674 F.3d 131
    , 135 (3d
    6
    Cir. 2012). “First, it stated that ERISA’s well-established policy favoring
    uniform and efficient plan administration would be undermined if employers
    had to consider benefit claims from sources extrinsic to plan documents.” Id.;
    see 
    Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 300-01
    . “Second, [it] explained that its holding was
    necessary in order to avoid subjecting plan administrators to potential double
    liability.” Estate of 
    Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 135
    ; see 
    Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 301
    .
    Allowing the estate to sue the plan administrator for disbursing the proceeds to
    the named beneficiary “would have placed the administrator in a hopeless
    bind: if it honored the waiver, it could be sued by the named beneficiary for
    disregarding the mandate of ERISA; if it honored the plan documents, it could
    be sued by the estate for disregarding [the] . . . waiver.” Estate of 
    Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 135
    -36.
    Contrary to the respondent’s assertions, “[t]hese two concerns – the need
    for straightforward administration of plans and the avoidance of potential
    liability – . . . are not implicated here.” 
    Id. at 136.
    The constructive trust
    action brought against the respondent, after she received her share of the life
    insurance proceeds, does not implicate the administration of the decedent’s life
    insurance plan. See 
    id. As the
    trial court aptly observed:
    If imposed, a constructive trust would not interfere with or disrupt
    the transfer of the insurance proceeds to [the respondent]. The
    money has already been paid out by the insurer and is currently
    being held in escrow . . . . Accordingly, if the remedy of
    constructive trust is ultimately awarded, it will be funded with the
    money now held in escrow – not with an insurance policy or
    property rights under it.
    Although the Supreme Court also stated that an important ERISA
    objective was to “ensur[e] that beneficiaries get what’s coming quickly, without
    the folderol essential under less-certain rules,” 
    Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 301
    (quotation omitted), this refers to the “expeditious distribution of funds from
    plan administrators.” Estate of 
    Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 136
    (emphasis omitted);
    see Andochick v. Byrd, 
    709 F.3d 296
    , 299 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 235
    (2013). Imposing a constructive trust on the proceeds in this case does
    not prevent the beneficiary from “get[ting] what’s coming quickly” from the plan
    itself. 
    Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 301
    (quotation omitted). Rather, it merely
    prevents her from retaining what she “quickly” received. See 
    Andochick, 709 F.3d at 300
    (quotation omitted). As other courts have observed, there is “a
    fundamental difference between state law causes of action that challenge a
    plan beneficiary’s right to receive the proceeds of an ERISA plan and those that
    seek to challenge a plan beneficiary’s right to keep the proceeds of an ERISA
    plan.” Brown ex rel. Estate of Sanger v. Wright, 
    511 F. Supp. 2d 850
    , 853
    (E.D. Mich. 2007). As one commentator has explained: “Once the proceeds are
    distributed, the person seeking recovery of [them] is no longer seeking a
    7
    determination of the beneficiary under the plan, but is instead challenging who
    has the continuing right to retain the proceeds.” Comment, When Happily Ever
    After is Not Ever After, After All: Rectifying the Plan Documents Rule Under
    ERISA to Benefit the Right Person, 52 S. Tex. L. Rev. 127, 133 (2010). Here,
    because the respondent has already received her share of the life insurance
    proceeds, we conclude that ERISA does not bar the petitioner’s constructive
    trust action.
    Federal courts have held that ERISA does not preempt post-
    disbursement suits against ERISA beneficiaries in similar contexts. See
    
    Andochick, 709 F.3d at 301
    (“adopt[ing] the same view as every published
    appellate opinion to address the question”); Estate of 
    Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 132
    (in case of first impression, court decides that estate may bring action
    directly against beneficiary to recover proceeds paid to her pursuant to
    beneficiary designation form); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension
    Fund, 
    39 F.3d 1078
    , 1080-83 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming, en banc, imposition
    of trust on distributed proceeds from ERISA plan); Central States, SE & SW
    Areas Pension v. Howell, 
    227 F.3d 672
    , 678-79 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
    constructive trust could be imposed on employee welfare plan benefits after
    distribution to beneficiary). But see Staelens ex rel. Estate of Staelens v.
    Staelens, 
    677 F. Supp. 2d 499
    , 508 (D. Mass. 2010).
    That the petitioner should be able to bring a constructive trust action
    against the respondent “finds further support in a line of federal cases holding
    that creditors can sue named beneficiaries to recover plan benefits once those
    benefits have been distributed.” Estate of 
    Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 137
    . “A
    number of circuits,” including the First Circuit Court of Appeals, “have held
    that even though ERISA prevents a creditor from encumbering [benefit
    payments] held by a plan administrator, the funds are no longer entitled to
    ERISA’s protections against the creditor’s claims once they are paid to the
    beneficiary.” Id.; see Kickham Hanley PC v. Kodak Retirement Income Plan,
    
    558 F.3d 204
    , 211 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Only once the proceeds of the pension plan
    have been released to the beneficiary’s hands, can creditors and others pursue
    claims against the funds and the funds’ owners[s].” (quotation omitted));
    DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, 
    447 F.3d 967
    , 974 (6th Cir. 2006) (“This circuit,
    along with a majority of the other circuits, has held that once benefits
    payments have been disbursed to a beneficiary, creditors may encumber the
    proceeds.”); 
    Hoult, 373 F.3d at 54-55
    (holding that once benefits have been
    distributed to a beneficiary, a creditor’s rights are enforceable against that
    beneficiary). “The same principle is equally applicable here.” Estate of
    
    Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 138
    . If a creditor may enforce its rights against a
    beneficiary once plan proceeds have been distributed, there is no reason why
    the petitioner in this case should not be able to seek to impose a constructive
    trust against the respondent’s share of the proceeds, which have already been
    distributed. See 
    id. 8 Although
    the respondent relies upon Staelens to support her argument,
    we agree with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that Staelens is inapposite to
    claims such as the respondent’s claim here. See Estate of 
    Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 138
    . In Staelens, the court held that the decedent’s estate could not sue the
    decedent’s ex-wife to enforce her purported waiver of her entitlement to plan
    proceeds. 
    Staelens, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 508-11
    . However, the court based its
    decision on the specific language of the couple’s separation agreement. 
    Id. at 510-11.
    Though the court opined, in dicta, that allowing lawsuits to be
    brought against a plan beneficiary after plan proceeds have been distributed
    “would appear to go against the various interests which the Supreme Court
    deemed served by a uniform administrative scheme,” it also “acknowledge[d]
    that the First Circuit itself, pre-Kennedy, appears to have treated distributed
    funds differently” from funds that had not yet been distributed. 
    Id. at 508;
    see
    
    Hoult, 373 F.3d at 54
    . Accordingly, “[r]ecognizing what appeared to be the law
    of the circuit in which it sat, the court avoided the question of whether the
    estate could sue the ex-wife directly and instead based its decision on narrow
    grounds related to the specificity of the contract language.” Estate of
    
    Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 139
    ; see Teves v. Teves, Civil Action No. 13-11162-FDS,
    
    2013 WL 5508246
    , at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2013) (“After benefits have been
    distributed to the designated beneficiary in accordance with plan documents,
    . . . ERISA is no longer implicated.”).
    D. Constructive Trust
    The respondent next argues that the trial court “misapplied the law of
    constructive trust” to the facts of this case. We disagree. “[T]here are no rigid
    requirements for imposing a constructive trust.” In re Estate of McIntosh, 
    146 N.H. 474
    , 478 (2001). “[A] constructive trust is merely the formula through
    which the conscience of equity finds expression.” Milne v. Burlington Homes,
    Inc., 
    117 N.H. 813
    , 816 (1977) (quotation omitted). “A constructive trust will
    be imposed whenever necessary to satisfy the demand of justice.” 
    Id. To support
    a claim for a constructive trust, the moving party must
    demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that such action is warranted.
    Walsh v. Young, 
    139 N.H. 693
    , 695 (1995). To prevail in the instant case, the
    petitioner had to prove that the respondent possessed the life insurance
    proceeds at issue, that she and the decedent had a confidential relationship,
    and that she would be unjustly enriched were she allowed to retain the
    proceeds. See 
    id. “The basic
    confidential relationship arises out of the family
    relationship, where one party is justified in believing that the other party will
    act in [his] interest.” Clooney v. Clooney, 
    118 N.H. 754
    , 757 (1978).
    The respondent argues that, to recover in this case, the petitioner had to
    prove what we required of the plaintiffs in Patey v. Peaslee, 
    101 N.H. 26
    (1957).
    In Patey, the plaintiffs alleged that “knowing that the decedent was possessed
    9
    of property of substantial value, and was of unsound mind and suffering from
    physical disabilities from which she would shortly die, the defendant entered
    into a marriage with her, intending at her death to marry another woman . . . .”
    
    Patey, 101 N.H. at 28
    . The plaintiffs further alleged that in marrying the
    decedent, “the defendant concealed from her his sole purpose in doing so,
    which was to become a beneficiary of her estate.” 
    Id. In light
    of those
    allegations, we held that, to recover, the plaintiffs had to show that the
    defendant and the decedent had a confidential relationship “in which the
    defendant occupied a dominant position” and that he used that position,
    “either by concealment of his purpose or by undue influence, to procure the
    marriage solely to obtain the decedent’s property.” 
    Id. at 30.
    The plaintiffs also
    had to “prove that the decedent was thereafter incompetent to dispose of her
    property, so that but for the marriage it would have gone to the plaintiffs by
    intestacy; or if she was competent, that she would have made no other
    disposition of it.” 
    Id. We held
    that if the plaintiffs met this burden of proof, the
    burden of proof would then shift to the defendant “to show that the action by
    which he obtained title to the property was fair, and taken in good faith.” 
    Id. In Patey,
    we did not set forth a “rule of law” to be applied generally.
    Rather, we set forth what was required of the plaintiffs in that case because of
    the allegations in their complaint. “The Patey case recognized . . . that the
    equitable principle of imposing a constructive trust rests upon the doctrine
    that restitution will be compelled to prevent unjust enrichment.” Lamkin v.
    Hill, 
    120 N.H. 547
    , 551 (1980). “The specific instances in which equity imposes
    a constructive trust are numberless, as numberless as the modes by which
    property may be obtained through bad faith and unconscientious acts.” 
    Milne, 117 N.H. at 816
    . Accordingly, in this case, the trial court properly focused
    upon whether the circumstances rendered it unconscionable “for the
    [respondent] to retain and enjoy [her] beneficial interest” in the life insurance
    proceeds. 
    Id. (quotation and
    ellipses omitted).
    The respondent next asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
    support the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust. We review such
    claims as a matter of law and uphold the findings and rulings of the trial court
    unless they are lacking in evidentiary support or tainted by error of law.
    Walker v. Walker, 
    158 N.H. 602
    , 608 (2009). We accord considerable weight to
    the trial court’s judgments on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be
    given testimony. 
    Id. We view
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    petitioner. 
    Id. Viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner, we
    conclude that it supports the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust.
    The trial court found, and the record supports its finding, that the respondent
    fraudulently induced the decedent because she married him without telling
    him of her concurrent relationship with Tamara. For instance, Pastor Wallace
    10
    Elliot Horton testified that, in approximately 2002, he first met Tamara and the
    respondent, whom Pastor Horton knew as Tamara’s wife, then known as Ellen
    or Hellen Tamara. The child whom the respondent claims was fathered by the
    decedent was known to the Pastor as Tamara’s child. Indeed, Pastor Horton
    testified that he presided at a “dedication ceremony” in which Tamara and the
    respondent participated with the child as her parents. Pastor Horton further
    testified that before he provided a reference for Tamara to the Northern New
    England District Council for the Assembly of God church in 2005, he contacted
    numerous individuals who confirmed that Tamara and the respondent were
    husband and wife. Pastor Horton testified that throughout his friendship with
    Tamara, he never doubted that the respondent was Tamara’s wife and, until
    the instant proceeding, he had never heard of the decedent. Although, as the
    trial court noted, the respondent “steadfastly denied that she was married to,
    or intimately involved with, . . . Tamara,” the trial court found that her
    testimony “was evasive, nonresponsive and not credible.”
    The trial court also found, and the record supports its finding, that by
    concealing her relationship with Tamara, the respondent “was able to deceive
    the decedent into believing that he was [the] only possible biological father” of
    the respondent’s daughter. The decedent’s sister testified that the decedent
    believed that the respondent’s daughter was his child, despite the fact that he
    had had a vasectomy, and that the respondent convinced the decedent that he
    had fathered her daughter.
    The record also supports the trial court’s finding that as a result of the
    respondent’s fraud and deceit, the decedent was not only induced to marry her,
    but also to designate her as a beneficiary of his life insurance policy. The sister
    testified that in 2008, while the divorce action was pending, the decedent told
    her that he now believed that the respondent was “already married” to Tamara.
    The sister also testified that she believed that the decedent did not change the
    beneficiary form because he was told that he could not do so while the divorce
    was pending.
    Accordingly, the trial court found, and the record supports its finding,
    that the decedent and the respondent had a confidential relationship (a
    marriage) into which the decedent entered because of the respondent’s “bad
    faith, deceit and misrepresentations.” The trial court found “by clear and
    convincing evidence that were the [r]espondent allowed to profit from her
    misconduct by retaining her beneficial share of the life insurance proceeds, an
    unjust enrichment would result.” Because the record supports the trial court’s
    findings, we uphold its determination that it was necessary to impose a
    constructive trust to prevent the respondent from being unjustly enriched.
    11
    E. Attorney’s Fees
    The respondent next asserts that the trial court erred when it declined to
    award her prevailing party attorney’s fees. The respondent did not prevail in
    the probate division and has not prevailed in this appeal. Accordingly, the trial
    court did not err by denying her request for prevailing party attorney’s fees.
    Although the petitioner argues that the trial court should have awarded him
    attorney’s fees, he did not file a cross-appeal, and, accordingly, this issue is not
    properly before us.
    F. Ripeness
    We briefly address the respondent’s argument that the instant case is not
    ripe for adjudication because it is not clear that the petitioner will ultimately
    receive the life insurance proceeds now that the trial court has imposed, and
    we have upheld its imposition of, a constructive trust on them. However, as
    the trial court explained when it denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss, “[i]f
    a constructive trust were to be imposed, the beneficiary of these assets would
    be the person wronged by [the respondent], as determined by the court.” We
    decline to decide, in the first instance, the identity of “the person wronged by
    [the respondent],” and remand this issue to the trial court for resolution.
    We have reviewed the respondent’s remaining arguments and conclude
    that they do not warrant further discussion. Vogel v. Vogel, 
    137 N.H. 321
    , 322
    (1993).
    Affirmed and remanded.
    DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, LYNN and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.
    12