Petition of State of New Hampshire , 166 N.H. 659 ( 2014 )


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    THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    ___________________________
    Original
    No. 2013-566
    PETITION OF STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    Argued: June 18, 2014
    Opinion Issued: August 29, 2014
    Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the
    joint brief and orally, for respondents Robert Dingman and Eduardo Lopez, Jr.
    Lothstein Guerriero, of Keene (Richard Guerriero on the joint brief), and
    Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, orally, for
    respondent Robert Tulloch.
    Getman, Schulthess & Steere, of Manchester (Andrew Schulman and
    Clara Lyons on the joint brief), and Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate
    defender, of Concord, orally, for respondent Michael Soto.
    Joseph A. Foster, attorney general (Elizabeth C. Woodcock, assistant
    attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
    Juvenile Law Center, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Marsha L. Levick on
    the brief), and Cohen & Winters, PLLC, of Concord (Andrew S. Winters on the
    brief), for the Juvenile Law Center, as amicus curiae.
    New Hampshire Civil Liberties Union, of Concord (Gilles R. Bissonnette
    on the brief), New Hampshire Legal Assistance, of Portsmouth (Michelle
    Wangerin on the brief), Disabilities Rights Center, Inc., of Concord (Amy B.
    Messer and Aaron Ginsberg on the brief), and New Hampshire Association of
    Criminal Defense Lawyers, of Manchester (Katherine Cooper on the brief), for
    The New Hampshire Civil Liberties Union, New Hampshire Legal Assistance,
    Disabilities Rights Center, Inc., The New Hampshire Association of Criminal
    Defense Lawyers, Child and Family Services of New Hampshire, New
    Hampshire Kids Count, The National Association of Social Workers and its New
    Hampshire chapters, and four professors from the University of New
    Hampshire School of Law (in their individual capacities only), as amici curiae.
    CONBOY, J. In this Rule 11 petition, see Sup. Ct. R. 11, the State
    appeals the determination of the Superior Court (Smukler, J.) that the rule
    announced in Miller v. Alabama, 
    132 S. Ct. 2455
    (2012), precluding the
    imposition of mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences on
    juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes, applies
    retroactively to the respondents (petitioners in the trial court), Robert Dingman,
    Eduardo Lopez, Jr., Michael Soto, and Robert Tulloch on collateral review. We
    affirm.
    I.    Background
    The respondents were convicted of first degree murder for offenses
    committed when they were seventeen years old. Accordingly, they each
    received a statutorily-mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the
    possibility of parole. See RSA 630:1-a, III (2007).
    On June 25, 2012, after all of the respondents’ convictions had become
    final, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller, holding
    “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in
    prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller, 132 S.
    Ct. at 2469. The Court stated that, when sentencing juvenile offenders
    convicted of homicide, sentencers must “take into account how children are
    2
    different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
    them to a lifetime in prison.” 
    Id. As a
    result of the Supreme Court’s decision, the respondents each
    sought post-conviction relief in the superior court, arguing that the rule
    announced in Miller applied retroactively and that, consistent with Miller, the
    Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
    Part I, Articles 18 and 33 of the New Hampshire Constitution, they are each
    entitled to a new sentencing hearing. The cases were consolidated to address
    the threshold question of whether Miller applies retroactively. After hearing
    arguments, the trial court ruled that Miller applies retroactively so as to entitle
    each respondent to a new sentencing hearing. Thereafter, the State filed this
    petition for writ of certiorari challenging the trial court’s ruling.
    II.    Standard of Review
    Certiorari is a remedy that is not granted as a matter of right, but rather
    at the discretion of the court. Petition of State of N.H. (State v. MacDonald),
    
    162 N.H. 64
    , 66 (2011); see Sup. Ct. R. 11. Certiorari is available to review
    whether the trial court acted illegally with respect to jurisdiction, authority or
    observance of the law, or unsustainably exercised its discretion or acted
    arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously. 
    Id. The sole
    issue for our review is whether the Supreme Court’s decision in
    Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, i.e., whether the
    decision applies to the respondents in this case whose direct appeals were
    completed before Miller was decided. Because this issue poses a question of
    law, we review the matter de novo. See In the Matter of Sullivan & Sullivan,
    
    159 N.H. 251
    , 254 (2009).
    III.   Analysis
    A.   Miller v. Alabama
    We begin our analysis by examining the Miller decision itself. In Miller,
    the Supreme Court addressed whether imposing mandatory life-without-parole
    sentences upon juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
    against cruel and unusual punishments. 
    Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460
    . The case
    involved the consolidated appeals of two fourteen-year-old offenders, each of
    whom was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the
    possibility of parole. 
    Id. “In neither
    case did the sentencing authority have any
    discretion to impose a different punishment.” 
    Id. One of
    the offenders, Evan
    Miller, was granted certiorari from a direct appeal. 
    Id. at 2462-63.
    However,
    the other offender, Kuntrell Jackson, was granted review from the dismissal of
    a state court petition for habeas corpus relief. 
    Id. at 2461.
    3
    The Supreme Court found that both Miller’s and Jackson’s cases
    implicated “two strands of precedent reflecting [its] concern with proportionate
    punishment.” 
    Id. at 2463.
    “The first has adopted categorical bans on
    sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of
    offenders and the severity of the penalty.” 
    Id. That line
    of precedent includes
    several cases that “specially focused on juvenile offenders, because of their
    lesser culpability.” 
    Id. For instance,
    the Court noted that in Roper v.
    Simmons, 
    543 U.S. 551
    (2005), it held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital
    punishment of children. 
    Id. It also
    noted that in Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    (2010), it held that the Eighth Amendment “prohibits a sentence of life
    without the possibility of parole for a child who committed a nonhomicide
    offense.” 
    Id. Drawing from
    those cases, the Court explained that juveniles “are
    constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” 
    Id. at 2464.
    “Roper and Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth” —
    such as immaturity, impetuosity, inability to appreciate risks, and vulnerability
    to family and home environment — “diminish the penalogical justifications for
    imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit
    terrible crimes.” 
    Id. at 2465,
    2468. The Court explained that although
    Graham addressed life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of
    nonhomicide crimes, “none of what it said about children — about their
    distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities — is
    crime specific.” 
    Id. at 2465.
    “Those features are evident in the same way, and
    to the same degree, when . . . a botched robbery turns into a killing.” 
    Id. Thus, “Graham’s
    reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence
    imposed on a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide
    offenses. . . . Graham insists that youth matters in determining the
    appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole.”
    
    Id. Applying this
    reasoning, the Court found that, “by subjecting a juvenile to
    the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult — these laws
    prohibit the sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s harshest
    term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” 
    Id. at 2466.
    This, the Court concluded, contravened the foundational principle in
    Graham and Roper: “[I]mposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile
    offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.” 
    Id. The second
    strand of precedent implicated in Miller prohibits “mandatory
    imposition of capital punishment, requiring that sentencing authorities
    consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before
    sentencing him to death.” 
    Id. at 2463-64.
    In the Court’s view, Graham’s
    treatment of life-without-parole sentences as analogous to capital punishment
    made relevant its line of capital punishment precedent “demanding
    individualized sentencing.” 
    Id. at 2467.
    Citing its decision in Woodson v.
    North Carolina, 
    428 U.S. 280
    (1976), which “held that a statute mandating a
    4
    death sentence for first-degree murder violated the Eighth Amendment,” the
    Court explained that it “thought the mandatory scheme flawed because it gave
    no significance to the character and record of the individual offender or the
    circumstances of the offense and excluded from consideration the possibility of
    compassionate or mitigating factors.” 
    Id. (quotations, brackets,
    and ellipsis
    omitted). The Court concluded that “the confluence of these two lines of
    precedent leads to the conclusion that mandatory life-without-parole sentences
    for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.” 
    Id. at 2464.
    Thus, the Court
    held that, in order to be constitutional, “a judge or jury must have the
    opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest
    possible penalty for juveniles.” 
    Id. at 2475.
    The states argued that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
    juveniles are not unusual and, therefore, not violative of the Eighth
    Amendment. 
    Id. at 2470-71.
    The Court explained, however, that, unlike other
    decisions “considering categorical bars to the death penalty and life without
    parole,” in which it examined “society’s standards, as expressed in legislative
    enactments and state practice,” 
    id. at 2470
    (quotations omitted), the Court’s
    decision in Miller did “not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or
    type of crime,” 
    id. at 2471.
    Rather, the decision “mandates only that a
    sentencer follow a certain process — considering an offender’s youth and
    attendant characteristics — before imposing a particular penalty.” 
    Id. The Court
    explained that, “[i]n so requiring, [its] decision flows straightforwardly
    from [its] precedents: specifically, the principle of Roper, Graham, and [the
    Court’s] individualized sentencing cases that youth matters for purposes of
    meting out the law’s most serious punishments.” 
    Id. Accordingly, the
    Court
    reversed the Miller and Jackson judgments and remanded the cases for further
    proceedings consistent with its holding. 
    Id. at 2475.
    B.    Retroactivity Principles
    We next review the legal principles governing the retroactive application
    of judicial decisions on collateral review. “The determination [of] whether a
    constitutional decision of the United States Supreme Court is retroactive – that
    is, whether the decision applies to conduct or events that occurred before the
    date of the decision – is a matter of federal law.” State v. Tallard, 
    149 N.H. 183
    , 185 (2003) (quotation and brackets omitted). “The retroactive applicability
    of a constitutional decision of [the Supreme Court] . . . is every bit as much of a
    federal question as what particular federal constitutional provisions themselves
    mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have been denied.” 
    Id. (quotation and
    brackets omitted). “In order to ensure the uniform application
    of decisions construing constitutional requirements and to prevent States from
    denying or curtailing federally protected rights, the Court has consistently
    required that state courts adhere to its retroactivity decision.” 
    Id. (quotation and
    brackets omitted).
    5
    In Teague v. Lane, 
    489 U.S. 288
    (1989), and its progeny, the Supreme
    Court “laid out the framework to be used in determining whether a rule
    announced in one of [its] opinions should be applied retroactively to judgments
    in criminal cases that are already final on direct review.” Whorton v. Bockting,
    
    549 U.S. 406
    , 416 (2007). The Court explained that “the question whether a
    decision announcing a new rule should be given prospective or retroactive
    effect should be faced at the time of that decision.” 
    Teague, 489 U.S. at 300
    (quotation and brackets omitted). “Retroactivity is properly treated as a
    threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case
    announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied
    retroactively to all who are similarly situated.” 
    Id. “Under the
    Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct and
    collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are
    still on direct review.” 
    Whorton, 549 U.S. at 416
    . As the Supreme Court
    explained in Teague, “[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule,
    new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those
    cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.” 
    Teague, 489 U.S. at 310
    . The Court concluded in Teague “that a new rule will not be
    applied retroactively to defendants on collateral review unless it falls within one
    of two exceptions.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 
    492 U.S. 302
    , 329 (1989), abrogated on
    other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 
    536 U.S. 304
    (2002).
    Under the two exceptions, “[a] new rule applies retroactively in a
    collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a
    ‘watershed rule of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness
    and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” 
    Whorton, 549 U.S. at 416
    (quotation
    and brackets omitted). In this case, the parties agree that Miller announced a
    new rule. They dispute whether the Miller rule falls within the first exception,
    i.e., whether the rule is substantive.
    The first exception provides that a new rule will “be applied retroactively
    if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
    power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,” 
    Teague, 489 U.S. at 307
    (quotation omitted), or if it prohibits “a certain category of punishment for
    a class of defendants because of their status or offense,” 
    Penry, 492 U.S. at 330
    . “Such rules apply retroactively because they necessarily carry a
    significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does
    not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon
    him.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 
    542 U.S. 348
    , 352 (2004) (quotations omitted).
    The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] rule is substantive rather than
    procedural if it alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law
    punishes.” 
    Id. at 353.
    With this in mind, we now turn to the question of
    whether the Miller rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review,
    including the four cases before us.
    6
    C.    Application of Retroactivity Principles to Miller
    The State argues that the Miller rule “addressed the process by which
    juvenile defendants who are convicted of first-degree murder should be
    sentenced” simply by adding “the requirement of a sentencing hearing.”
    Accordingly, the State contends that the rule announced in Miller constitutes a
    new procedural rule that cannot be applied on collateral review. The
    respondents disagree, contending that Miller announced a new substantive
    rule of law that applies retroactively in this case and, therefore, requires that
    each of them receive a new sentencing hearing.
    Federal and state courts across the country “have considered whether
    Miller announced a new rule that should be applied retroactively, with varying
    outcomes.” Malvo v. Mathena, Civil Action No. 2:13–cv–375, 
    2014 WL 2808805
    , at *10 (E.D. Va. June 20, 2014); see also 
    id. at *10-13
    (collecting
    cases). “Indeed, there is no consensus among lower courts whether Miller is
    retroactively applied to cases on collateral review.” 
    Id. at *10.
    Generally, in consideration of [the Miller decision and federal
    retroactivity principles], lower courts that hold Miller is retroactive
    on collateral review find that it announced a new substantive rule,
    or that because the Supreme Court applied the holding to Jackson,
    a petitioner before the court on collateral review, the Supreme
    Court signaled that the rule must be applied retroactively.
    Alternatively, lower courts that hold Miller is not retroactive find
    that the new rule was not substantive but instead was a
    procedural rule that did not rise to the level of a “watershed” rule
    of procedure for purposes of the Teague analysis.
    
    Id. After thoroughly
    reviewing the decision in Miller and the jurisprudence
    on both sides of the matter, we agree with the reasoning of those courts finding
    the Miller rule to be “a new, substantive rule which should be applied
    retroactively to cases on collateral review.” Jones v. State, 
    122 So. 3d 698
    , 703
    (Miss. 2013); see Songster v. Beard, Civil Action No. 04–5916, 
    2014 WL 3731459
    , at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2014); People v. Davis, 
    6 N.E.3d 709
    , 722
    (Ill. 2014); State v. Ragland, 
    836 N.W.2d 107
    , 117 (Iowa 2013); Diatchenko v.
    District Atty. for Suffolk, 
    1 N.E.3d 270
    , 281 (Mass. 2013); State v. Mantich,
    
    842 N.W.2d 716
    , 730-31 (Neb. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 
    82 U.S.L.W. 3676
    (U.S. May 5, 2014); Ex parte Maxwell, 
    424 S.W.3d 66
    , 75 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2014). We recognize that Miller did not categorically ban sentences of life
    imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. See
    
    Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471
    . Nonetheless, “it explicitly foreclosed the imposition
    of a mandatory sentence of life without parole on juvenile offenders.” Jones,
    
    7 122 So. 3d at 702
    ; see also Songster, 
    2014 WL 3731459
    , at *4 (concluding that
    Miller announced a new substantive rule, in part, because it “bans a
    sentencing practice or a scheme as applied to all juveniles convicted of
    murder”). By prohibiting the imposition of mandatory sentences and requiring
    that the sentencing authority “have the opportunity to consider mitigating
    circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles,”
    
    Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475
    , Miller changed the permissible punishment for
    juveniles convicted of homicide. See 
    Jones, 122 So. 3d at 702
    ; 
    Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 730
    ; 
    Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d at 75
    . As the Nebraska Supreme Court
    explained:
    Miller did not simply change what entity considered the same
    facts. And Miller did not simply announce a rule that was
    designed to enhance accuracy in sentencing. Instead, Miller held
    that a sentencer must consider specific, individualized factors
    before handing down a sentence of life imprisonment without
    parole for a juvenile. Effectively, then, Miller required a sentencer
    of a juvenile to consider new facts, i.e., mitigation evidence, before
    imposing a life imprisonment sentence with no possibility of parole.
    . . . In other words, it imposed a new requirement as to what a
    sentencer must consider in order to constitutionally impose life
    imprisonment without parole on a juvenile.
    
    Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 730
    .
    The State maintains that the Supreme Court’s statement in Miller that
    its decision “does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type
    of crime,” but “[i]nstead, . . . mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain
    process,” 
    Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471
    , evinces the Court’s intent that Miller not
    be regarded as a substantive rule. See Craig v. Cain, No. 12–30035, 
    2013 WL 69128
    , at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (concluding that “Miller does not satisfy the
    test for retroactivity because it does not categorically bar all sentences of life
    imprisonment for juveniles”); see also In re Morgan, 
    713 F.3d 1365
    , 1368 (11th
    Cir. 2013); Malvo, 
    2014 WL 2808805
    , at *15-16; Johnson v. Ponton, Civil
    Action No. 3:13–CV–404, 
    2013 WL 5663068
    , at *5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2013);
    Williams v. State, No. CR–12–1862, 
    2014 WL 1392828
    , at *14-15 (Ala. Crim.
    App. Apr. 4, 2014); Geter v. State, 
    115 So. 3d 375
    , 384-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
    2013); State v. Tate, 
    130 So. 3d 829
    , 836-37 (La. 2013), cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 2663
    (2014); People v. Carp, Docket Nos. 146478, 146819, 147428, 
    2014 WL 3174626
    , at *___ (Mich. July 8, 2014); Chambers v. State, 
    831 N.W.2d 311
    ,
    328-30 (Minn. 2013); Com. v. Cunningham, 
    81 A.3d 1
    , 10-11 (Pa. 2013), cert.
    denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 2724
    (2014). The respondents disagree, and contend that
    the State “reads too much into that statement, given its context.” We believe,
    however, that, given its context, the State reads the statement too narrowly.
    8
    When read in context, the statement does not support the conclusion
    that the Miller rule is procedural; to the contrary, it supports the conclusion
    that the rule is substantive. Although there is a procedural element to the rule
    in that it “mandates . . . that a sentencer follow a certain process,” that
    procedural element is the result of the Court’s substantive change in the law
    prohibiting mandatory life-without-parole sentencing for juveniles because
    “youth matters for purposes of meting out the law’s most serious
    punishments.” 
    Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471
    ; see 
    Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722
    . We
    cannot see how such a rule could be anything other than substantive. Indeed,
    to hold otherwise would create “a significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a
    punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” 
    Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352
    (quotation omitted); see 
    Jones, 122 So. 3d at 702
    .
    The decision of the Supreme Court in Schriro regarding the retroactivity
    of the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona, 
    536 U.S. 584
    (2002), supports our
    conclusion. See 
    Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353
    . “Ring held that a sentencing judge,
    sitting without a jury, may not find an aggravating circumstance necessary for
    imposition of the death penalty. Rather, the Sixth Amendment requires that
    those circumstances be found by a jury.” 
    Id. at 353
    (quotations, citation, and
    brackets omitted). In Schriro, the Supreme Court explained:
    [The Ring] holding did not alter the range of conduct [the] law
    subjected to the death penalty. It could not have; it rested entirely
    on the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee, a provision that
    has nothing to do with the range of conduct a State may
    criminalize. Instead, Ring altered the range of permissible
    methods for determining whether a defendant’s conduct is
    punishable by death, requiring that a jury rather than a judge find
    the essential facts bearing on punishment. Rules that allocate
    decisionmaking authority in this fashion are prototypical
    procedural rules, a conclusion we have reached in numerous other
    contexts.
    
    Id. Unlike the
    holding in Ring, the Miller rule does more than merely
    “regulate . . . the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” 
    Id. (emphasis omitted).
    Miller provides discretion in sentencing where there once
    was none. See 
    Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d at 75
    . As the trial court here explained,
    Miller mandates that “a juvenile defendant is required to have the opportunity
    to establish that life without parole is not an appropriate sentence.” See 
    Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475
    . In this way, Miller “broadened the range of punishment for
    juveniles convicted of homicide.” Malvo, 
    2014 WL 2808805
    , at *11; see People
    v. Morfin, 
    981 N.E.2d 1010
    , 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); 
    Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722
    .
    Accordingly, Miller altered the range of outcomes for juveniles convicted of
    9
    homicide by allowing a sentencer to consider a punishment other than life in
    prison without the possibility of parole. See 
    Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1022
    .
    We also find it noteworthy that, upon rendering its decision in Miller, the
    Supreme Court reversed the state court decision dismissing Jackson’s state
    petition for habeas corpus relief. See 
    Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475
    . Like the
    respondents in this case, Jackson was before the Court on collateral review.
    See 
    id. at 2461.
    Although, as the State points out, it does not appear that the
    issue of retroactivity was raised by the state as a bar to relief in the Jackson
    case, we nonetheless find the Supreme Court’s decision regarding Jackson to
    be significant. As the Supreme Court explained in Teague, “once a new rule is
    applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice
    requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”
    
    Teague, 489 U.S. at 300
    . Under this reasoning, “the relief granted to Jackson
    in Miller tends to indicate that Miller should apply retroactively on collateral
    review.” 
    Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1023
    ; see also Songster, 
    2014 WL 3731459
    , at
    *1-2; 
    Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722
    ; 
    Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 116
    ; 
    Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281
    ; 
    Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 731
    .
    Relying upon Tyler v. Cain, 
    533 U.S. 656
    (2001), the State further
    contends that Miller is not retroactive to cases on collateral review because
    “[t]he Supreme Court did not ‘hold’ that its decision in Miller or Jackson was
    retroactive to cases on collateral review.” See In re 
    Morgan, 713 F.3d at 1367
    (citing Tyler and concluding that “the Supreme Court has not held that Miller is
    retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review”). In Tyler, the Supreme
    Court interpreted the word “made” in the federal statute which “requires a
    district court to dismiss a claim in a second or successive [habeas] application
    unless . . . the applicant ‘shows’ that the claim relies on a new rule of
    constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
    Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 
    Tyler, 533 U.S. at 660-61
    .
    The Court concluded “that a new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on
    collateral review’” within the meaning of the statute, “unless the Supreme
    Court holds it to be retroactive.” 
    Id. at 663.
    The statutory provision
    interpreted in Tyler is not at issue here, however, and we are not persuaded
    that the Court’s statutory analysis in Tyler as to congressional limitations on
    the federal courts’ habeas corpus jurisdiction has controlling effect “upon the
    application of the judicially crafted Teague construct as applied in the setting of
    a state post-conviction petition.” Id.; see also Johnson, 
    2013 WL 5663068
    , at
    *3 n.6.
    IV.   Conclusion
    We conclude that, pursuant to the Teague framework, the rule
    announced in Miller constitutes a new substantive rule of law that applies
    retroactively to cases on collateral review. Consequently, we find that the
    respondents are entitled to the retroactive benefit of the Miller rule in post-
    10
    conviction proceedings. In light of our decision, we decline to address the
    respondents’ argument that we should “apply a broader retroactivity doctrine
    than the federal courts apply.”
    Affirmed.
    DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.
    11