State of New Hampshire v. Kathryn D. Pate ( 2023 )

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2022-0320, State of New Hampshire v.
Kathryn D. Pate, the court on October 13, 2023, issued the
following order:
The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, has considered the oral arguments of the parties, and has
determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The
defendant, Kathryn D. Pate, was charged with aggravated driving while
intoxicated in violation of RSA 265-A:3, III (2014). The State appeals an order
of the Circuit Court (LeFrancois, J.) granting the defendant’s motion to
suppress her blood test results after finding that the State failed to establish
probable cause for the arrest of the defendant, and that the release of the blood
and blood test results was not authorized by RSA 329:26 (2017). Because we
agree with the trial court that the statutory exception to the confidentiality of
the defendant’s blood tests results does not apply, we do not address whether
the State failed to establish probable cause for the arrest or reach the question
of whether the blood draw implicated Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire
Constitution. We affirm and remand.
The following facts are taken from the trial court order or could have
been found by the trial court on the evidence before it. On April 21, 2019,
Officer Rodolakis was dispatched to a parking lot after an unidentified 911
caller reported a “nonresponsive” person in a black SUV. He arrived around
the same time as fire and emergency rescue personnel. Upon arriving at the
parking lot, the officer observed that the vehicle was running, and that the
wiper blades were on even though it was not raining. Rodolakis approached
the driver’s side door of the SUV, and saw the driver slumped over the center
console with her head and an arm on the passenger seat. The vehicle was in
reverse. He opened the door to the vehicle, determined that the driver was a
female in her forties, later identified as the defendant, and that she was
breathing. Rodolakis instructed the fire personnel to shut the vehicle off and
remove the key. After he shook her awake, the defendant started mumbling in
a slow, low tone, and Rodolakis observed her to have glassy and bloodshot
eyes. He did not see any contraband or evidence of drug use in the car, but
observed an aftermarket portable breath test in the backseat. Rodolakis
arrested the defendant and had her transported to the hospital where her blood
was drawn by hospital personnel. The defendant was thereafter charged, inter
alia, with aggravated driving while intoxicated. See RSA 265-A:3, III.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence “obtained as a
result of the illegal entry and search of her vehicle” and of her “arrest without a
warrant or probable cause,” and the “illegal forced blood draw.” Following a
November 7, 2019 hearing at which Rodolakis was the only witness, the trial
court granted the motion to suppress. The trial court determined that “there
was not a basis for the search and seizure of the defendant’s motor vehicle
triggered by the opening of the driver’s door by the officer,” and that “[t]he
evidence obtained by the State after that unlawful intrusion is therefore
suppressed.” The State filed a motion to reconsider, to which the defendant
objected. The trial court denied the State’s motion, and the State appealed.
We reversed, concluding that the officer’s act of opening the defendant’s door
fell under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.
See State v. Kathryn D. Pate, No. 2020-0033 (non-precedential order at 4),
2020 WL 739113 (N.H. Dec. 16, 2020).
On remand, the defendant renewed her motion to suppress. A hearing
was held on March 15, 2022, at which the court heard arguments from both
sides, but took no testimony. Thereafter, the court issued an order granting
the defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court found that the State had
failed to establish probable cause for the arrest of the defendant. In addition,
the trial court found that even if there had been probable cause for arrest, the
State had failed to establish that the blood draw was taken by the hospital staff
for the purposes of diagnosis and treatment.
When reviewing a trial court’s rulings on a motion to suppress, we accept
the trial court’s factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are
clearly erroneous. State v. Bazinet, 170 N.H. 680, 683 (2018). We review the
trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.In its order granting the motion to suppress, the trial court stated, in
relevant part:
Under RSA 329:26 and under [State v. Davis, 161 N.H. 292(2010)], in order for the exception to confidentiality of defendant’s blood
draw and results to apply, the State needs to submit evidence that the
blood draw was part of the consensual treatment of the defendant. The
State simply did not submit any evidence to establish the exception in
this case.
In its order denying the State’s motion to reconsider, the Trial Court
(LeFrancois, R. approved by Weaver, J.) clarified:
[I]n this case there was no evidence proffered by the State of any hospital
staff providing any information about the blood draw. The defendant in
this case was conscious, refusing medical treatment, and was not free to
go because she was already under arrest when she arrived at the
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hospital. There is a dispute in this case as to the purpose of the blood
draw. The court does not assume it was done for the purpose of
diagnosis and treatment when there is no evidence proffered by the
State, the defendant is refusing medical treatment, and the defendant is
in custody and cannot leave the hospital.
The State argues that the trial court erroneously shifted the defendant’s
burden of proof to the State when it concluded that RSA 329:26 required the
State to prove that the blood was drawn for the purposes of diagnosis and
treatment.
Assuming, without deciding, that the initial burden was on the
defendant, we read the trial court’s orders as finding that the defendant had
presented evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that the blood was not
drawn for the consensual medical diagnosis and treatment, after which the
burden shifted to the State to prove that the blood was drawn for medical
diagnosis and treatment. See In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 157 N.H.
698, 702 (2008) (interpretation of trial court order is a matter of law). We
conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s findings, and that the trial
court did not misapply the law when it found that the burden had shifted to
the State.
The only testimony offered at the hearing on the motion to suppress was
that of Rodolakis. He testified that after he arrested the defendant the rescue
personnel were still there, and that he heard the defendant tell them, “leave me
alone.” According to the officer, the rescue personnel asked him “to search her
while she was on the stretcher,” at which point he told them that he “wanted to
handcuff her,” so he handcuffed each of her arms to the stretcher. Thereafter,
according to Rodolakis, the East Kingston Fire Department transported the
defendant to the hospital because they “wanted to transport her as far as their
community caretaking obligation,” and he followed behind. Rodolakis also
testified that when the defendant arrived at the hospital, she was treated by the
emergency room team and that he was in the room “[a]t times” when this
happened. According to Rodolakis, the defendant was “belligerent” and
“aggressive” toward hospital staff. On cross-examination, the officer agreed
that the defendant had declined all treatment and care at the hospital, and
that the declination was “clear and unambiguous.” Nevertheless, at some
point, hospital personnel drew the defendant’s blood. While Rodolakis testified
that at no time did he indicate to hospital staff that he wanted the defendant’s
blood drawn, “[he] saw them draw blood for their medical assessment,” and
told staff that [he] was going to seize the blood.” He then asked hospital staff to
“set it aside” for him, and said that he was going to return with a warrant.
RSA 329:26 (“Confidential Communications”) provides that confidential
relations and communications between a physician and a patient are
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privileged, except as otherwise provided by law, and are not to be disclosed.
The statute also states:
This section shall also not apply to the release of blood or urine
samples and the results of laboratory tests for drugs or blood
alcohol content taken from a person for purposes of diagnosis and
treatment in connection with the incident giving rise to the
investigation for driving a motor vehicle while such person was
under the influence of intoxicating liquors or controlled drugs. The
use and disclosure of such information shall be limited to the
official criminal proceedings.
RSA 329:26 (emphasis added). We held in two cases that the defendants’
constitutional rights were not violated when the State obtained blood alcohol
test results without a warrant. State v. Davis, 161 N.H. 292, 294, 299 (2010);
Bazinet, 170 N.H. at 682-83, 686. In neither case was the question of whether
the blood was drawn for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment in
dispute. Bazinet, 170 N.H. at 682 (defendant was transported to a hospital
following a motor vehicle accident and arrived at the hospital unconscious and
with critical injuries; phlebotomist testified that it was hospital’s routine
medical practice to immediately obtain blood samples from trauma patients
upon their arrival); Davis, 161 N.H. at 294 (undisputed that the hospital had
withdrawn the defendant’s blood “as part of its treatment of the defendant”).
Accordingly, we did not consider who bears the initial burden of proving that
the exception to the statutory privilege applies. Nor do we need to decide that
issue today. Through its cross-examination of Rodolakis, the defense
presented evidence that the defendant did not consent to a blood draw for
diagnosis and treatment, and the State presented insufficient evidence to rebut
this. Accordingly, the exception to confidentiality set forth in RSA 329:26 does
not apply.
Having concluded that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
the medical exception set forth in RSA 329:26 does not apply, we need not
reach the question of whether the defendant’s constitutional rights were
violated, and therefore need not address the State’s argument that the
defendant bears the burden of proving that state action in some way motivated
or caused the blood draw.
Affirmed and remanded.
HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.
Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk
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