Daniel G. Busa & a. v. Town of Auburn ( 2023 )


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  •                     THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    SUPREME COURT
    In Case No. 2022-0439, Daniel G. Busa & a. v. Town of
    Auburn, the court on June 22, 2023, issued the following order:
    The court has reviewed the written arguments, oral arguments, and the
    record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of
    this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The plaintiffs, Daniel and Marjorie Busa,
    appeal an order of the Superior Court (St. Hilaire, J.) granting the Town of
    Auburn’s (Town) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandamus
    for failing to exhaust their administrative remedies. The plaintiffs argue that
    the trial court erred because the Auburn Board of Selectmen (Board) failed to
    issue a decision on their 2021 application to unmerge their lots, and thus, they
    could not exhaust their administrative remedies by appealing to the Zoning
    Board of Adjustment (ZBA).
    We conclude that the Board did in fact reach a decision that could have
    been appealed to the ZBA pursuant to RSA 674:39-aa, III (Supp. 2020)
    (amended 2021). See RSA 674:39-aa, III (“All decisions of the governing body
    may be appealed in accordance with the provisions of RSA 676.”). In 2019 and
    2021, the plaintiffs applied to the Board to unmerge their lots pursuant to RSA
    674:39-aa. As relevant here, in its 2021 decision the Board determined that
    the “2019 decision was a final decision that could have, but was not, appealed
    by the [plaintiffs].” Consequently, the Board determined that the plaintiffs
    “cannot now challenge” its prior decision that the lots were voluntarily merged.
    It therefore concluded, “[a]s a result, this Board will not take any action on the
    current application by the [plaintiffs] as the issue has already been acted on in
    2019.”
    When determining whether an agency’s decision “‘constitutes a final
    administrative disposition of the issue,’” we have previously held that “‘the crux
    of the matter is the practical impact of . . . the action.’” Appeal of Countrywide
    Home Loans, 
    163 N.H. 139
    , 143 (2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting New
    Hampshire Bankers Ass’n v. Nelson, 
    113 N.H. 127
    , 130 (1973)). The plaintiffs
    attempt to distinguish Appeal of Countrywide Home Loans by arguing that it
    involved our review of an agency decision following the agency’s investigation
    and examination of the facts; whereas here, the Board “made no such
    investigation or review of the 2021 Application” before issuing its decision. We
    have never held that whether an agency conducts an investigation or engages
    in fact finding prior to reaching its decision is relevant to whether an agency’s
    action or inaction constitutes a final decision. See 
    id.
     Here, our conclusion is
    consistent with our holding in Appeal of Countrywide Home Loans. The
    Board’s statement that it “will not take any action on the current application”
    provided its final decision denying the plaintiffs’ requested relief. See 
    id.
    In addition, assuming the argument is preserved for our review, we are
    unpersuaded by the plaintiffs’ contention that it would have been “futile” to
    appeal to the ZBA. As previously detailed, the Board articulated the legal
    grounds for its decision to deny the plaintiffs’ application. Thus, even if we
    credit the plaintiffs’ argument that the Board was bound by RSA 676:3, I
    (2016), the Board satisfied the statutory requirements. Moreover, nothing in
    the relevant statutory framework foreclosed an appeal by the plaintiffs to the
    ZBA to review the merits of that decision. See RSA 676:5 (2016) (“Such appeal
    shall be taken within a reasonable time, as provided by the rules of the board,
    by filing with the officer from whom the appeal is taken and with the board a
    notice of appeal specifying the grounds thereof.” (emphasis added)).
    We have frequently reiterated that a writ of mandamus will not be issued
    “where the remedy by appeal or error to another administrative board or
    tribunal has not been exhausted.” Bosonetto v. Town of Richmond, 
    163 N.H. 736
    , 746 (2012) (quotation omitted). In this case, it is undisputed that the
    plaintiffs failed to timely appeal both decisions of the Board to the ZBA as set
    forth in RSA 674:39-aa, III. Consequently, they have failed to exhaust their
    administrative remedies and mandamus relief is not warranted under these
    circumstances. 
    Id.
     Indeed, the plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that, if we
    conclude that the Board rendered a final decision in 2021, the plaintiffs cannot
    prevail in this appeal. In light of our conclusion, we therefore affirm the trial
    court’s decision granting the Town’s motion to dismiss and need not address
    the plaintiffs’ remaining arguments concerning the underlying merits of the
    plaintiffs’ applications to the Board. Finally, the plaintiffs’ request for
    attorney’s fees and costs is denied because the plaintiffs are not the “prevailing
    party.” See Sup. Ct. R. 23.
    Affirmed.
    MACDONALD, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and
    DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.
    Timothy A. Gudas,
    Clerk
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-0439

Filed Date: 6/22/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/12/2024