State of New Hampshire v. Jose Polanco Diaz ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •                     THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    SUPREME COURT
    In Case No. 2022-0033, State of New Hampshire v. Jose
    Polanco Diaz, the court on April 11, 2023, issued the following
    order:
    The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
    on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
    Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). Following a jury trial, the defendant, Jose Polanco Diaz, was
    convicted of aggravated felonious sexual assault, RSA 632-A:2, I(a) (2016),
    burglary, RSA 635:1, I (2016), three counts of criminal threatening, RSA 631:4,
    I(a) (2016), falsifying physical evidence, RSA 641:6 (2016), theft, RSA 637:3
    (2016), and indecent exposure, RSA 645:1 (2016) (amended 2022). On appeal,
    he argues that the Trial Court (Anderson, J.) erred by denying his motion to
    dismiss in which he argued, inter alia, that the State failed to prove his identity
    as the perpetrator of the charged offenses. We affirm.
    The record before us includes the following evidence. In September
    2020, the victim was living with her fiancé in a basement apartment in
    Manchester. After spending a sleepless night with a migraine headache, she
    went to sleep at 8 a.m. Her fiancé left to have coffee with his friend, who lived
    “maybe six houses” away. He did not lock the apartment door because the
    couple had only one set of keys. The victim was awakened by someone
    touching her back and rubbing her buttocks and who then ripped her pants.
    She saw a male masturbating while holding a machete. He then digitally
    penetrated her. She screamed and, unable to find her phone or purse, ran
    from the apartment. As she left she noticed her backpack outside on a bench;
    some of its contents were strewn on the ground and on the bench. When she
    reached the apartment of her fiancé’s friend, she reported that she had been
    sexually assaulted. Her fiancé ran back to the apartment where he found a
    man standing in the bathroom “with a machete up over his head.” At trial, he
    described the man as “black” with “afro hair” and “a big beard.” He also
    watched surveillance video of himself entering and leaving his apartment and
    being followed by a man. As he waited for the police to arrive, he drove around
    the block with his friend looking for the man that he had found in his
    apartment. At one point, they saw him in the alley near the apartment.
    Responding officers spoke with the victim and her fiancé, searched the
    apartment, and set up a perimeter position. Officer Pittman stopped the
    defendant while conducting the perimeter search but, after observing his calm
    demeanor and observing that he did not fully match the description of the
    assailant, the officer released him after identifying him. This interaction was
    recorded on the officer’s body camera. After the officer subsequently saw a
    photograph of the suspect in surveillance video collected as part of the
    investigation, he recognized him as the man that he had earlier stopped.
    Additional surveillance videos were collected that showed the defendant:
    (1) walking toward the victim’s apartment and coming out of that area
    approximately four minutes later carrying a black bag; (2) walking back toward
    the entrance to the apartment carrying black and white shoes and a long, hard
    object; and (3) shortly thereafter, wearing the black and white shoes and
    carrying his sneakers and the long, hard object. Two minutes after a patrol
    officer arrived at the victim’s apartment, the defendant was seen running away
    from the apartment. He ran into a yard where he put something behind a
    shed.
    At the close of the State’s case, the defendant moved to dismiss the
    charges, on several grounds, including that the State had failed to establish the
    identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the charged offenses. The trial
    court denied the motion and the defendant was subsequently convicted on
    eight of the charged offenses. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, the defendant argues that the State presented only
    circumstantial evidence that he was the perpetrator of the charged offenses
    and that the evidence was insufficient to meet its burden. See State v. Ploof,
    
    165 N.H. 113
    , 116 (2013) (State bears burden of proving beyond reasonable
    doubt that person charged with offense is perpetrator of the offense). We
    disagree.
    The victim identified the defendant as her assailant when presented with
    a photo array on the day of the assault. Before she saw the defendant’s
    picture, she identified another person as her assailant but upon seeing the
    defendant’s picture, she identified him as her assailant. That she stated that
    she was 85 per cent sure that the photo depicted her assailant went to the
    weight of the evidence, but did not alter the fact that it was some direct
    evidence of the perpetrator’s identity. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 
    466 S.W.2d 313
    , 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (observing that fact that witness cannot be
    positive of his or her identification goes to the weight of the testimony, not to
    its admissibility; therefore, lack of a positive identification is a jury issue).
    We next address the standard of review applicable to this case. A
    challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law; our
    standard of review is therefore de novo. State v. Seibel, 
    174 N.H. 440
    , 445
    (2021). When considering such challenges in a case that includes both direct
    and circumstantial evidence, we objectively review the entire record to
    determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt, considering the evidence, and all reasonable inferences
    drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the State. 
    Id.
     We examine each
    item of evidence in the context of the entire case, and not in isolation. 
    Id.
     The
    trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from facts proved as well as from
    2
    facts found as the result of other inferences, provided they can be reasonably
    drawn therefrom. 
    Id.
     The defendant bears the burden of proving that the
    evidence was insufficient to prove guilt. 
    Id.
    The evidence before the jury included: (1) surveillance video admitted as
    a full exhibit which depicted the defendant walking towards and subsequently
    away from the victim’s apartment during the short period in which the assault
    took place; (2) still photographs produced from the surveillance video; (3)
    footage from the body camera worn by Officer Pittman during his stop of the
    defendant; (4) testimony by two investigating officers who identified the
    defendant as the male seen in still photographs taken from the surveillance
    video; and (5) the identification by another investigating officer of the defendant
    as the male that he had interviewed on the day of the assault. Additional video
    evidence showed the defendant’s actions following the assault of the victim
    which included him running from her apartment and hiding a machete when
    he saw the police. When later interviewed, the defendant denied at first that he
    had been anywhere other than a nearby restaurant but, after additional
    questioning, he admitted that he had entered a nearby basement apartment
    during the morning of the assault.
    Having reviewed the record before us, including the transferred exhibits,
    we conclude that a rational trier of fact, after considering the evidence
    presented, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most
    favorable to the State could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    defendant committed the offenses of which he was convicted.
    Affirmed.
    MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
    concurred.
    Timothy A. Gudas,
    Clerk
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-0033

Filed Date: 4/11/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/12/2024