State of New Hampshire v. Joyce LaFrance ( 2018 )

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2017-0180, State of New Hampshire v. Joyce
LaFrance, the court on December 26, 2018, issued the following
order:
Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.
The defendant, Joyce LaFrance, appeals an order of the Superior Court
(Schulman, J.) denying her motion to dismiss charges against her for lack of a
speedy trial in an earlier circuit court prosecution, under the New Hampshire
and Federal Constitutions. She contends that the superior court erred by: (1)
attributing certain delays to her that she claims should have been attributed to
the State; (2) failing to find that she asserted her right to a speedy trial when she
claimed she did; (3) finding that she suffered no trial prejudice; and (4)
“overweight[ing] the need for [her] to show significant trial prejudice given the
length of the delay.” We assume, without deciding, that her arguments are
preserved.
At the outset, we note that, when a defendant exercises her unique right to
a de novo trial in superior court, the effect is to “vacate[ ] [the circuit court]
conviction completely.” State v. Thompson, 165 N.H. 779, 789 (2013);
State v. Guy, 140 N.H. 453, 455 (1995) (stating that effect of such an appeal is to
“vacate that judgment and transfer the whole proceeding to the Superior Court,
there to be tried de novo” (quotation omitted)). A defendant convicted of a Class
A misdemeanor in circuit court, thus, has the right either to appeal that
conviction to us or to seek a de novo trial in the superior court, see RSA 599:1
(Supp. 2017), after which the defendant may appeal the superior court judgment
to us. Thompson, 165 N.H. at 783. She may not do both. See id.; but see State
v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 54 (1985) (finding, after defendant was convicted in de
novo trial in superior court, that he had been denied speedy trial in district
court).
In this case, we will assume, without deciding, that the defendant did not
effectively waive her challenge to the purported speedy trial violation that
allegedly occurred in the now vacated circuit court action by exercising her right
to a de novo trial in superior court. Thus, we review the superior court’s decision
including the time elapsed in both circuit and superior courts.
As the appealing party, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our
review of the trial court’s order, the defendant’s challenges to it, the relevant law,
and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that the defendant has not
demonstrated reversible error. See id.Affirmed.
Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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