State of New Hampshire v. Travis Martein ( 2018 )

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2018-0004, State of New Hampshire v. Travis
Martein, the court on December 6, 2018, issued the following
order:
Having considered the brief, the memorandum of law, and the record
submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this
case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.
The defendant, Travis Martein, appeals his conviction, following a jury trial
in Superior Court (Temple, J.), on a charge of falsifying physical evidence. See
RSA 641:6 (2016). He contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that, when he disposed of a knife with which he had
stabbed someone, he acted with the purpose of impairing the knife’s availability
in an investigation of the stabbing. See id. Because the defendant failed to
preserve this issue, he requests that we review it for plain error. See Sup. Ct. R.
16-A.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises a claim of legal error
that we review de novo. State v. Cable, 168 N.H. 673, 677 (2016). The defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient. State v.
Roy, 167 N.H. 276, 292 (2015). We objectively review the record to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, considering all the evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the State. Id. We examine
each evidentiary item in the context of all the evidence, not in isolation. Id.Further, the trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from facts proved and
also inferences from facts found as a result of other inferences, provided they can
be reasonably drawn therefrom. Id.The defendant argues, and the State does not contest, that, at trial, the
State relied solely upon circumstantial evidence to prove his intent.
Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. To prevail upon a sufficiency of the evidence challenge
when the evidence as to an element of the charged offense is solely
circumstantial, the defendant must establish that the evidence does not exclude
all reasonable conclusions except guilt. Id. The proper analysis is not whether
every possible conclusion consistent with innocence has been excluded, but,
rather, whether all reasonable conclusions based upon the evidence have been
excluded. Id. We do not just determine whether the defendant has suggested
another possible hypothesis that could explain the events in an exculpatory
fashion. Id. Rather, we evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State and determine whether the alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable
that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.In this case, the defendant argues that, when he threw the knife out the
sunroof of his vehicle into a construction area just before being stopped by police,
“he acted not with the conscious object to impair the knife’s availability, but
rather out of stress-induced confusion.” He points to his statements to the police
that, when he left his house with the knife, “he was under the impression that he
was bleeding out” from a bullet wound in his thigh, “he wasn’t thinking clearly,”
and “he was worried that he had just stabbed someone.”
However, a rational juror could have concluded that the defendant’s
actions did not reflect confusion. After the defendant was shot in the thigh by
one assailant, he continued to struggle with another assailant, and, when they
ended up in the defendant’s bedroom, the defendant had the presence of mind to
retrieve a “ka-bar” military-style knife, unsheathe it, and stab his assailant. The
defendant then went downstairs with the knife, collected his car keys, got into his
vehicle, and drove in a direction away from the nearest hospital.
A detective testified that, had the defendant taken the direct route to the
hospital, he would have driven through a developed business district. By going
in the direction he chose, he drove through a residential neighborhood with
brush and wooded areas, where he threw the knife through his vehicle’s sun-roof
and down a slope into a construction site.
When the defendant was stopped by a police officer immediately thereafter
for speeding and driving without his headlights illuminated, the officer testified
that the defendant immediately “jumped out” and followed the officer’s directions.
Another officer testified that the defendant described the man who shot him in
detail and identified the vehicle his assailant was driving and the address to
which he believed his assailant was heading. He also warned the officer that he
believed the assailant still had a gun. The defendant said nothing to the officers
about having stabbed a man or having disposed of the knife he had used.
The defendant had a second conversation with police officers in the
emergency department while he was awaiting surgery for his gunshot wound. At
that time, the defendant said that he had been attacked by three or four men,
that he had “pushed” them off and run to his bedroom, that the men had begun
kicking in the door, that he had picked up a knife and “held it out in front of him
and said, get away, I’ll defend myself if I have to,” and that this caused the men
to run away. The defendant could not describe the knife, where or how he had
acquired it, or where it was. The officer testified that the defendant’s answers to
those questions were “I don’t know[,] I don’t remember, [and] I can’t recall.” The
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officer further testified that there was time for the defendant to provide more
information.
Not until his third conversation with police, after his surgery, did the
defendant disclose that he had stabbed someone and inform the police where he
had thrown the knife. The defendant told the police that he thought “he was
bleeding out” and that, when he realized that he still held the knife, he threw it
out of the vehicle.
Approximately ten days later, the defendant was interviewed by police, at
which time he said “he felt he was shot, he was injured, and he was bleeding out,
so he protected himself” by stabbing the other man. He also said that, when he
threw the knife out of the vehicle, he was concerned that he had just stabbed
someone and that he was not thinking clearly.
The defendant argues that, when he was first stopped by the police, he was
“preoccupied with his need for medical treatment, and no inference of guilt can
reasonably attach to his failure then to mention the knife.” However, the jury
could have reasonably inferred from the defendant’s detailed statements about
the man who shot him that he could have made an equally detailed statement
about his use and the whereabouts of the knife.
The defendant argues that, during his second conversation with police,
while awaiting surgery, his “lack of clarity or memory about what happened to”
the knife was “consistent with confusion.” However, the jury was not required to
credit the defendant’s statement that he did not recall where he put the knife.
See State v. Gordon, 141 N.H. 703, 705 (1997) (stating that credibility of
witnesses is factual determination). It could have reasonably inferred that the
defendant was simply attempting to provide a false exculpatory story.
The defendant argues that his revealing to police, after surgery, where he
had thrown the knife, “supports the conclusion that [his] earlier failures to
mention the knife or recall its location do not reflect consciousness of guilt.” To
the contrary, a jury could have reasonably inferred, instead, that it reflected his
decision that his prior efforts to conceal the knife would be ineffectual.
The defendant argues that driving away from the nearest hospital and
throwing the knife out of the car “do[ ] not defeat the alternative rational
explanation of impulsivity and confusion.” Even if the defendant’s alternative
theory were possible, we do not review whether another hypothesis could explain
the events in an exculpatory fashion. Roy, 167 N.H. at 292. We conclude that,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the defendant has
not met his burden to show that his alternative hypothesis is sufficiently
reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. See id. Thus, we conclude that the trial court committed no
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error, plain or otherwise. See State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 380 (2011) (stating
that, to find plain error, there must be error).
Affirmed.
Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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