Wayne A. Sabato & a. v. Federal National Mortgage Association ( 2018 )


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  •                     THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    SUPREME COURT
    In Case No. 2018-0133, Wayne A. Sabato & a. v. Federal
    National Mortgage Association, the court on September 14,
    2018, issued the following order:
    Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
    that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.
    The plaintiffs, Wayne A. Sabato (husband) and Cheryl A. Sabato, appeal an
    order of the Superior Court (Temple, J.) dismissing their action against the
    defendant, Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), for failure to state a
    claim. They contend that, pursuant to RSA 480:3-a (2013), the husband’s
    homestead interest entitles them to occupy the premises for his lifetime and
    precludes their eviction, even though FNMA has foreclosed on the property and
    holds title to it. In reviewing the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, we
    assume the truth of the facts alleged and construe all reasonable inferences in
    the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Kurowski v. Town of Chester, 
    170 N.H. 307
    , 310 (2017). We will uphold the granting of the motion if the facts pleaded
    do not constitute a basis for legal relief. 
    Id.
    RSA 480:1 (Supp. 2017) defines a homestead interest as a dollar amount.
    This is reflected in RSA 529:20-a (Supp. 2017), which concerns the payment of a
    homestead interest when property is levied upon. “RSA 480:3-a does not entitle
    the [holder of a homestead interest] to occupy the marital premises . . . .”
    Boissonnault v. Savage, 
    137 N.H. 229
    , 232-33 (1993). Instead, RSA 480:3-a,
    which is titled “Duration,” “merely establishes the duration of the homestead
    right; it does not define the nature of the right itself.” 
    Id. at 232
    ; see State v.
    Fogg, 
    170 N.H. 234
    , 236 (2017) (stating that we interpret a statute in context of
    overall statutory scheme, and not in isolation).
    The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Boissonnault because there the
    purchaser of a tenancy in common at a sheriff’s sale petitioned to partition the
    property, while here, the purchaser of the entire property at foreclosure seeks to
    evict the plaintiffs. However, in both cases, the issue is whether a homestead
    interest entitled the holder to remain on the property. The plaintiffs argue that
    occupying the property is essential to establishing a homestead interest. See
    Walbridge v. Estate of Beaudoin, 
    163 N.H. 804
    , 805 (2012). However, while
    occupancy is necessary to establish the right to a dollar amount, this does not
    mean that a homestead interest allows a party to remain on the property for life.
    We conclude that the plaintiffs’ claim does not constitute a basis for legal
    relief. See Kurowski, 
    170 N.H. at 310
    .
    Affirmed.
    Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
    concurred.
    Eileen Fox,
    Clerk
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2018-0133

Filed Date: 9/14/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/12/2024