State v. Lorraine P. Lanciaux ( 2018 )

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2017-0434, State of New Hampshire v. Lorraine
P. Lanciaux, the court on March 29, 2018, issued the following
order:
Having considered the brief and the record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We vacate and remand.
The State appeals an order of the Superior Court (Ignatius, J.) dismissing
the charge against the defendant, Lorraine P. Lanciaux, with prejudice. It
contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the case and that it exceeded its
authority by doing so with prejudice.
The defendant was subject to enhanced penalties on a charge of simple
assault on a police officer while subject to a bail order. See RSA 597:14-b (2001);
RSA 631:2-a (2016); RSA 651:6 (2016). She refused to appear at the
arraignment, refused appointment of counsel, and refused to speak with
appointed standby counsel. Although bail was set, the defendant remained
incarcerated throughout the case.
The trial court ordered that the defendant be evaluated to determine her
competency to stand trial. See RSA 135:17 (Supp. 2017). However, she refused
to answer any questions or to cooperate with the evaluation. The doctor
conducting the evaluation reported that he had attempted to evaluate the
defendant previously, in 2011, at which time she was “quite staunch in her
refusal to cooperate, answer questions, and participate in the evaluation.” In
2011, he had concluded that she was likely “suffering from some form of mental
illness, possibly a psychotic disorder, with some paranoid and delusional
ideation.” However, he was not able to offer any definitive diagnosis or an
opinion regarding her competency.
Regarding the current evaluation, the doctor reported that, “based upon
[the defendant’s] refusal to participate in the current competency evaluation, [he
was] not able to offer any definitive opinion presently as to her competency to
stand trial or any definitive diagnosis as to possible mental illness.” He described
the defendant as someone who “presented in a well-spoken, articulate, and
serious manner[,] . . . appeared neat and clean[,] . . . demonstrated good eye
contact and had an overall articulate, intelligent, and business-like demeanor.”
However, he “strongly suspect[ed] that [she] has a mental illness.”
The trial court held three status conferences, all of which the defendant
refused to attend. Following the last conference, it ordered the charge against
her dismissed, with prejudice. The trial court noted that it had never observed
the defendant, but had “not taken the step of physically forcing her to appear in
court, believing it [would] only exacerbate further her paranoia and hostility.” It
stated that it did “not have adequate evidence to conclude that [the defendant] is
competent to stand trial, or that she is not competent as a result of a mental
illness.”
In response to the State’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court stated
that, although the State offered to accept a plea of guilty and time served, the
court “had no basis to find a plea to be the product of a knowing, intelligent and
voluntary waiver of her rights.” It concluded that “[b]ecause [the defendant] had
been in custody for nearly a year, [dismissing the charge] was effectively the
equivalent of a ‘time served’ disposition.” The State appealed.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right not to be tried if she is
legally incompetent. State v. Decato, 165 N.H. 294, 296 (2013). The State bears
the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant is
competent to stand trial. Id. at 296-97. Competency to stand trial is a legal, and
not a medical, concept. State v. Bertrand, 123 N.H. 719, 726 (1983).
Generally, we defer to the trial court’s decision regarding the need for a
competency hearing. State v. Kincaid, 158 N.H. 90, 93 (2008). However,
whenever a trial court orders a criminal defendant to undergo a psychiatric
evaluation to determine competency, such an order reflects the existence of a
bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competency. Bertrand, 123 N.H. at 728.
Consequently, in such cases, an evidentiary hearing must follow at which the
defendant is entitled to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. Id. The
trial court must make specific findings of fact on the record and must identify the
evidence on which it bases its decision, thereby enabling adequate appellate
review. Id. The trial court may not abdicate to psychiatrists its judicial
responsibility to determine a defendant’s competency. State v. Haycock, 146
N.H. 5, 8 (2001).
In this case, the trial court allowed the defendant to control the proceeding
and to benefit from her own intransigence. Furthermore, it deprived the State of
its opportunity to carry its burden regarding the defendant’s competence. The
trial court had the authority to compel the defendant to attend hearings and to
comply with its orders. Cf. In the Matter of Brownell & Brownell, 163 N.H. 593,
601 (2012) (describing trial court’s civil contempt power). Once the defendant’s
competence was questioned, the trial court was required to hold a hearing, see
Bertrand, 123 N.H. at 728, determine the defendant’s competence, see RSA
135:17-a (2015) (authorizing trial court to determine competency), and make
specific findings of fact, see Bertrand, 123 N.H. at 728.
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To the extent that the trial court justified dismissing the charge against the
defendant on the basis of the length of her pretrial confinement, it erred. If the
defendant was incompetent to stand trial, RSA 135:17-a, I, required the trial
court to “order treatment for the restoration of competency unless it determines
. . . that there is no reasonable likelihood that the defendant can be restored to
competency through appropriate treatment within 12 months.” By dismissing
the charge against the defendant without first determining her competency, the
trial court undermined the statutory scheme.
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for proceedings
consistent with this order. In light of this order, we need not address whether
the trial court erred by dismissing the charge with prejudice. But see RSA
135:17-a, I (providing that if, after hearing, trial court finds defendant is
incompetent and cannot be restored to competency within 12 months, case shall
be dismissed without prejudice); State v. Cotell, 143 N.H. 275, 279 (1998) (stating
extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice reserved for extraordinary
circumstances when government’s misconduct has prejudiced defendant).
Vacated and remanded.
Hicks, Lynn, Bassett, and Hantz Marconi, JJ., concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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