Appeal of Health Trust, Inc. ( 2018 )


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  •                    THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    SUPREME COURT
    In Case No. 2016-0654, Appeal of HealthTrust, Inc., the
    court on March 29, 2018, issued the following order:
    Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the court
    concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. This is the
    third time that this matter has come before us. The respondent, HealthTrust,
    Inc. (HealthTrust), is a pooled risk management program operated by the Local
    Government Center, Inc. Appeal of the Local Gov’t Ctr., 
    165 N.H. 790
    , 794
    (2014). HealthTrust appeals orders issued by a presiding officer of the
    petitioner, the New Hampshire Bureau of Securities Regulation (Bureau), which
    were issued after remand. See Appeal of Town of Salem, 
    168 N.H. 572
    , 580-81
    (2016). On appeal, HealthTrust argues that the presiding officer exceeded the
    scope of remand when he required HealthTrust to pay an additional $2.1
    million to 66 of its former and current members that had not previously
    participated in this case. We agree and, therefore, reverse that portion of the
    presiding officer’s order.
    The following facts were found by the presiding officer, were recited in
    our prior opinions, or appear in the record before us. See Appeal of Local Gov’t
    Ctr., 
    165 N.H. at 794-803
    ; Appeal of Town of Salem, 
    168 N.H. at 574-76
    .
    Briefly, in 2011, the secretary of state began an administrative proceeding
    against HealthTrust and related pooled risk management programs, including
    Property-Liability Trust, Inc. (Property-Liability Trust), based upon allegations
    that the pooled risk management programs had violated RSA chapter 5-B. See
    Appeal of Town of Salem, 
    168 N.H. at 575
    . In an August 2012 order, the
    Bureau’s presiding officer decided that the pooled risk management programs
    had violated several provisions of RSA chapter 5-B, including RSA 5-B:5, I(c)
    (2013), which requires a pooled risk management program to return to
    “participating political subdivisions” the “earnings and surplus” that are “in
    excess of any amounts required for administration, claims, reserves, and
    purchase of excess insurance.” 
    Id.
     (quotations omitted).
    To remedy the violation of RSA 5-B:5, I(c), the presiding officer ordered
    the Bureau and HealthTrust to submit an agreed-upon plan for the return of
    $33.2 million to HealthTrust’s members who had participated in HealthTrust
    “at any time after June 14, 2010.” See Appeal of Local Gov’t Ctr., 
    165 N.H. at 802
    . If the Bureau and HealthTrust failed to agree, the order required that the
    $33.2 million be disbursed only to those members who participated in
    HealthTrust as of August 16, 2012, the date of the presiding officer’s decision.
    See Appeal of Town of Salem, 
    168 N.H. at 575
    . The presiding officer ordered
    that the $33.2 million be returned to HealthTrust members by September 1,
    2013. Appeal of Local Gov’t Ctr., 
    165 N.H. at 802
    .
    The presiding officer also ordered Property-Liability Trust to transfer
    $17.1 million to HealthTrust. See 
    id. at 794, 802-03
    . Those funds, “to the
    extent they constitute[d] amounts in excess of earnings and surplus” of
    HealthTrust, were to be “returned to members consistent with RSA 5-B:5, I(c).”
    See 
    id. at 803
    ; Appeal of Town of Salem, 
    168 N.H. at 580
    .
    HealthTrust, Property-Liability Trust, and the other pooled risk
    management programs appealed the presiding officer’s August 2012 order to
    this court. See Appeal of Local Gov’t Ctr., 
    165 N.H. at 793-94
    . We affirmed in
    part, vacated portions of the order not relevant here, and remanded for further
    proceedings. See 
    id. at 809, 810, 814
    .
    The Bureau subsequently filed a motion for entry of a default order
    against HealthTrust and the other pooled risk management programs. See
    Appeal of Town of Salem, 
    168 N.H. at 575-76
    . The motion for entry of a default
    order alleged that, unbeknownst to the Bureau, HealthTrust and Property-
    Liability Trust had entered into a confidential settlement agreement, effective
    upon the issuance of our opinion in Appeal of Local Government Center. The
    motion asserted that the settlement agreement violated the presiding officer’s
    August 2012 order and requested that the presiding officer so rule.
    Thereafter, HealthTrust and Property-Liability Trust entered into a new
    agreement that, in effect, extinguished their prior settlement agreement. In its
    pleading notifying the presiding officer of the new agreement, HealthTrust
    stated that “subject to the Presiding Officer’s and [the Bureau’s] approval,
    HealthTrust will distribute the $17.1 million to its current members or another
    identified combination of current and former HealthTrust members.”
    In response, eight towns sought to intervene in the proceedings. See 
    id. at 576
    . For ease of reference, we refer to those towns as “the intervenor
    towns.” The presiding officer granted them “limited intervenor status,” allowing
    them “to address solely the issue of any payment of funds by HealthTrust . . .
    to political subdivisions” from the $17.1 million transferred to HealthTrust by
    Property-Liability Trust. See 
    id.
    Subsequently, the Bureau, HealthTrust, and Property-Liability Trust
    entered into a consent decree, approved by the presiding officer, that resolved
    the issues raised in the Bureau’s motion for entry of a default order. See 
    id.
     In
    the consent decree, the parties acknowledged that Property-Liability Trust had
    paid to HealthTrust approximately $15.4 million of the $17.1 million owed.
    The decree set forth the terms by which Property-Liability Trust would pay the
    remaining $1.7 million and provided that the Bureau would not “take any
    regulatory action” against Property-Liability Trust based solely and exclusively
    2
    on those payments. The consent decree provided that the parties “waive[d] all
    appeals from the enforcement proceeding which is resolved by this Consent
    Decree.”
    The intervenor towns filed a motion proposing how to distribute the
    $17.1 million to former members of HealthTrust. See 
    id.
     The intervenor towns
    recommended a method by which to calculate each former member’s proposed
    proportional share of the $17.1 million in surplus funds. The portion of the
    $17.1 million sought by the intervenor towns was $278,587. HealthTrust
    objected to the intervenor towns’ motion; the Bureau took no position on it.
    The presiding officer denied the intervenor towns’ motion, ruling that the
    towns could not share in the surplus funds because, pursuant to the presiding
    officer’s August 2012 order, the $17.1 million was to be “returned to members
    consistent with RSA 5-B:5, I(c),” and because RSA 5-B:5, I(c) allows return of
    funds only to “participating political subdivisions.” 
    Id. at 580
     (quotation
    omitted). The presiding officer interpreted the phrase “participating political
    subdivisions” to refer only to towns that were current members of HealthTrust
    and not to towns that were past or former members. 
    Id.
     The presiding officer
    specifically noted that the intervenor towns did not represent any entities other
    than themselves, and, thus, he declined to consider whether any other
    potential intervenors had standing.
    The intervenor towns appealed, but, according to HealthTrust, no party
    moved to stay HealthTrust’s distribution of the $17.1 million. 
    Id. at 576
    .
    Thus, in September 2014, HealthTrust disbursed the $17.1 million to 352 of its
    then-current members based upon each member’s proportional payments
    during the 2014 fiscal year.
    In the intervenor towns’ appeal, we held that the presiding officer had
    erred when he ruled that the intervenor towns were not entitled to a share of
    the $17.1 million. See 
    id. at 580-81
    . We explained that RSA 5-B:5, I(c) is the
    provision that HealthTrust violated; “it does not circumscribe the remedy.” 
    Id. at 580
    . Rather, RSA 5-B:4-a, I(b)(2) (2013) allows the presiding officer to
    remedy a violation of RSA 5-B:5, I(c) by ordering rescission, restitution, or
    disgorgement. 
    Id.
     We further explained that “to the extent the presiding officer
    concluded that he lacked the authority to penalize a violation of RSA 5-B:5, I(c)
    by ordering payment to former members of a pooled risk management program
    as either restitution or disgorgement, he committed an error of law.” 
    Id. at 581
    . Therefore, we vacated the presiding officer’s decision on the intervenor
    towns’ motion and remanded “for further proceedings.” 
    Id.
     We stated that we
    expressed no opinion “as to what penalty should be ordered in this case,” given
    that we were merely clarifying the scope of the presiding officer’s authority
    under RSA 5-B:4-a (Supp. 2017) to penalize violations of RSA 5-B:5, I(c). 
    Id.
    3
    On remand, the presiding officer determined that, in light of this court’s
    statutory interpretation, he had erred when he had excluded former
    HealthTrust members from the universe of potential recipients of the $17.1
    million surplus funds. He decided that the remand proceeding had to “resolve
    the issues of both the universe of potential recipients and the proportional
    distribution of the $17.1 million surplus funds.” He further determined that
    preclusion did not apply to claims of restitution by political subdivisions that
    had not sought to intervene in the proceedings. According to the presiding
    officer, our decision in Appeal of Town of Salem gave “breath to all political
    subdivisions now determined to have a statutory right to receive a
    proportionate share of the illegal subsidy made by [HealthTrust] to support . . .
    Property[-]Liability Trust . . . .” Thus, the presiding officer concluded that our
    decision in Appeal of Town of Salem required that “a true proportionate
    restitution” be “made to all political subdivisions which had contributed funds
    during the years 2003 through 2010” to HealthTrust. (Emphasis added.)
    Accordingly, the presiding officer ordered HealthTrust to make payments
    to an “expanded pool of recipients,” which included “all former members and,
    as appropriate, current members,” in accordance with amounts to which the
    parties and intervenor towns had previously stipulated. He also ordered that,
    to the extent that funds in excess of $17.1 million were required to be paid,
    those funds constituted an additional penalty for HealthTrust’s prior violation
    of RSA 5-B:5, I(c). HealthTrust asserts that the presiding officer’s decision
    requires it to pay an additional $2.1 million to 66 of its former and current
    members that had not previously participated in this case.
    HealthTrust unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the presiding
    officer’s decision, and this appeal followed. At HealthTrust’s request, we have
    stayed the presiding officer’s decision while this appeal is pending.
    HealthTrust represents that, after it filed this appeal, it agreed to pay the
    intervenor towns $278,587, the entire amount of their claim. Because the
    intervenor towns have represented that they are no longer interested parties in
    this appeal, they are deemed non-participants.
    Our standard of review of the presiding officer’s decision is set forth in
    RSA 541:13 (2007). See RSA 5-B:4-a, VIII (2013). Thus, we will not set aside
    the presiding officer’s decision except for errors of law, unless we are satisfied,
    by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that his order is unjust or
    unreasonable. Appeal of Local Gov’t Ctr., 
    165 N.H. at 803
    ; see RSA 541:13.
    The presiding officer’s findings of fact are deemed prima facie lawful and
    reasonable. Appeal of Local Gov’t Ctr., 
    165 N.H. at 803
    ; see RSA 541:13.
    HealthTrust and the Bureau dispute the scope of our remand to the
    presiding officer. “The scope of remand is limited by the nature of the error or
    issue identified.” Kalil v. Town of Dummer Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
    155 N.H. 307
    , 312 (2007). In Appeal of Town of Salem, the issue before us was narrow:
    4
    whether the presiding officer had erred when he denied the intervenor towns’
    motion regarding distribution of the $17.1 million. See Appeal of Town of
    Salem, 
    168 N.H. at 580-81
    . We decided only that discrete issue. See 
    id.
     We
    explained that, when the presiding officer denied the motion, he did so because
    he mistakenly determined that the statutory scheme precluded former
    HealthTrust members from sharing in those funds. 
    Id.
     Having clarified the
    law, we then vacated the presiding officer’s denial of the intervenor towns’
    motion and remanded for him to decide the motion anew. See 
    id. at 581
    .
    We intended that the presiding officer, on remand, would address only
    the narrow issue of whether to grant or deny the intervenor towns’ motion
    regarding distribution of the $17.1 million in surplus funds. See 
    id.
     Although,
    in their motion, the intervenor towns also sought a remedy on behalf of other
    former HealthTrust members, they had no standing to do so. As the presiding
    officer observed, the intervenor towns represented only themselves. To the
    extent that the presiding officer decided issues beyond whether the intervenor
    towns were entitled to a remedy, he exceeded the scope of remand. We,
    therefore, reverse his decision to the extent that it required HealthTrust to
    make payments to political subdivisions other than the intervenor towns and
    the 352 then-current members to which HealthTrust paid the $17.1 million in
    September 2014.
    Reversed in part.
    HICKS, LYNN, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ., concurred.
    Eileen Fox,
    Clerk
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-0654

Filed Date: 3/29/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/12/2024