State of New Hampshire v. Jason Millett ( 2017 )

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2016-0249, State of New Hampshire v. Jason
Millett, the court on March 10, 2017, issued the following order:
Having considered the parties’ briefs and the record submitted on appeal,
we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R.
18(1). The defendant, Jason Millett, appeals his conviction, following a jury
trial, of possession of a controlled drug (cocaine) with intent to sell or
distribute. See RSA 318-B:2, I (2011). On appeal, he argues that the Superior
Court (Delker, J.) erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized
during a stop for a motor vehicle violation. In support of this argument, the
defendant contends, among other things, that: (1) the officer who stopped the
vehicle impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop; and (2) his consent,
given while he was unlawfully detained, was involuntary. We reverse and
remand.
The relevant facts are set forth in an opinion issued today, State v.
Morrill, 169 N.H. ___ (decided March 10, 2017)—a case involving the same
motor vehicle stop that was consolidated with this case for the suppression
hearing before the trial court. In Morrill, we held that the officer who stopped
the vehicle impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop. Morrill, 169 N.H. at
___. That holding is controlling in the instant case.
Because the defendant consented to the search of the vehicle while
unlawfully detained, his consent was ‘tainted’ by the illegality of the detention.
See State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 749 (2001). Consequently, the evidence
obtained following the purported consensual search would be admissible only if
the State could demonstrate “that the consent was both voluntary and not an
exploitation of the prior illegality.” Id. at 750 (quotation omitted).
Here, the State does not argue that the taint of the unlawful detention
had been purged or attenuated. Id. at 749. We thus conclude that the State
failed to meet its burden to establish that the evidence obtained by the
purported consent was “not an exploitation of the prior illegality.” Id. Because
of our determination on this issue, we need not consider the issue of the
voluntariness of the defendant’s consent. See id. at 751.
For these reasons, and for the reasons stated in Morrill, we conclude that
the evidence seized following the defendant’s purported consent should have
been suppressed.
Reversed and remanded.
DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ.,
concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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