State of New Hampshire v. Robert E. Johnson ( 2016 )

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2015-0225, State of New Hampshire v. Robert
E. Johnson, the court on February 22, 2016, issued the following
order:
Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.
The defendant, Robert E. Johnson, appeals his conviction, following a jury
trial in Superior Court (MacLeod, J.), on a charge of selling heroin. See RSA 318-
B:2 (Supp. 2015). He contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion
to dismiss due to insufficient evidence.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
objectively review the record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,
considering all the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the State. State v. Thelusma, 167 N.H. 481, 487 (2015). The
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient
to prove guilt. Id. In reviewing the evidence, we examine each evidentiary item in
the context of all the evidence, not in isolation. Id. Further, the trier of fact may
draw reasonable inferences from facts proved and also inferences from facts
found as a result of other inferences, provided they can be reasonably drawn
therefrom. Id.The defendant argues that the primary witness against him, Timothy
Hebert, “was a demonstrably incredible witness” because: (1) his testimony
varied from that of a third-party witness; (2) the other witness testified that
Hebert kept part of the drugs he purchased at the request of the State as a
“cooperating individual”; (3) Hebert failed to return $10.00 to the officer with
whom he was working; and (4) the State asked Hebert to take a polygraph.
However, we defer to the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, unless it acted
unreasonably. State v. Briere, 138 N.H. 617, 622 (1994). The defendant made
these arguments to the jury, and its duty was to decide the credibility of the
witnesses. See id. We note that the trial court instructed the jury to “scrutinize”
Hebert’s testimony “with great care and caution.” See State v. Willis, 165 N.H.
206, 225 (2013) (“Juries are presumed to follow instructions.”). We conclude that
the jury’s implicit decision to credit Hebert’s testimony was not unreasonable.
The defendant next argues that the audio recording of Hebert’s transaction
with the defendant does not contain explicit statements regarding the purchase
and sale of drugs. However, the transcript of the recording indicates that Hebert
asked the defendant, “This is a hundred?” After the defendant made an
unintelligible reply, Hebert then thanked him, and the defendant warned Hebert
to be careful because police officers were about. This discussion, along with the
other evidence, supports a reasonable conclusion that a drug transaction had
taken place.
The defendant next argues that Hebert could have secreted drugs in his
clothing or in the defendant’s building and then represented to police that he had
purchased them from the defendant. However, when reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, we do not review whether another hypothesis could explain the
events in an exculpatory fashion, but whether the alternative hypothesis is
sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thelusma, 167 N.H. at 489. The defendant further
argues that this “transaction yielded a quantity of heroin that did not correspond
with the amount of money” that the officer had given Hebert. However, this fact
did not compel the jury to acquit the defendant of the charged sale.
The defendant next argues that no rational jury could have found him
guilty of the charge unless it relied upon a “forbidden propensity inference”
arising from two other sales of heroin for which he was tried and convicted
concurrently with the conviction that he challenges in this appeal. We disagree.
We note that the defendant did not seek severance of the charges and has not
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the other two convictions.
When viewing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences from it, in the
light most favorable to the State, we cannot say that no rational trier of fact could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Thelusma, 167
N.H. at 487.
Affirmed.
Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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