Gregg Blackstock v. Executive Assistant, Adult Parole Board & a. ( 2016 )

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2014-0720, Gregg Blackstock v. Executive
Assistant, Adult Parole Board & a., the court on June 9, 2016,
issued the following order:
Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties and the
record submitted on appeal, the court concludes that a formal written opinion
is unnecessary in the case. The petitioner, Gregg Blackstock, appeals an order
of the Superior Court (Wageling, J.) dismissing his writ of mandamus against
the respondents, the executive assistant to the Adult Parole Board (APB) and
the New Hampshire Department of Corrections (DOC). We affirm.
I. Background
The following facts are derived from the trial court’s order or appear in
the record. In 2001, the petitioner was sentenced to four sentences of five to
ten years of incarceration on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual
assault. Three sentences were to run consecutively and one sentence was to
run concurrently.
The petitioner began serving his initial sentence on January 12, 2001,
and received a 95-day credit based upon his pretrial confinement. On August
18, 2005, the APB held the petitioner’s first parole hearing, after which it
denied parole. On January 5, 2006, the APB held a second hearing, after
which it granted the petitioner parole from his initial sentence to his first
consecutive sentence.
Nearly five years later, on November 4, 2010, the APB conducted a third
hearing, after which the petitioner was denied parole. On October 10, 2011,
the APB conducted a fourth hearing, after which the petitioner was granted
parole to his final consecutive sentence. The petitioner remains incarcerated,
and is currently serving his final sentence. The maximum term of this
sentence is set to expire on October 9, 2021.
In May 2014, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus against
the APB, asserting that it impermissibly paroled him to consecutive sentences
and improperly conducted his parole hearings in advance of his minimum
parole eligibility date. He contended that, as a result, his minimum term of
incarceration was increased by at least one year. The petitioner requested,
among other things, that the court: (1) order the APB to “cease and desist” all
parole hearings until his aggregate minimum parole eligibility date, which he
asserted was governed by RSA 651:20, I(a)(2) (Supp. 2015); and (2) order the
DOC to re-calculate his minimum parole eligibility date based upon an
aggregate minimum term of 15 years.
The APB moved to dismiss, arguing that: (1) “the APB properly
considered [the petitioner] for administrative parole at the end of his first two
consecutive sentences, and properly calculated the minimum parole date for
his final sentence”; and (2) the petitioner erroneously relied upon RSA 651:20,
I(a)(2), which applies to suspended sentences, rather than RSA chapter 651-A
(2007 & Supp. 2015), which governs parole. The petitioner objected, arguing
that: (1) RSA 651-A:6, II (2007) (repealed 2008), which was the applicable
statute in effect at the time of his offenses, convictions, and sentencing,
governed the calculation of “the minimum parole eligibility date for an inmate
serving multiple consecutive sentences”; (2) pursuant to RSA 651-A:6, II, he
had to serve only the total of the minimum terms of his two longest sentences,
ten years, before becoming eligible for parole from prison; (3) application of the
current version of RSA 651-A:6, see RSA 651-A:6 (Supp. 2015), would violate
his federal constitutional guarantee against ex post facto laws; and (4) the APB
lacked the authority to parole him to consecutive sentences. The petitioner
requested, among other things, that the court: (1) order “the DOC to calculate
[his] sentence pursuant to RSA 651-A:6, [II] as it existed during the date of the
charged offense, making [him] time eligible for parole (to society) after he had
served the minimum portions of the two [longest] sentences imposed”; and (2)
order “the APB to conduct a parole hearing (to society) . . . forthwith for [him]
using only the mandated criteria pursuant to State statutes and promulgated
rules.”
The trial court held a hearing on the matter on July 11, 2014. After the
hearing, the petitioner filed a motion to amend, seeking to add the DOC as a
respondent, which the court granted. Also, after the hearing, the parties filed
supplemental briefs. In August 2014, the court issued an order granting the
respondents’ request for dismissal. The court ruled that: (1) the now repealed
RSA 651-A:6, II set forth the calculation of “the duration of parole once an
inmate was released, not the length of a minimum sentence required in order
for an inmate to be considered for parole”; (2) even assuming the petitioner’s
interpretation of RSA 651-A:6, II is correct, application of the current version of
RSA 651-A:6 “does not constitute an ex post facto law because it does not
increase [the petitioner’s] punishment”; (3) “the APB did not act outside its
jurisdiction in considering [the petitioner] for parole after each of his first two
minimum sentences”; and (4) the APB did not lack jurisdiction to consider the
petitioner for parole even though he would be paroled to a consecutive
sentence, rather than released from prison. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the court denied. This appeal followed.
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II. Standard of Review
“In reviewing the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, we consider
whether the allegations in the [petitioner’s] pleadings are reasonably
susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” England v. Brianas,
166 N.H. 369, 371 (2014). “We assume that the [petitioner’s] factual
allegations are true and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to him.” Id. “We need not, however, assume the truth of statements
that are merely conclusions of law.” Id. “We then engage in a threshold
inquiry, testing the facts alleged in the pleadings against the applicable law.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “We will uphold the trial court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss if the facts pleaded do not constitute a basis for legal relief.” Id.(quotation omitted).
III. Interpretation of RSA 651-A:6, II
The petitioner first argues that the trial court erred in ruling that RSA
651-A:6, II set forth the calculation of the duration of parole upon release from
prison, not the calculation of the minimum parole eligibility date for an inmate
serving multiple sentences. Specifically, he contends that: (1) legislative
history supports the conclusion that RSA 651-A:6, II concerned the minimum
parole eligibility date of an inmate serving multiple sentences; (2) inclusion of
RSA 651:3, III (1974) (repealed 1975) in RSA 651-A:6, II did not affect the
applicability of RSA 651-A:6, II; (3) the rule of lenity should apply in favor of his
interpretation of RSA 651-A:6, II; and (4) federal district court case law
supports the conclusion that RSA 651-A:6, II addressed parole eligibility. The
respondents assert that: (1) the trial court properly concluded that, based upon
the plain language of RSA 651-A:6 (2007) (amended 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013,
2014), RSA 651-A:6, II set forth the calculation of the duration of parole upon
release from prison, not the calculation of the minimum parole eligibility date
for an inmate serving multiple sentences; (2) legislative history supports the
trial court’s conclusion that RSA 651-A:6, II concerned the duration of parole,
not parole eligibility; (3) the longstanding practice of the APB of paroling an
inmate serving multiple sentences to society only after he or she has served all
of his or her minimum terms supports the conclusion that RSA 651-A:6, II did
not address parole eligibility; and (4) the petitioner’s interpretation of RSA
651-A:6, II produces an absurd result.
“Because resolution of this issue requires the interpretation of a statute,
our review is de novo.” State v. Gilley, 168 N.H. 188, 189 (2015). “In matters
of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the intent of the
legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Id.“We construe provisions of the Criminal Code according to the fair import of
their terms and to promote justice.” Id. “We first look to the language of the
statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and
ordinary meaning.” Id. “Further, we interpret legislative intent from the
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statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said, or
add language that it did not see fit to include.” Id. at 189-90. “Finally, we
interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in
isolation.” Id. at 190.
At the time of the petitioner’s offenses, convictions, and sentencing, RSA
651-A:6, entitled “Terms of Release,” provided, in relevant part:
I. A prisoner may be released on parole upon the expiration of
the minimum term of his sentence, minus any credits received
pursuant to RSA 651-A:23, plus the disciplinary period added to
such minimum under RSA 651:2, II-e, any part of which is not
reduced for good conduct as provided in RSA 651-A:22, provided
that there shall appear to the adult parole board, after having
given the notice required in RSA 651-A:11, to be a reasonable
probability that he will remain at liberty without violating the law
and will conduct himself as a good citizen. Any prisoner so
released shall be given a permit by the board to be at liberty from
prison during the unexpired portion of the maximum term of his
sentence.
II. When a person is subject to multiple concurrent or
consecutive sentences of imprisonment, as provided in RSA 651:3,
III, the provisions of this section shall be computed from the total
of the 2 longest sentences, subject to the provisions of RSA
651-A:14.
RSA 651-A:6, I (2007) (amended 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014), II (emphases added).
As an initial matter, we note that RSA 651:3, III, which is referenced in
RSA 651-A:6, II, was repealed in 1975. See Laws 1975, 158:2. Prior to its
repeal, the provision “provided for all sentences to run concurrently except
those of persons convicted of a felony either during imprisonment or an escape
from imprisonment.” Duquette v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 154 N.H. 737,
741 (2007). The parties agree that inclusion in RSA 651-A:6, II of this repealed
provision does not affect the application of RSA 651-A:6, II in the instant case.
Cf. State v. Whittey, 149 N.H. 463, 467-69 (2003) (concluding, after reviewing
applicable legislative history, that reference to rape statute within first degree
murder statute subsequent to repeal of rape statute was an oversight that did
not eliminate rape element of first degree murder statute). Thus, we assume,
without deciding, that when the legislature repealed RSA 651:3, III, it did not
nullify RSA 651-A:6, II.
We begin our statutory analysis by interpreting the phrase “the
provisions of this section” in RSA 651-A:6, II. RSA 651-A:6, II. We interpret
the plain meaning of the phrase “this section” to refer to the section in RSA
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chapter 651-A in which RSA 651-A:6, II was found. See Black’s Law Dictionary
1557 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “section,” in relevant part, as a “distinct part or
division of a writing, esp. a legal instrument”). Additionally, we construe the
plain meaning of the term “provisions” to refer to the clauses within that
section. See id. at 1420 (defining “provision,” as relevant here, as a “clause in a
statute”). Prior to its repeal, RSA 651-A:6, II was part of RSA 651-A:6, which
governed terms of release. See RSA 651-A:6; Bussiere v. Cunningham,
Warden, 132 N.H. 747, 752 (1990) (referring to RSA 651-A:6 as “the parole
release statute”). We, therefore, interpret the phrase “the provisions of this
section” to mean the clauses of RSA 651-A:6 relative to terms of release. RSA
651-A:6, II.
We must next determine what the legislature meant when it stated that
the provisions of RSA 651-A:6 “shall be computed from the total of the 2 longest
sentences.” RSA 651-A:6, II (emphasis added). The petitioner contends that
RSA 651-A:6, II set forth the calculation of the minimum parole eligibility date
for an inmate serving multiple sentences. The respondents counter that
paragraph II did not address parole eligibility, but rather the duration of parole
upon release from prison. The Appellate Defender Program, acting as amicus
curiae, maintains that paragraph II addressed both the minimum parole
eligibility date and the duration of parole for an inmate serving multiple
sentences.
We have defined the term “sentence,” in the context of suspended
sentences, to mean “the punishment prescribed by a court in relation to a
conviction on a single offense.” State v. Horner, 153 N.H. 306, 310 (2006).
Although we find no reason to diverge from this definition in the context of
parole, the definition fails to clarify the meaning of the phrase “2 longest
sentences” as used in RSA 651-A:6, II. The phrase could refer to the two
longest maximum terms. Under this reading, as the respondents contend, RSA
651-A:6, II set forth the calculation of the duration of parole upon release from
prison, because duration of parole was based upon an inmate’s maximum
term. See RSA 651-A:6, I (“Any prisoner so released shall be given a permit by
the board to be at liberty from prison during the unexpired portion of the
maximum term of his sentence.” (emphasis added)). However, because
sentences for felonies have both minimum and maximum terms, see RSA
651:2, II(d) (Supp. 2015), the phrase could also refer to the minimum and
maximum terms of an inmate’s two longest sentences. Under this reading, as
the amicus curiae suggests, RSA 651-A:6, II set forth the calculation of both
the minimum parole eligibility date and the duration of parole upon release
from prison.
“Where more than one reasonable interpretation of the statutory
language exists, we review legislative history to aid our analysis.” Duquette,
154 N.H. at 740. Upon review of the relevant legislative history, we conclude
that RSA 651-A:6, II set forth the calculation of the duration of parole upon
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release from prison, not the calculation of the minimum parole eligibility date
for an inmate serving multiple sentences.
Prior to 1991, RSA 651-A:6, II provided: “When a person is subject to
multiple concurrent or consecutive sentences of imprisonment, as provided in
RSA 651:3, III, the provisions of this section shall be computed from the
longest of said sentences.” RSA 651-A:6, II (1986) (amended 1991; repealed
2008) (emphasis added). In 1991, the legislature introduced House Bill (HB)
771, which sought to amend RSA 651-A:6, II to read: “When a person is subject
to multiple concurrent or consecutive sentences of imprisonment, as provided
in RSA 651:3, III, the provisions of this section shall be computed from the . . .
total of the maximums of said sentences.” House Bill 771 (1991). In testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, in support of HB 771, Arthur Brennan,
then-Governor Judd Gregg’s legal counsel, stated that:
[The APB] said that currently a prisoner who has had multiple
convictions, which might add up to fifteen years of three year
convictions, only serves parole for the longest of those convictions.
So that person, although they had a fifteen year period might only
have a three year parole after serving all of the minimum
sentences. The parole board’s rationale . . . is that the longer the
person is on supervision, if it is someone who has been convicted
of multiple crimes, the more likely that person is to get used to the
idea of going straight. It is as simple as that.
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Hearing on HB 771 (April 17, 1991) (testimony of
Arthur Brennan) (emphases added). Ultimately, the legislature did not adopt
the language originally proposed in HB 771. See Laws 1991, 342:3. Rather, it
adopted the language in the version of RSA 651-A:6, II at issue in this case.
See id. Nevertheless, we find the legislative history of the 1991 amendment
instructive as to the legislature’s intent.
“We construe statutes to address the evil or mischief that the legislature
intended to correct or remedy.” State v. Lathrop, 164 N.H. 468, 470 (2012). As
Brennan’s testimony evinces, the purpose of amending RSA 651-A:6, II in 1991
was to increase the duration of parole for an inmate who was sentenced to
multiple sentences. Thus, construing paragraph II as setting forth the
calculation of the duration of parole is consistent with the legislature’s
apparent effort to lengthen parole supervision.
Moreover, “the construction of a statute by those charged with its
administration is entitled to substantial deference.” N.H. Retirement System v.
Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 108 (1985). “[W]hen the meaning of a statute is in
doubt, the long-standing practical and plausible interpretation applied by the
agency responsible for its implementation, without any interference by the
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legislature, is evidence that the administrative construction conforms to the
legislative intent.” Id. at 109 (quotation omitted).
Brennan’s testimony indicates that, as early as 1991, the APB did not
interpret RSA 651-A:6, II as addressing the minimum parole eligibility date for
an inmate serving multiple sentences. As he explained in his testimony, “[the
APB] said that currently a prisoner who has had multiple convictions . . . only
serves parole for the longest of those convictions . . . after serving all of the
minimum sentences.” Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Hearing on HB 771 (April
17, 1991) (testimony of Arthur Brennan) (emphases added). This explanation
suggests that the APB interpreted the language of RSA 651-A:6, II — which at
the time provided that “the provisions of this section shall be computed from
the longest of said sentences,” RSA 651-A:6, II (1986) (amended 1991; repealed
2008) (emphasis added) — to refer only to the duration of parole upon release,
not parole eligibility. If the APB had interpreted paragraph II as setting forth
the calculation of the minimum parole eligibility date, it would not have
required an inmate to serve “all of the minimum sentences” before becoming
eligible for parole from prison. Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Hearing on HB 771
(April 17, 1991) (testimony of Arthur Brennan) (emphasis added). Had the
legislature disagreed with the APB’s interpretation, it presumably would have
corrected the error when it amended RSA 651-A:6, II in 1991. See Woodman v.
Cunningham, 126 N.H. 481, 484 (1985) (concluding that, if warden had been
releasing prisoners much sooner than the legislature intended under former
RSA chapter 607, “we have no doubt that the legislature would have acted
swiftly to correct the warden’s misinterpretation”). Additionally, at no time
between the 1991 amendment and the repeal of RSA 651-A:6, II in 2008 did
the legislature intervene to correct the APB’s interpretation and the apparent
resulting APB practice of paroling an inmate serving multiple sentences only
after such an inmate served all of his minimum terms.
Finally, it is clear from the language of HB 771, as originally introduced,
that it could not have referred to parole eligibility. HB 771 sought to amend
RSA 651-A:6, II to read: “the provisions of this section shall be computed from
the . . . total of the maximums of said sentences.” House Bill 771. Such a
calculation, if applied to parole eligibility, would have required an inmate to
serve, in prison, the entirety of all of his or her maximum terms; thus, no
inmate serving multiple sentences would ever become eligible for parole.
Although the initial language of HB 771 was not ultimately adopted, it confirms
that the legislature’s focus in amending RSA 651-A:6, II was on the duration of
parole, not parole eligibility. Accordingly, we conclude that when the
legislature amended RSA 651-A:6, II in 1991, it intended the paragraph to set
forth the calculation of the duration of parole once an inmate serving
concurrent or consecutive sentences is released from prison, not the
calculation of such an inmate’s minimum parole eligibility date.
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The petitioner argues that legislative history extending back to 1909
supports his contention that RSA 651-A:6, II set forth the calculation of his
minimum parole eligibility date. However, legislative intent is not stagnant.
Rather, an individual amendment to a statute may have “its own history and,
potentially, its own intent, which may or may not be the same as the intent
behind earlier amendments.” Doe v. State of N.H., 167 N.H. 382, 399 (2015).
We conclude, therefore, that the legislative history that directly relates to the
1991 amendment, as reviewed above, is more indicative of the legislature’s
intent. Moreover, to the extent that the petitioner relies upon subsequent
legislative history to support his contention, we have reviewed it and are not
persuaded that it supports his position.
The petitioner also maintains that the rule of lenity should apply in favor
of his interpretation of RSA 651-A:6, II. The “rule of lenity serves as a guide for
interpreting criminal statutes where the legislature failed to articulate its intent
unambiguously.” State v. Dansereau, 157 N.H. 596, 602 (2008) (quotation
omitted). “This rule of statutory construction generally holds that ambiguity in
a criminal statute should be resolved against an interpretation which would
increase the penalties or punishments imposed on a defendant.” Id. (quotation
omitted). The rule, however, “is not to be applied lightly: it applies only if, after
seizing everything from which aid can be derived, the court can make no more
than a guess as to what the legislature intended.” State v. Ravell, 155 N.H.
280, 287 (2007) (Duggan, J., dissenting) (quotation and brackets omitted).
Having concluded that the pertinent legislative history establishes that the
legislature intended RSA 651-A:6, II to set forth the calculation of the duration
of parole upon release from prison, not the calculation of the minimum parole
eligibility date for an inmate serving multiple sentences, we decline to apply the
rule of lenity.
We are similarly not persuaded by the petitioner’s contention that cases
from the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
construing RSA 651-A:6, II should influence our interpretation of the
paragraph. We are the final arbiters in matters of statutory interpretation of
State law. See Gilley, 168 N.H. at 189.
IV. Parole to a Consecutive Sentence
The petitioner next argues that the trial court erred in failing to address
his contention that the APB impermissibly paroled him to consecutive
sentences. He also contends that the APB does not have the authority to
parole an inmate to a consecutive sentence because: (1) parole means release
from prison; (2) the administrative rules governing parole do not authorize
parole to a consecutive sentence and, thus, the practice violates the
Administrative Procedures Act, see RSA ch. 541-A (2007 & Supp. 2015); (3)
parole to a consecutive sentence violates due process; and (4) the APB’s
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longstanding practice of paroling an inmate serving consecutive sentences from
one sentence to another is irrelevant because it is contrary to established law.
Whether the trial court failed to address this issue is immaterial because
we have decided that, as a matter of law, the APB has the authority to parole
an inmate to a consecutive sentence. See Petition of Warden (State v. Roberts),
168 N.H. 9, 15-17 (2015). In Petition of Warden, we stated:
Although no provision of RSA chapter 651-A or the administrative
rules governing parole specifically authorizes the APB to grant
parole to a consecutive sentence, neither do the statutes or the
rules prohibit it from doing so; and, given the APB’s longstanding
history of exercising this power, we agree with the State that the
legitimacy of this practice is now beyond question.
Id. at 15. Thus, we conclude that the APB permissibly paroled the petitioner to
consecutive sentences.
The petitioner also argues that the effect of paroling him to consecutive
sentences was to impermissibly lengthen his aggregate minimum and
maximum terms of incarceration. The petitioner misconceives the function of
paroling to consecutive sentences. The practice allows an inmate “to serve time
on a consecutive sentence while continuing to serve time on the initial
sentence, and thus potentially earn conditional release into the community
more quickly.” Id. It consolidates “the unexpired portion of both an initial
sentence and a consecutive sentence.” Id. at 16. Thus, the practice of paroling
an inmate to a consecutive sentence benefits an inmate and, in fact, benefitted
the petitioner here. Accordingly, we reject this claim of error.
V. Consecutive Sentences
The petitioner also argues that the sentencing court did not have the
authority to sentence him to consecutive sentences. He asserts that: (1) the
repeal of RSA 651:3, III did not revive the court’s common law authority to
impose consecutive sentences; (2) the legislative history concerning the repeal
of RSA 651:3, III is devoid of any reference to a common law authority to
impose consecutive sentences; (3) if the legislature intended to permit
consecutive sentences it would have done so expressly; (4) even if the
legislature has authorized the imposition of a consecutive sentence for certain
crimes, it has not authorized the imposition of multiple consecutive sentences
generally; and (5) imposition of consecutive sentences in this case violated the
due process requirement of “fair warning,” the due process prohibition against
vague statutes, the doctrine of separation of powers, and double jeopardy. The
respondents contend that the petitioner’s arguments are not preserved, but
even if they are, they are contrary to our case law. We assume, without
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deciding, that the petitioner has preserved these arguments for our review, but
we agree with the respondents that they are unavailing.
In Duquette, we concluded that the repeal of RSA 651:3, III revived the
court’s common law authority to impose consecutive sentences and that the
court’s imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate the notice
requirements of the Due Process Clauses of the State and Federal
Constitutions or the doctrine of separation of powers. Duquette, 154 N.H. at
744-47. Accordingly, we conclude that the sentencing court here had common
law authority to sentence the petitioner to consecutive sentences and, in doing
so, violated neither the due process concerns the petitioner describes nor the
doctrine of separation of powers. To the extent that the petitioner is asking us
to overrule Duquette or arguing that Duquette was wrongly decided, he has not
briefed the stare decisis factors. See State v. Smith, 166 N.H. 40, 44 (2014)
(setting forth stare decisis factors). Having failed to brief those factors, the
petitioner has not persuaded us that Duquette must be overruled or was
wrongly decided. See id. at 45.
With regard to the petitioner’s assertion that the imposition of
consecutive sentences violated his right to be protected against double
jeopardy, he has not sufficiently developed this argument for our review. As we
have repeatedly stated, “judicial review is not warranted for complaints
regarding adverse rulings without developed legal argument, and neither
passing reference to constitutional claims nor off-hand invocations of
constitutional rights without support by legal argument or authority warrants
extended consideration.” State v. Durgin, 165 N.H. 725, 731 (2013) (quotation
and brackets omitted).
VI. Findings and Rulings Pursuant to RSA 491:15
The petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in failing to set
forth its findings and rulings in its order on the respondents’ request for
dismissal as he requested in his motion for a ruling pursuant to RSA 491:15
(2010). We assume, without deciding, that RSA 491:15 applies in this case,
but we nonetheless disagree with the petitioner that the trial court erred.
RSA 491:15 provides: “The court . . . shall, if either party requests it, give
[its] decision in writing, stating the facts found and [its] rulings of law, which
shall be filed and recorded.”
In interpreting RSA 491:15, we have held that although a superior
court justice sitting without a jury is generally under no obligation
to make findings and rulings in support of a decree unless a party
asks for them, when either party does request them, RSA 491:15
requires a statement of facts and legal rulings in jury-waived and
non-jury cases.
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Birch Broad. v. Capitol Broad. Corp., 161 N.H. 192, 200-01 (2010). “The trial
judge in such a case need not respond to every request filed by a party, but the
court is obligated to make findings of the basic or essential facts that are
sufficient to support the ultimate decision.” Id. at 201. “This may be done in
the narrative form, and the essential rulings of law may be likewise explained.”
Id. “The object is to allow an opportunity for adequate review in this court by
providing us with the actual basis for the trial court’s decision, in terms of facts
found and law applied.” Id.Here, in its order dismissing the petitioner’s writ, the trial court provided
the procedural history, relevant facts, standard of review, arguments, relevant
law, and its analysis and rulings. Likewise, the court’s order on the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration set forth the basis for its denial. Upon review of
both narrative orders, we conclude that the trial court did not fail to provide an
adequate basis for appellate review and, therefore, the orders are sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of RSA 491:15.
VII. Evidentiary Hearing
Finally, the petitioner argues that the trial court erred in not providing
him an evidentiary hearing to further develop his arguments. We review the
superior court’s decision not to hold a hearing for an unsustainable exercise of
discretion. See Provencher v. Buzzell-Plourde Assoc., 142 N.H. 848, 851 (1998)
(noting that we review trial court’s “decision not to hold a hearing for an abuse
of discretion”); see also State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining
that we refer to abuse of discretion standard as the unsustainable exercise of
discretion standard).
Superior Court Civil Rule 13 provides, in pertinent part:
Unless a party requests oral argument or an evidentiary hearing on
any motion filed by the party, or on any objection thereto by
another party, setting forth by memorandum, brief statement or
written offer of proof the reasons why the oral argument or
evidentiary hearing will further assist the court in determining the
pending issue(s), no oral argument or evidentiary hearing will be
scheduled and the court may act on the motion on the basis of the
pleadings and record before it.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 13(b). The rule requires a party who requests an evidentiary
hearing to set forth the reasons why a hearing will further assist the court in
determining whether to grant a particular motion. See Provencher, 142 N.H. at
852 (analyzing former Superior Court Rule 58, which contained nearly identical
language to Superior Court Civil Rule 13(b)). As we explained in addressing
former Superior Court Rule 58, “the superior court has discretion to deny a
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requested oral argument or evidentiary hearing if the proffered reasons for
holding such a hearing are insufficient.” Id. (quotation and ellipsis omitted).
Here, the petitioner did not meet the requirements of Superior Court Civil
Rule 13(b). The petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing to present
witnesses, but failed to set forth any reasons as to why the hearing would
assist the court in addressing the motion to dismiss. He failed to submit any
memorandum, brief statement, or offer of proof to demonstrate what facts or
additional information he would present at the hearing if he was given the
opportunity. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not
unsustainably exercise its discretion when it did not conduct an evidentiary
hearing in this matter.
Affirmed.
DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ.,
concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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