In the Matter of Alan Perewitz and Suzanne Perewitz ( 2024 )

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2023-0042, In the Matter of Alan Perewitz and
Suzanne Perewitz, the court on June 17, 2024, issued the
following order:
The petitioner’s motion to strike the respondent’s untimely reply brief is
granted. The petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees is denied. The court has
reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has
determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The
respondent, Suzanne Perewitz, appeals the final decree of the Circuit Court
(Countway, J.), in her divorce from the petitioner, Alan Perewitz. She raises
thirteen issues on appeal. We affirm.
At the outset, we note that the respondent makes numerous factual
assertions in her brief without providing any citations to the record to support
her allegations or to show that she raised her issues in the trial court. See
Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004) (noting that parties
may not have judicial review of matters not raised in the trial court); see also
Sup. Ct. R. 16(3)(b) (“After each statement of a question presented, counsel
shall make specific reference to the volume and page of the transcript where
the issue was raised and where an objection was made, or to the pleading
which raised the issue.”). Moreover, the respondent does not provide developed
legal arguments, with authorities, to support her claims of error. See State v.
Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003) (“[I]n the realm of appellate review, a mere
laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without
developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.”) (quotation
omitted); see also Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 499 (1988) (observing that
“off-hand invocations” of constitutional rights supported by neither argument
nor authority warrant no extended consideration).
Notwithstanding these briefing deficiencies, we note that the respondent
raises several issues regarding the trial court’s management of the proceedings.
The trial court has broad discretion in managing the proceedings before it. In
the Matter of Conner & Conner, 156 N.H. 250, 252 (2007). We review a trial
court’s rulings in this area under an unsustainable exercise of discretion
standard. Id. To establish that the court erred under this standard, the
respondent must demonstrate that the court’s rulings were clearly untenable
or unreasonable to the prejudice of her case. Id. The record shows that the
trial court denied the respondent’s motion to continue the final hearing. In its
final order, the court noted that the respondent did not provide a signed
financial affidavit until the date of the final hearing, and that the petitioner
sought a decree pro confesso and a default against her for failing to comply
with Rule 1.25-A disclosures and for failing to provide discovery responses.
The trial court declined to resolve the matter based on a default; however, the
court barred the respondent from submitting exhibits that were not exchanged
or provided to the petitioner in discovery. We conclude that the respondent
has failed to demonstrate that these rulings, or any other court rulings
complained of, were clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of her
case.
The respondent also argues that the trial court erred in its rulings
regarding the division of the marital estate, including marital debts. The trial
court awarded the petitioner the real estate in New Hampshire, which it valued
at $222,757, and which is encumbered by a mortgage of $40,968.77. The
court awarded the respondent the real estate in South Carolina, which it
valued at $225,625. The court awarded the petitioner personal property valued
at $22,300. The court awarded the respondent personal property valued at
$51,900. To equalize these disparities, the court awarded the petitioner all of
his worker’s compensation award. The court divided the parties’ marital debts.
The respondent’s arguments regarding the alleged inequities in the
property division are based primarily upon challenges to the trial court’s
factual findings. On appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence to determine
whether we would have found differently. In the Matter of Conant & Faller,
167 N.H. 577, 582 (2015). The trial court noted in its order that it found the
petitioner’s testimony to be credible, and the respondent’s testimony not to be
credible, regarding numerous issues in dispute. Conflicts in the testimony,
questions about the credibility of witnesses, and the weight assigned to
testimony are matters for the trial court to resolve. In the Matter of Kurowski
& Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011). Moreover, we afford trial courts broad
discretion in dividing the marital estate in a final divorce decree. In the Matter
of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N.H. 275, 285 (2006). We will not overturn the
trial court’s decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id. Based
upon this record, we cannot conclude that the court unsustainably exercised
its discretion in its rulings regarding the division of the marital estate. See In
the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327 (2007).
Finally, the respondent argues that the trial court erred in denying her
request for alimony. The trial court is afforded broad discretion in awarding
alimony. In the Matter of Nassar & Nassar, 156 N.H. 769, 772 (2008). We will
not overturn its decision unless it is lacking in evidentiary support or legally
erroneous. Id. The trial court found that the respondent failed to demonstrate
that she lacks sufficient income, property, or both to provide for her own
reasonable needs without an award of alimony, and that the petitioner
established that he will be unable to meet both his own reasonable needs and
provide alimony payments to the wife. See RSA 458:19-a, I (Supp. 2023).
These findings are supported by the record. Moreover, the court found that the
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petitioner testified credibly that he has no ability to pay alimony. Based upon
this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its
discretion in denying the respondent’s request for alimony.
Affirmed.
MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.
Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk
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