Appeal of Robert W. Barry ( 2024 )


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  •                    THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    SUPREME COURT
    In Case No. 2022-0581, Appeal of Robert W. Barry, the
    court on February 29, 2024, issued the following order:
    The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
    on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
    Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The petitioner, Robert W. Barry, challenges a decision of the
    New Hampshire Real Estate Commission denying his request for a finding that
    he has “equivalent experience” regarding two of the qualifications for licensure
    as a real estate broker. See RSA 331-A:10, II(c)(3), (g) (2017).
    By order of November 29, 2022, we accepted the appeal “for the limited
    purpose of determining whether this court has jurisdiction,” and ordered the
    parties to address the impact of RSA 331-A:28, III (2007) (repealed 2023), on
    our jurisdiction. After the parties briefed the jurisdictional issue, the
    legislature repealed RSA 331-A:28 effective September 1, 2023, see Laws 2023,
    79:336, XV, and implemented a new administrative appeal process relative to
    the commission’s licensure decisions. See RSA 310:2, II(yy), :14 (Supp. 2023).
    Accordingly, we ordered the parties to file supplemental memoranda addressing
    the impact of these legislative changes.
    RSA 331-A:10, II sets forth the qualifications for licensure as a real
    estate broker. The statute provides that the commission shall issue a broker’s
    license to any applicant who, among other things, has met certain employment
    and experience criteria, or proves to the commission that the applicant has
    equivalent experience. See RSA 331-A:10, II(c), (g). An applicant claiming to
    have equivalent experience may, but is not required to, submit an “equivalency
    packet,” detailing the experience claimed to be equivalent prior to applying for
    licensure. According to the commission, this “is an informal process that
    applicants may follow in advance of applying for a license.”
    On March 31, 2022, the petitioner filed an equivalency packet with the
    commission, in which he requested a finding that he has the experience
    equivalent to that required by RSA 331-A:10, II(c) and (g). On May 20, 2022,
    the commission denied the request. On June 14, 2022, the petitioner
    submitted a second equivalency packet, with additional supporting
    documentation. On July 18, 2022, the commission again denied his request
    for a finding of equivalency, this time noting that the petitioner is not
    prohibited from seeking licensure “other than by equivalent experience.” On
    October 19, 2022, the commission denied the petitioner’s motion for
    reconsideration, again stating that he may apply for a license by any method
    other than equivalency. The petitioner has not yet applied for a license.
    The parties agree that the administrative appeal processes set forth in
    RSA 310:14 and the now-repealed RSA 331-A:28, III, do not apply to this
    appeal because they are limited to the denial of a license application or
    discipline imposed by the commission, circumstances not present here. The
    petitioner contends that this court nevertheless has jurisdiction over the appeal
    under RSA 541:6 (2021) because he filed his appeal within 30 days of the
    commission’s order on his request for rehearing. However, RSA 541:2 (2021)
    provides that appeals from administrative agencies may be taken under RSA
    chapter 541 only when authorized by law. Petition of Whitman Operating Co.,
    
    174 N.H. 453
    , 457 (2021); RSA 541:2 (2021). The petitioner has not identified
    any statute authorizing an appeal under RSA chapter 541 when the
    commission denies a preliminary request for a finding of equivalency.
    Nevertheless, the commission concedes that, by precluding the petitioner
    from applying for a license on the basis of “equivalent experience,” the issue of
    whether his experience is “equivalent” for purposes of the licensure
    requirements has become essentially unreviewable, except by writ of certiorari.
    We consider the petitioner’s appeal as a Rule 11 petition for certiorari and
    conclude that we have jurisdiction to the limited extent that he challenges the
    commission’s decision to preclude him from applying for a broker’s license
    based on his claim of “equivalent experience.”
    “Our review of an administrative body’s decision on a petition for writ of
    certiorari entails examining whether the administrative body acted illegally with
    respect to jurisdiction, authority or observance of the law or has unsustainably
    exercised its discretion or acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or capriciously.”
    Petition of Whitman Operating Co., 
    174 N.H. 453
    , 459 (2021) (quotation
    omitted). We agree with the commission’s position on appeal that, by stating
    that the petitioner may only satisfy the licensing requirements “other than by
    equivalent experience,” it erroneously limited the grounds on which he may
    apply for a license. We reverse its decision to the extent that it precluded the
    petitioner from applying for a license based on his claim of “equivalent
    experience.”
    The petitioner invites us to address the standards by which the
    commission determines equivalency in order to provide the commission with
    “guidance.” The commission counters that, because the petitioner has not yet
    applied for a license, and has not been afforded a full adjudicatory hearing on
    his claims of “equivalent experience,” we should decline to address these
    issues. We note that the petitioner may litigate his issues through an
    application for a broker’s license and, if necessary, an appeal of the denial of
    his application. See RSA 310:14, III. Accordingly, we decline to address these
    issues as part of this appeal. See Petition of Whitman Operating Co., 
    174 N.H.
                                     2
    at 458 (noting that certiorari review “is an extraordinary remedy, usually
    available only in the absence of a right to appeal, and only at the discretion of
    the court”).
    Reversed.
    MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett, Hantz Marconi, Donovan, and Countway,
    JJ., concurred.
    Timothy A. Gudas,
    Clerk
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-0581

Filed Date: 2/29/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/12/2024